Links |
|
Links |
|||
|
Orgl Env | ||||
|
Orgs' Control of Their Envs | ||||
|
The Orgl Env & the Development of Orgs | ||||
|
Tech & Dec Mking in Orgs | ||||
|
Legal Conditions as an Orgl Env | ||||
|
Political Conditons as an Orgl Env | ||||
|
Economic Conditions as an Orgl Env | ||||
|
Demographic Conditions as an Orgl Env | ||||
|
Ecological Conditions as an Orgl Env | ||||
|
Cultural Conditions as an Orgl Env | ||||
|
Analytical Dimensions of the Orgl Env | ||||
|
Orgl Boundaries | ||||
|
Orgl Perception of the Orgl Env | ||||
|
The Impact of the Orgl Env on the Org | ||||
|
TVA & Cooptation of the Env | ||||
|
Interorganizational Relationships | ||||
|
Networks | ||||
|
Network Theory | ||||
|
Granovetter on the Strength of Weak Ties | ||||
|
Mizruchi on Organizational Cohesion | ||||
|
Burt's Structural Theory of Action | ||||
|
Reasons for IORs | ||||
|
Resource Flows in IORs | ||||
|
Transaction Forms in IORs | ||||
|
Interlocking Directorates | ||||
|
IOR Outcomes |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
ORG ENVS INCLUDE ALL ASPECTS WHICH ARE EXT TO THE ORG & POTENTIALLY OR ACTUALLY INFLUENCE THE ORG | |||||
For Perrow, the org env is all the phenomena that are ext to & that potentially or actually influence the org |
|
||||
Perrow notes that in most cases we look primarily at how the env affects the org |
|
||||
While it is true that envs shape orgs, it is also true that orgs influence their env |
|
||||
ORGS ADAPT TO THEIR ENV (IE SOCIETY), & THEY SHAPE THEIR ENV |
|
||||
Researchers often fail to see that society adapts to orgs |
|
||||
The view that orgs shape society directs us to the study of powerful orgs & to public data on orgl power gathered by the govt |
|
||||
The institutional school & most org theory (esp mgt/bus theory) does not link orgl influence to the structure of society |
|
||||
The instit school sees orgs as adapting to env & their internal power brokers, but does not see society as adapting to orgs |
|
||||
In relation to orgs' control of their env, orgs define, create, influence, & shape their env |
|
||||
For Perrow, to see orgs as adaptive to a turbulent, dynamic env is to indulge in fantasy |
|
||||
The env of most powerful orgs is well controlled by them, quite stable, & made of other orgs with similar interests |
|
||||
Why is the logic of the relationship between orgs and their env turned around? |
|
||||
One reason is the heritage of the functionalist perspective |
|
||||
The peaceful tribe who fought off a warring tribe then found that they had warriors who needed to make war to win honor & thus they made war, shaped their env, to meet their needs, to win honor |
|
||||
For Schumpeter, those w/ power make sure that their skills are imp for the community by shaping the community to accept/need those skills | |||||
Morris Janowitz’s view of the military fits Perrow's view of orgs shaping their env in that he sees the military shaping the intl political env to create the demand for defense expenditures | |||||
GM too shapes it env | |||||
COMBINING THE ASPECTS OF PERROW'S UNDERSTANDING ORGL CONTROL OF THEIR ENV & WEBER'S UNDERSTANDING OF GOAL DISPLACEMENT GIVES THE IMAGE OF ORGS WHICH FORM STRAT & STRUC TO EXPLOIT /SHAPE ANY ENV & GOAL AVAILABLE TO THEM | |||||
There are more reasons to question the goal displacement effect in that is is not an aberration but an orgl characteristic that env try to develop |
|
||||
The trend in goal displacement is that some orgs, such as GM & the AMA, understand & embrace it while others do not, e.g. the military |
|
||||
|
Contenders for top leadership positions in our large vol & econ orgs are those who share dominant perspectives of our elates |
|
|||
It is from muckrakers, sociologists, etc. that we learn about the ways in which orgs. shape our env, not from the org specialists | |||||
Earlier Perrow argued we have more to fear more orgs. than their negative effects upon spontaneity and self realization | |||||
Perrow argues that we have more to fear than goal displacement | |||||
For Perrow, what we have to fear is orgs controlling their envs | |||||
Perrow embraces the 'tool of the powerful view' which is a neo Weberian view where orgl structure is accompanied by the insights of the institutional school | |||||
For Perrow, the expose’ tradition examines the dangers arising from the orgl search for stability & growth & their resistance to character restructuring | |||||
|
THE ORG SCHOOL'S VIEW OF THE ORG ENV IS THAT ORGS:
1. ARE NOT SIMPLY RAT ORGS THAT OPERATE IN THEIR ENV AFTER RAT GOALS 2. DEVELOP THEIR OWN INNER LOGIC 3. ARE SHAPED BY THE ENV, & THEY SHAPE THEIR ENV 4. ARE THE TOOLS OF THEIR MASTERS |
||||
The contributions of the Institutional School to the Orgl School view that orgs shape their env is that: | |||||
First, there are a variety of orgs that the technical school has not grasped | |||||
While the tech school of orgs largely holds that orgs are rational actors who pursue rational goals, some orgs operate on other sets of rules | |||||
Second, the neo Weberians must realize that orgs do develop their own inner logic that is not the result of those who control them | |||||
For Weber, modern orgs develop the bureaucratic structure which often dictates the strategy, which has survival, expansion, control, etc as primary goals; ie not simply rat goals | |||||
The neo Weberians must realize that those who control orgs come to accept their own inner logic & are not controlled by the env | |||||
Third, the acceptance of the env as a shaper of orgs & as shaped by orgs | |||||
Modern orgs are large & powerful, larger than many nation states, & thus they have the power to shape their very env | |||||
Lastly, orgs are tools in the hands of their masters | |||||
The masters of orgs have an agenda, & are shaped by the env & the org |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
ORGS HAVE EVOLVED OVER TIME & LIKE BIO EVOL, ORGS EVOL IN RESPONSE TO ENVL FACTORS | |||||
Stinchcombe (1965) posits that particular envl conditions are necessary for the emergence of orgs as new forms of social interaction |
|
||||
For Stinchcombe, special purpose orgs take over various social functions as in the past when the military became a separate branch |
|
||||
Orgs evolve at different rates in different societies, replacing or supplementing multipurpose grps such as the family or the community |
|
||||
For orgs to evolve, people must have an awareness of the various orgl alternatives available to them & thus resources such as education, urbanization, wealth, political stability, orgl density, & sufficient tech are advantageous |
|
||||
The conditions which allow new org structures to evolve have not been randomly distributed throughout history because the resources necessary for that evolution are valuable, thus those w/ power try to control them, & thus org dev |
|
||||
The env at the time of an org's formation is critical for the form that the org takes | |||||
Because orgs are constantly changing, to a certain extent, they are 'new' everyday, & thus the env at any given time impacts the org's structure | |||||
The orgl & envl relationship is dynamic & codeterminative | |||||
ENV CONDITIONS WHICH ALLOW ORGL EVOL INCLUDE ED, URBANIZATION, WEALTH, POL STABILITY, ORGL DENSITY, & TECH | |||||
According to Stinchcombe, the basic envl conditions which allow new orgs to dev include education, urbanization, wealth, political stability, orgl density, & sufficient tech |
|
||||
a. Education is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because it increases the staying power of new orgs, it makes people aware of the alternative orgl possibilities, it encourages impersonality & merit achievement, it provides for the recording of transactions, & it makes info available to orgs thereby increasing predictability |
|
||||
b. Urbanization is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because it makes a greater heterogeneity of lifestyles acceptable |
|
||||
In relation to the dev or orgs, urbanization requires dealing w/ strangers, thus reducing the influence of ascriptive status & increasing the influence of achieved status |
|
||||
Impersonal rules are required in urban areas just as they are in orgs |
|
||||
c. A money econ is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because it facilitates the formation of free mkts |
|
||||
Money simplifies the calculation of advantages & disadvantages of the alt ways of doing this, allowing for new orgs to dev to exploit advantages |
|
||||
d. Orgl density is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because w/ greater density more people will be experienced in orgs & have ideas for new dev |
|
||||
For Stinchcombe, the concept of orgl density denotes that orgs often produces an exponential growth curve |
|
||||
e. Technology is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because to a certain extent tech itself offers limits & opportunities for orgl dev | |||||
When reviewing the hist or orgl dev, patterns emerge whereby orgs have become ever more complex, large, influential, & networked |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
TECH IS UNIQUE IN DEC MKING BECAUSE IT IS HUMAN CREATED, CAN BE TRANSFORMATIVE, OFTEN NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, & MAY CONTAIN UNKNOWN BENEFITS / COSTS | |||||
Technology is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because to a certain extent tech itself offers limits & opportunities for orgl dev |
|
||||
Orgs operating in an uncertain & dynamic techl env have different structures from those in techly stable envs |
|
||||
To deal w/ orgl uncertainly, orgs often estb separate divisions including R & D, indl engineering, mgt info systems |
|
||||
Tech is usually something external to an org, i.e. a resource, opportunity, threat, etc. that exists in the orgl env, but some tech orgs have tech as an internal factor over which they have greater control |
|
||||
Because tech & new ideas are part of the env, & since the sciences have norms of distribution, knowledge & scientific developments take a particular course to become useful to an org |
|
||||
Tech also exists in the managerial & administrative sciences in the form of the social sciences |
|
||||
Because orgs do not respond to tech through simple absorption, the control & dissemination of knowledge is a political process operating both in the env as well as in the org |
|
||||
Orgs have forces for stability & change & thus have their own internal "radical" & "reactionary" responses to tech, knowledge, etc. |
|
||||
In relation to the interorganizational relationships of orgs (IORs), orgs in highly complex techl envs are known to each other & can rank each other's performance |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
- Project: Changing the Legal Env |
|
||||
LEGAL CONDITIONS ARE PART OF AN ORG'S ENV, THOUGH SOME ORGS DO OPERATE OUTSIDE OF THE LAW |
|
||||
Many voluntary orgs have many less legal constraints as compared to businesses |
|
||||
Most orgs live w/in an env w/ fed, state, & local laws & regs, as well as some intl laws & regs |
|
||||
To deal w/ the legal env, many orgs have staffs of legal & other experts |
|
||||
Major shifts in the legal env have occurred as a result of major soc mvmts in the west, including the labor mvmt, the civil rights mvmt, the env mvmt, the women's mvmt, & more |
|
||||
The major shifts in the legal env caused by soc mvmt have been integrated into civil society & the env of orgs through legislative, judicial, & executive laws, decisions, & orders |
|
||||
Orgs are not benign recipients of their legal env, just as they are not benign recipients in relation to any envl factor; orgs attempt to shape their legal env, just as they attempt to shape their general env |
|
||||
SIGNIFICANT LEGAL SECTORS OF MANY ORG'S ENV INCLUDE LABOR, ENVL, CIVIL RIGHTS, FINANCIAL, CORP, ET AL LAWS & REGS | |||||
|
Orgs are important actors in the dev of laws & regs through their lobbying efforts |
|
|||
Legal mandates are an imp basis for encouraging or hindering interorganizational relations (IORs) | |||||
Labor laws & regs are a significant part of many org's legal env | |||||
See Also: Labor Law | |||||
Envl laws & regs are a significant part of many org's legal env | |||||
See Also: Env law | |||||
Civil rights laws & regs are a significant part of many org's legal env | |||||
|
See Also: Hist of Race | ||||
Financial & corp laws & regs are a significant part of many org's legal env |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
Laws are passed as a result of pressure from the env; therefore as orgs respond to laws, they are responding to their env |
|
||||
Police depts, schools, land mgt agencies, & many other orgs have been buffeted by the politics of their respective envs which come to affect them through laws, admin decisions, changes in public pressure, customer opinions, etc. |
|
||||
Orgs in the public sector experience the greatest political pressure in that lead fed, state, & local agencies often experience a change in upper admin whenever there is a change in elected officials |
|
||||
Orgs in the public sector may be directed to implement one strategic plan for one admin, & be directed to totally change it w/ the next admin |
|
||||
An example of inconsistent direction for fed agencies can be seen in the Roadless Area Conservation Plan as implemented by the Clinton Admin which was subsequently reversed by the Bush Jr Admin |
|
||||
While orgs in the private sector are less susceptible to political pressure, they still react strongly to any political pressure |
|
||||
Orgs react to pol press in their env by lobbying |
|
||||
Because of lobbying, the business policies of states have had major implications for the dev of trans, fossil fuels, & other bus activities |
|
||||
See Also: Lobbying | |||||
Regulatory agencies such as OSHA, the USFS, the INS, the FDA, & many others experience a constant high level of political pressure as a result of other orgs in their env lobbying govt leaders to pass legislation or install new leaders to control the reg agencies |
|
||||
The most extreme form of political envl shock is a political revolution which Meyer, 1982, calls an envl jolt |
|
||||
As a result of a pol rev, the changed political system has ramifications for almost all orgs in that society, even cultural & voluntary orgs |
|
||||
Note that not all rev actually change anything more than the party in power, & thus under these revolutionary conditions, orgs may not experience much of a change |
|
||||
During the Cold War, many revs were significant in the cases of Cuba & Argentina |
|
||||
During the Cold War in Cuba, they totally remade the society, & thus the orgl climate as the system transitioned from capitalism to socialism | |||||
During the Cold War in Argentina, they totally remade the society, & thus the orgl climate as the system transitioned from socialism to capitalism |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
To most orgs, esp business leaders, the state of the econ is a crucial variable in starting up & operating an on-going enterprise |
|
||||
The nature & stability of the mkt system itself is important for orgs; in general business leaders would rather have weak econ conditions rather than uncertain econ conditions |
|
||||
Econ conditions do not affect all orgs equally in that different sectors of the econ experience their own cycles of bust & boom |
|
||||
Govt agencies do not necessarily experience a downturn when the econ goes down, rather they are subject to the cost cutting & tax cutting trends of the govt |
|
||||
Econ conditions are likely to make the priorities of the org more clear in that the less important or powerful depts will be the first to be cut |
|
||||
Because orgs are not & cannot be totally rational, they often cut depts in an inefficient manner |
|
||||
Competition is one of the most salient aspect of the econ env affecting org because it creates 'winners & losers' thus separating successful & unsuccessful orgs |
|
||||
Even corp philanthropy is affected by the econ env because it is often used as advertising & to win the loyalty of consumers |
|
||||
Public sector firms also experience their own type of competition as, for example, in education, all the colleges, secondary, & elementary schools often compete in state legislatures for money through their administrators who act as lobbyists |
|
Links |
|
Links |
|||
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECT ORGS BOTH IN HOW THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION AFFECT THE MEMBERSHIP BUT ALSO HOW THEIR ATTITUDES & BEHAVIORS IMPACT THE ECON & POL CLIMATE & OTHER ENVL FACTORS | |||||
Demographics is the study of the people where in demo means 'people' & graphic means 'study of' | |||||
In practice, as a discipline, demographics is the scientific study of populations | |||||
Orgs can generally predict its mkt from census data, but population shifts, such as those resulting from migration, are less predictable |
|
||||
Race, religion, ethnicity, & other characteristics of the general pop can change faster than the pop in general |
|
||||
One recent demographic change which has affected orgs is the growing & economically declining central cities |
|
||||
One recent demographic change which has affected orgs is the mvmt of significant numbers of people from the 'rust belt,' i.e. the northeast and the eastern midwest states to the southwest 'sunbelt' |
|
||||
Demographic changes affect not only consumption factors for orgs, but also supply factors |
|
||||
A demographic supply factor that affects orgs is the labor mkt |
|
Links |
|
Links |
|||
Ecological conditions for orgs or any social grp can be divided into social ecology & physical ecology |
|
||||
Social ecology includes the number, types, varieties of social actors in the env |
|
||||
Physical ecology is the physical env conditions such as weather, geography, etc. |
|
||||
Both social & physical ecology impact orgs |
|
||||
Orgs in urban areas are likely to have contact w/ many other orgs & social actors while those in rural areas are less likely to have such contact |
|
||||
Orgs often choose particular social ecological niches such as a hi tech zone or a tourist destination | |||||
Many lobbyist firms or professional associations choose the centers of political & econ power such as Washington DC or NYC | |||||
In relation to the physical env, some orgs deal directly w/ the env, such as extractive industries, or those that regulate social actors in a particular env, such as the USFS, while other orgs seem to operate almost independently of the env, i.e. a hi tech firm |
|
||||
The physical env can affect all orgs when an envl crisis such as when a flood or storm occurs |
|
||||
Geographical Proximity | |||||
Geo prox is the spatial distance btwn orgs or their subunits & this distance may facilitate or inhibit interactions | |||||
It is more difficult for orgs to maintain & estb interorganizational relationships the greater the distance | |||||
The type of org involved in the IOR interacts w/ the spatial issue because mod communication techniques permit better communication & thus those types of orgs w/o this tech will have more difficulties w/ long distances IORs | |||||
The coordination of activities w/ other orgs in IORs is easier if the orgs are physically close | |||||
Proximity promotes the familiarity of domains | |||||
Familiarity can be seen in public safety orgs, such as police, fire, ems, etc., which share the same building | |||||
Familiarity can be seen in business concentration zones such as Silicone Valley, Hollywood, the Boeing Corridor, etc. |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
Culture may be defined as the shared content of society | |||||
Culture is the shared knowledge, beliefs, values, norms ( K B V N ) & the physical & abstract manifestations of that content | |||||
The FOUR components of culture are knowledge, beliefs, values, norms ( K B V N ) | |||||
Intl culture, natl culture & local culture are not the only cultures affecting orgs because there are innumerable subcultures w/in a region, or that may even function internationally |
|
||||
For org theorists, it is not whether culture overrides other factors in the orgl env, though it seems certain that is some situations, culture is indeed the primary factor |
|
||||
Cultural orgl factors are unique because they will strongly impact every other envl factor |
|
||||
Cul factors are more significant when the env is more turbulent, that is when tech, legal, political, economic, demographic, & ecological factors are in flux |
|
||||
Culture is an imp factor to take into acct when designing orgl structure as well as orgl strategy |
|
||||
For orgs, culture is not a constant even in a single local setting |
|
||||
The media indicates how values can change in regard to a particular org |
|
||||
Culture is an imp factor in determining consumer tastes |
|
||||
Like the orgl env in general, the culture - org relationship is not a one way dynamic in that while culture affects orgs, orgs can also shape culture |
|
||||
Orgs attempt to shape cul values through their public relations efforts |
|
||||
The cultural conditions in an orgl env can support or repress interorganizational relations (IORs) |
|
Links |
|
Links |
|||
ORG BOUNDARIES ARE THE LINES OF DIVISION BTWN ORGS, & BTWN ORGS & THEIR ENV, WHICH ARE NOT ALWAYS CLEAR | |||||
Boundaries distinguish btwn an org & the env | |||||
Nearly every group & org is in a network of some type in that they share resources, goals etc. | |||||
Because orgs are reified, so are boundaries | |||||
|
The reification & nature of orgs & boundaries makes developing typologies difficult | ||||
Different types of orgs have different types of org boundaries & vice versa | |||||
Generally, rational, closed orgs have clear boundaries | |||||
Generally, open systems, networks, adhocracies, NGOs, etc. have less defined boundaries | |||||
Boundaries shift due to forces in the env & to the actions of other orgs | |||||
Some orgs attempt to control their boundaries, access into & out of the org |
Links |
|
Linkso |
|||
Like any actor - env relationship, the manner in which the actor perceives the env is paramount in understanding the org - env relationship |
|
||||
In the case of orgs & orgl envs, the env also perceives the org, & the manner in which the orgl env perceives the env is paramount in understanding the org - env relationship |
|
||||
Orgs perceive the env based on the info that comes into the org from the env & like all info, it is based on communications coming into the org |
|
||||
In addition to the typical commo problems of noise, extraneous info, mis sent commo, misreceived info, etc. orgl commo is subject to the power of gate keepers & boundary spanner, envl scanners, & other orgl actors who garner info from the env |
|
||||
The actions of gate keepers & boundary spanner, envl scanners, & other orgl actors who garner info from the env raise the problem of orgl boundaries in that these orgl actors tend to try to control the boundaries of the org, while other orgl actors may disagree w/ their determination of the location of the orgl boundary |
|
||||
Efficient env orgl scanners select those aspects of the env w/ which it is going to deal in order to avoid becoming overwhelmed w/ envl info |
|
||||
The selection of which aspects of the env to scan is in part shaped by the selection process of other orgs in that if a competitor or similar org is scanning a particular element in the env, then other similar orgs will tend to follow suit |
|
||||
The knowledge of who is scanning whom is exchanged via interorganizational relationships (IORs) |
|
||||
Because orgs limit which aspects of the env to scan, & because they choose which aspects of the env to scan, orgs are in effect constructing their env, or at least their perception of the env |
|
||||
The scope of the domain of the org affects it operation in that narrow domain claims are associated w/ stability, while broad & inconsistent claims are associated w/ loss of functions |
|
||||
The perception of certainty or uncertainty in relation to any of the over 196 orgl envl dimensions adds even more complexity to an env & to the discussion of the perception of the env |
|
||||
While much of the env scanning that occurs is certain, the depth & extent of uncertainty on even one dimension can be organizationally catastrophic |
|
||||
However the perception of uncertainty is fraught w/ difficulties for orgs & individuals & thus the degree of danger from a given uncertainty is even more unknown |
|
||||
The perceptions of individuals & orgs are shaped by their experiences |
|
||||
Starbuck (1976) believes that orgs may be more realistic than individuals in assessing uncertainty because of their constant comparisons w/ & sharing personnel among comparable orgs | |||||
Hall notes that it has not been clearly shown that orgs are more perceptive of uncertainty than are individuals | |||||
For orgs, perceivers of the env are individuals | |||||
AWARENESS | |||||
Orgs operate in a "field" of other orgs & orgs vary in their awareness of the field around them | |||||
Awareness varies simple in the recognition that orgs have of each other as well as by the extent to which the orgs are interdependent w/ each other | |||||
Interorganizational relationships (IORs) do not occur automatically & one factor which affects how often they occur, & how effective they are when the do occur is the awareness that the orgs have of each other | |||||
The greater the awareness orgs have of each other, the more likely it is that they will form IORs | |||||
There is a hierarchy of awareness in the orgl env that runs from no info to a lot of info | |||||
At one end of the hierarchy of awareness is a general awareness of the existence of other orgs & their activities | |||||
Another level of the hierarchy of awareness involves mutual acquaintanceamong the directors of the orgs, or of any actors w/in the org | |||||
Another level of the hierarchy of awareness involves specific interactions & joint board membership among directors | |||||
Orgl awareness is affected by the extent to which boundary spanners in the orgs are knowledgeable about the goals, services, & resources present in other orgs | |||||
The awareness which boundary spanners have of other orgs provides their org w/ alternative sources of services & resources | |||||
Orgl awareness is affected by the number & level of interpersonal ties among orgl personnel | |||||
Orgl interpersonal ties might be "old school" ties, membership in common professional orgs, membership in common religious or fraternal orgs, friendships, or work contacts | |||||
Interpersonal contacts are imp in general for grp cohesion, but are also imp for IORs in times of envl turbulence | |||||
The quality of of ties is imp in IORs in that friendships often yield enhanced collaboration & mitigate competition | |||||
The strength of IORs, the length of time have been in existence, the possibility of alternative IORs, etc. all |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
Orgs vary in their vulnerability to the 196+ orgl envl dimensions, & this vulnerability is shaped by internal features of the org & by the strength of the orgl envl factors |
|
||||
In general, the more dependent the org is on any single envl dimension or grp of dimensions, the more vulnerable it is |
|
||||
The ability of an org to control the key dimensions in the env make it less vulnerable to the env |
|
||||
Competitors & threats in the env make an org more vulnerable |
|
||||
Lack of opportunities & lack of strengths make an org more vulnerable |
|
||||
When an org is vulnerable, it reacts as opposed the acting in the env |
|
||||
Strong envl pressures often result in increased formalization & a general tightening of the org meaning that slack resources are utilized & low priority projects are eliminated |
|
||||
Hall notes that it is odd that envl pressure causes orgs to become more tightly coupled since it is often loosely coupled orgs that are more innovative, but orgs who are innovative face a greater risk of failure when under conditions of envl pressure |
|
||||
While orgs vary in the vulnerability to the env, all orgs are in some manner dependent on the env |
|
||||
Contingency theory suggests that there is no best way to cope w/ envl pressure because the pressure may be the result of almost any combination of the 196+ dimensions of a typical orgl env |
|
||||
There is no single best way to deal w/ envl pressure because of the myriad combinations of envl pressure, because each org has its own unique set of tools to deal w/ env pressure, because each org has its own internal politics which will influence its decision, & because each org has its own unique perception of the problem & its solutions |
|
||||
One major strategy for dealing w/ envl pressure is to attempt to shape the env itself |
|
||||
Orgs more typically try to illegally shape their env when the org is doing well, rather than, as common sense might indicate, when the org is going poorly |
|
||||
It is well known that orgs try to gain & maintain power over env conditions that are of strategic importance to them |
|
||||
Orgl envs are subject to actual, attempted & even unintentional manipulation by the orgs w/in them |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
- Project: Cooptation in Everyday Life |
|
||||
Cooptation is a common method of launching a attack against a soc mvmt | |||||
See Also: Resistance to Soc Mvmts | |||||
Philip Selznick wrote the book TVA and the Grass Roots (1966) which clearly defined the process of orgl cooptation |
|
||||
The TVA Act, 1933, creates a govt agency w/ responsibility for the TN Valley & thus the project is run by neither local, state, nor fed jurisdiction |
|
||||
The TVA had a hierarchy of goals / responsibilities including...
- flood control & navigation - providing electricity - developing nitrate properties, that is, fertilizer |
|
||||
The TVA was to be decentralized in that decisions were to be made at the grass roots level, i.e. local orgs & citizens were to participate in decision making |
|
||||
Cooptation & the TVA |
|
||||
Coopting is the 'Process of absorbing new elements into leadership or policy determining structure of an org as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence' |
|
||||
Cooptation is a two way process where the org itself is changed & it changes it's environment, including other orgs |
|
||||
The org itself, such as is the case w/ the TVA, is affected by the new elements in the orgl env |
|
||||
The TVA was coopted (diverted) from it's major goals of recreation, forestry, & farm oriented goals |
|
||||
But the TVA affected, coopted, the local bodies' & individual's goals in return |
|
||||
Often inclusion of one grp meant the exclusion of another |
|
||||
Cooptation occurred when particular groups, i.e. the ag extension service, the land grant colleges, & the Am Farm Bureau Federation gained power, & the black colleges, the non farm bureaus, & other fed govt farm programs lost power |
|
||||
Cooptation is not cooperation in that these orgs should have all worked together |
|
||||
Orgs are geared to self preservation & one way they do this is by controlling their env, & other orgs are part of the env |
|
||||
The control other orgs in an organizational network is a type of control of the env & thus cooptation is a type of control | |||||
|
Thus an org designed to be a change agent can do that, but often change occurs in unforeseen ways | ||||
The TVA worked w/ some other govt orgs, & worked against many others | |||||
TVA outcomes: | |||||
The farmers who were better off to begin w/ got more aid than before while the farmers who were less well off to begin w/ got less aid | |||||
Recreation areas were given over to private businesses which emphasized profit over preservation | |||||
Forests were logged | |||||
The TVA got cooperation on flood control, electricity generation, fertilizer run-off from formerly reluctant orgs | |||||
Selznick concludes that such an accommodation was the only feasible one: it helped save the major programs | |||||
The TVA was coopted to give up control of aid programs, recreation programs, logging programs & more in exchange for flood control, electricity generation, fertilizer run-off from formerly reluctant orgs |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES COMPRISE A LARGE PART OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENV IN THAT ORGS ARE REGULARLY INTERACTING W/ OTHER ORGS | |||||
The relationships of any single org w/in an env takes place through the actions of other orgs; orgs affect orgs, as well as directly w/ the env |
|
||||
The legal env is experienced through the actions of the govt, & by suits brought by individuals & orgs |
|
||||
The econ env is experienced through competing orgs, orgs that give donations, orgs that sell or provide resources to the org, as well as directly from consumers |
|
||||
Individuals & orgs live in an env of interorganizational relationships (IORs) as seen in welfare clients who are referred to various agencies for the services they need |
|
||||
Students in college are in a web of IORs consisting of the registrar, fin aid, classes, student services, etc. |
|
||||
Welfare clients, students, & anyone acting w/in an IOR can fall btwn the cracks, meaning that somehow they never get the services they need or have a right to |
|
||||
One notable IOR is the military - industrial - Congressional - complex (MICC) which refers to the interorganizational patterns linking the military w/ industry & govt into a powerful set of organizations that can dominate other spheres of life |
|
||||
IORs among powerful orgs through interlocking boards of directors have become the focus of intense scrutiny |
|
||||
Urban theorists recognized urban communities as networks of orgs & individuals |
|
||||
Integrated, i.e. well organized IORs, are more efficient & effective than the loosely coupled IORs |
|
||||
THE FORMS OF IORs ARE DYADIC, INTERORGANIZATIONAL SET, & INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK | |||||
IORs have 3 basic forms which are derived from Merton's work on role sets, including the dyadic IOR, the IO set, & the IO network |
|
||||
a. The Dyadic IOR | |||||
A pair wise or dyadic IOR emphasizes the relationship btwn two orgs |
|
||||
A joint venture is a type of dyadic IOR where two orgs cooperate at a level that is below the actual merging of the orgs | |||||
A joint venture permits the orgs to experience many of the advantages of a merger while avoiding the legal restrictions on mergers | |||||
b. The Interorganizational Set (IO set) | |||||
An interorganizational set emphasizes the relationship btwn a focal agency (FA) and the marginal agencies (MAs) in mostly dyadic relationships, in that the MAs have no or weak relationships among them |
|
||||
The action set is composed of "a group of orgs formed in a temporary alliance for a limited purpose" (Aldrich, 1979) | |||||
Action sets may have their own formalized agreements, internal division of labor, behavioral norms, & clearly defined principles for recruitment | |||||
|
c. The Interorganizational Network (IO network) |
|
|||
An interorganizational network emphasizes the relationships btwn several orgs, all of which are in IORs w/ some or all of the other orgs in the network | |||||
THE TYPES OF IORs HAVE CHARACTERISTICS OF INCLUSIVENESS, EMBEDDEDNESS, CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS, & INTEGRATION |
|
||||
a. Interorganizational networks are more inclusive, consisting of all orgs linked by a specified type of relation | |||||
Networks are the total pattern of interrelationships among a cluster of orgs that are meshed together in a social system to attain collective & self interest goals or to resolve specific problems in a target population | |||||
Networks are the basis of integrative agreements that may transcend factors in decision making | |||||
b. Embeddedness refers to the amount & strength of ties an org or individual has in a network | |||||
As w/ any IOR, one can focus on the nature of the old pre-existing entities, the IOR, or on both, or the orgl env, or on all these components | |||||
|
c. The causal relationship btwn the orgs in a network, the relationships in the network, the network itself, & the network env are dynamic in that given the feedback loops that are possible in any set of causal relationships, any single causal relationship, or set of causal relationships may be primary in a particular situation |
|
|||
Thus for org networks, theorists must look to the characteristics of that network to determine the primary causative agent: an org or orgs, the relationships, the network, the network env, or any combination of them | |||||
d. Integratedness generally fosters more efficient & resilient IORs, but it also makes it more difficult to end an IOR, start new IORs, or adapt |
|
Links |
|
Links |
|||
- Project: Your Network |
|
||||
Network theory is highly psychological but avoids an atomistic micro view which views actors as making decisions in isolation from others | |||||
Network theory counters the atomistic point of view by focusing on the social, networked, context of decision making |
|
||||
Network theory focuses on the personal attributes that exist w/in networks |
|
||||
Network theory counters a normative or prescriptive approach by it's focus on culture, the socialization processes, the internalization of norms & values, and on the consensus of norms & values in society |
|
||||
Network theory focuses on objective pattern of ties linking members of the network including individuals, groups, & organizations |
|
||||
Network theory focuses networks qualities in micro & macro structures |
|
||||
In networks, members have differential access to resources, rewards, etc. |
|
||||
In networks, all members or actors are stratified |
|
||||
In network theory, as in power dependency theory, some members are dependent on others |
|
||||
In network theory, there is a search for deep structures: | |||||
The concept of deep structure was developed by post modern theorists | |||||
See Also: Post Modernism | |||||
Deep structures are differentiated from the traditional social structures as developed by Marx, Parsons, et al, which include PF REG M CEML | |||||
Where Marx might examine at the economic base, & Parsons might examine the family, post modernists might examine the deep structure of punishment which would include the socio historical development of the prison system & other institutions of punishment as a reflection of the development of cultural norms & values around punishment, evil, confession, rehabilitation, etc. | |||||
Other deep structures include sex & pleasure, consumerism, war, etc. | |||||
Deep structures are more fundamental and controlling than organizations, institutions, or social structures |
|
||||
Deep structures are regular network patterns beneath the surface of social systems |
|
||||
Example: |
|
||||
Action is embedded in concrete personal relations, structures, & networks |
|
||||
Most ties are symmetrical in content & intensity |
|
||||
Networks are nonrandom (patterned) and transitive (action oriented & moveable) |
|
||||
An example, of the patterning & transitiveness of networks is seen in the relationship btwn BMW Owner 1 & BMW Owner 2 & the BMW Dealer, where one owner was unlikely to buy a BMW like another. This example is easily transferred to another relationship |
|
||||
There are limits to the number of links in networks, based on the power, dependency, resources, etc. of members in the network | |||||
Clusters exist in all networks in that there are stronger ties among particular members | |||||
There can be links among individuals, groups, structures, networks, clusters | |||||
There may be asymmetrical ties, which result in resources being differentially distributed | |||||
|
Stratification leads to both collaboration & competition |
|
Links |
|
Links |
|||
- Project: Networks, Network Theory, & the Strength of Weak Ties |
|
||||
INTRODUCTION: INTERPERSONAL TIES ARE CONNECTIONS AMONG PEOPLE & MAY BE STRONG, WEAK, OR ABSENT | |||||
Interpersonal ties are defined as info carrying connections btwn people | |||||
Interpersonal ties, generally, come in three varieties: strong, weak, or absent | |||||
Weak social ties, it is argued, are responsible for the majority of the structure of social networks in society as well as the transmission of info through these networks | |||||
Weak ties are said to embed social qualities into a network, i.e. structure the network | |||||
The embeddedness of networks, of social structures, of society is created by the innumerable weak social relations that define our daily reality | |||||
The concept of embeddedness ties network theory to classic symbolic interactionism through the idea that embeddedness may be defined as the innumerable messages that we get daily, moment by moment, that define our role, our self, our society | |||||
Embeddedness is similar to the sym int concept of the over determination of social reality that we get via messages from others & the self | |||||
Granovetter's article, "The strength of weak ties" is now considered a classic in sociological theory because of its exploration of the nature of human relationships | |||||
A HISTL ANALYSIS OF INTERPERSONAL CONNECTIONS SHOWS THAT TIES ARE FUNDAMENTAL FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF SOCIETY | |||||
One the of the earliest writers to discuss the effects of ties btwn people was the German scientist & philosopher Johann Wolfgang von Goethe | |||||
In his classic 1809 novella, Elective Affinities, Goethe speaks of the marriage tie which shows how strong marriage unions are similar in character to that by which the particles of quicksilver find a unity together though the process of chemical affinity | |||||
Starting in the late 1940s, Anatol Rapoport & others developed a probabilistic approach to the characterization of large social networks in which the nodes are persons & the links are acquaintanceships or ties | |||||
During these years, formulas were derived that connected local parameters such as closure of contacts, & the supposed existence of a tie to the global network via a property called connectivity | |||||
In 1954, the Russian mathematical psychologist Anatol Rapoport commented that: [The] "well known fact that the likely contacts of two individuals who are closely acquainted tend to be more overlapping than those of two arbitrarily selected individuals" | |||||
Rapoport's argument that acquaintances have more overlapping other acquaintances became one of the corner stones of the probabilistic approach to network theory | |||||
Granovetter is best known for his work in social network theory & in econ sociology, particularly his theory on the spread of info in a community known as "The Strength of Weak Ties" in 1973 | |||||
In the early 1990s, American social economist James Montgomery contributed to economic theories of network structures in labor mkt | |||||
Montgomery explored the role of weak ties, which he defined as non frequent & transitory social relations, in labor mkts demonstrating that weak ties are positively related to higher wages & higher aggregate employment rates | |||||
FACTORS IN THE RELATIONSHIP OR THE ENV MAY IMPACT WHETHER SOCIAL TIES ARE STRONG, WEAK, OR ABSENT | |||||
|
For Granovetter & most social scientists, the linkages or social ties that make up society are of central importance in understanding social life |
|
|||
|
Granovetter is unique in that he examines social ties & finds that there are several types of social connections |
|
|||
|
Strong ties are those among, for example, friends |
|
|||
|
W/ strong ties, actors have a greater motivation to help one another & are more readily available to one another |
|
|||
|
Weak ties are those among, for example, acquaintances |
|
|||
|
Social scientists have tended to focus on strong ties or social groups |
|
|||
|
Strong ties were thought to be crucial while weak ties were thought to be trivial, but for Granovetter weak ties can be equally important |
|
|||
|
A weak tie of acquaintances can serve as a link btwn two groups which have strong internal ties |
|
|||
|
W/out weak ties, an individual would find themselves isolated in a tight knit group & would lack contacts w/ the rest of society |
|
|||
|
Weak ties prevent isolation, & allow individuals to be integrated into larger society |
|
|||
Absent ties are those relationships (or ties) w/o substantial significance, such as "nodding" relationships between people living on the same street, or the "tie", for example, to a frequent vendor one would buy from | |||||
The fact that two people may know each other by name does not necessarily qualify the existence of a weak tie | |||||
If the interaction btwn two or more people or social units is negligible, the tie may be absent | |||||
The strength of an interpersonal tie is a linear combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (or mutual confiding), & the reciprocal services which characterize each tie | |||||
Granovetter's basic argument is that your strong tie relationship to family members & close friends will not supply you w/ as much diversity of knowledge as your weak ties relationship to acquaintances, distant friends, & the like | |||||
More novel info flows to individuals through weak rather than strong ties | |||||
Because our close friends tend to move in the same circles that we do, the info they receive overlaps considerably w/ what we already know | |||||
Acquaintances, by contrast, know people that we do not, & thus receive more novel info | |||||
SOCIAL TIES HAVE VARIED ORGANIZATION W/IN THE VARIED SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF SOCIETY | |||||
|
For Granovetter, most of society is made up of small orgs |
|
|||
|
Granovetter's view that most of society is made up of small orgs is true in a limited sense in that we all live everyday life in small groups, but these groups have strong, structural links to larger groups & networks |
|
|||
|
Many ties reduces the likelihood of each of the ties being strong, so that a greater proportion of linkages in a large network, would be more superficial than in a smaller network |
|
|||
|
For Granovetter, economic transactions are embedded in social relationship |
|
|||
|
In modern societies, economic transactions are linked to trust, that is, in turn, linked to social relationships, rather than economic relationships |
|
|||
|
Thus, economic transactions are often backed up, reinforced, supplemented, etc. by weak ties, i.e. social relationships |
|
|||
|
This line of argument has several implications |
|
|||
|
That, contrary to the transaction cost approach, which states that orgs & networks would benefit from transforming as many of their transactions to external economic transactions as possible (i.e. subcontract out labor, supplies, etc.), people engage in a transaction on the basis of trust, not pure economics |
|
|||
|
This means that economic transactions have more of the characteristics of strong ties |
|
|||
A person or an org may be able to enhance exposure or influence by creating or maintaining contacts w/ weak ties | |||||
|
With regard to social ties, marketers have recognized that for the mass consumer, trust is one factor, economics is another, peer buying is a another, etc. |
|
|||
|
Thus, we make our purchases in a social network, constructed of strong & weak ties |
|
|||
In marketing or politics, the weak ties enable reaching populations & audiences that are not accessible via strong ties | |||||
|
Granovetter did not clearly delineate the difference btwn a strong & weak tie, or the factors that create the strength of ties |
|
|||
|
Granovetter needs a theory that would allow for the development of a measure of the strength of ties |
|
|||
THE WEAK TIE HYPOTHESIS IS THAT IF I KNOW TWO PEOPLE, IT IS LIKELY THAT THOSE TWO PEOPLE ALSO KNOW EACH OTHER | |||||
The weak tie hypothesis argues that if A is linked to both B & C, then there is a greater than chance probability that B & C are linked to each other | |||||
|
|||||
Of any two randomly selected individuals, such as A & B, from the set S = A, B, C, D, E, ..., if A is strongly tied to both B & C, then according to probability arguments, the B - C tie is always present | |||||
The absence of the B - C tie, in this situation, would create, according to Granovetter, what is called the forbidden triad | |||||
The B - C tie, according to this logic, is always present, whether weak or strong, given the other two strong ties | |||||
The weak tie hypothesis postulates that clumps or cliques of social structure will form, being bound predominately by strong ties | |||||
The weak tie hypothesis postulates that weak ties will function as the crucial bridge btwn any two densely knit clumps of close friends | |||||
Individuals w/ few weak ties will be deprived of info from distant parts of the social system & will be confined to the provincial news & views of their close friends | |||||
On the basis of the weak tie hypothesis, other theories can be formulated & tested, e.g. that the diffusion of info, such as rumors, may tend to be dampened by strong ties, & thus flow more easily through weak ties | |||||
TIES ARE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE AS DETERMINED ALONG INNUMERABLE CRITERIA BY THE PEOPLE IN THE RELATIONSHIP | |||||
Acquaintanceships are usually a positive tie | |||||
There are also negative ties such as animosity among persons | |||||
If a network of interrelated positive & negative ties is balanced, then it consists of two subnetworks such that each has positive ties among its nodes & negative ties btwn nodes in distinct subnetworks | |||||
The notion that positive & negative ties may exist as subnetworks w/in networks, is supported by the aphorism that "my friend's enemy is my enemy" | |||||
Positive & negative ties creates a social system that splits into two cliques | |||||
There is a special case where one of the two subnetworks may be empty, which might occur in very small networks. |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
COHESION IS MEMBER'S FEELINGS OF IDENTIFICATION W/ A GROUP | |||||
Mizruchi has a subjective view of cohesion in his definition of cohesion as members' feelings of identification w/ a group |
|
||||
Mizruchi's subjective view begs the question of, 'What are the feelings of identification w/ a group?' |
|
||||
Mizruchi's position is similar to that of Granovetter's strong ties |
|
||||
Mizruchi's view mirrors the traditional sociological view of cohesion & individual, grp, & network ties through a norm based, psychological approach |
|
||||
Mizruchi also examines cohesion as a variable that can be examined independent of the sentiments of individuals |
|
||||
We can compare cohesion among actors who have structural equivalence, ie are in a similar position is a social group, org, network, etc. |
|
||||
Many actors have identical relations w/ other actors in the social structure |
|
||||
|
Mizruchi believes that structural equality is at least as powerful as cohesion |
|
|||
|
The factors contributing to an actor's cohesion, or identification w/ the group, should be able to be dissected by examining actors who have structural equivalence |
|
|||
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES BUILD COHESION AMONG CORPORATIONS | |||||
One of the main forms of orgl cohesion is through corp interlocking directorates | |||||
Mirzuchi's The American Corporate Network, 1904-1974, (1982) is a historical examination of the changing structure of the American corporate elite | |||||
Mizruchi uses network analysis to find significant patterns in corp interlock data on 167 major U.S. corps through the first three quarters of the twentieth century | |||||
Interlocks have major implications for wider society because they effect the econ social structure which has direct links to many other social structures or spheres of society | |||||
In Intercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis of Business (1987) Mizruchi & Schwartz demonstrate that corporate behavior cannot be explained in terms of the actions of individual firms alone | |||||
|
In order to understand how businesses operate, it is necessary to explore the relationships among them |
|
|||
|
Mizruchi & Schwartz's employ a structural approach to the study of business, taking relations among firms as the fundamental unit of analysis, & examining the behavior of individual firms w/in that framework |
|
|||
THE FACTORS OF PROXIMITY, MEMBERSHIP STOCK OWNERSHIP, INTERLOCKS, & INTERFIRM RELATIONS, MAKE CORPS SIMILAR, & SIMILARITY MAKES THEM SUCCESSFUL | |||||
Because the business community is characterized by both unity & conflict, the key issue is not whether business is unified but the conditions under which unity or conflict occurs | |||||
Using a structural model of social action, Mizruchi determines that factors such as geographic proximity, common industry membership, stock ownership, interlocking directorates, & interfirm mkt relations impacts the extent to which firms behave similarly or differently | |||||
Through an analysis of the data on the campaign contributions of corp political action committees & corp testimony before Congress, Mizruchi finds that both orgl & social network factors contribute to similar behavior | |||||
Similar behavior increases a corp's, or any group's likelihood of political success | |||||
Rather than making their political decisions in a vacuum, firms are influenced by the social structures w/in which they are embedded | |||||
The nature of relations btwn firms has real political consequences |
|
Links |
|
Links |
|||
INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS (IORs) ARE ESTBED TO PROCURE RESOURCES, TO FORM COALITIONS, TO ACHIEVE LEGITIMACY, & BECAUSE THEY ARE MANDATED |
|
||||
IORs are estbed to procure resources & to sell or distribute resources such as facilities, materials, products, revenues, certification, etc. |
|
||||
IORs are estbed to form coalitions for political advocacy & advantage |
|
||||
IORs are estbed to achieve legitimacy or public approval |
|
||||
In some cases, IORs achieve legitimacy by estbing interlocking directorates among cultural orgs & corps |
|
||||
See Also: Interlocking Directorates | |||||
IORs are estbed to achieve certification or legal compliance | |||||
Cultural orgs strive to enhance their reputations by aligning w/ more influential orgs |
|
||||
Corps strive to enhance legitimacy by aligning w/ prestigious orgs |
|
||||
THE REASONS FOR THE FORMATION OF IORs LEAD TO FOUR TYPES OF IORs: AD HOC, EXCHANGE BASED, FORMALIZED, & MANDATED | |||||
IORs may be ad hoc, exchange based, formalized, or mandated |
|
||||
1. AD HOC BASED IORs |
|
||||
IORs are ad hoc when there is little or no previous patterning |
|
||||
When an org devs a specific need, this may trigger the org to call up another to get an opinion, make a referral, or assist in some other manner |
|
||||
Ad hoc IORs are the least imp type of IORs since they tend to be one time relationships |
|
||||
2. EXCHANGED BASED IORs | |||||
An exchange is any voluntary activity btwn btwn 2 or more orgs which has consequences, actual or anticipated for the realization of their respective goals or objectives | |||||
Exchanges can take place in networks & w/ inherent power differentials | |||||
Exchanges exist so that orgs can acquire resources or sell or distribute resources | |||||
During exchanges, bargaining occurs in a context where each org seeks to maximize its advantage | |||||
In the past, it was thought that exchanges occurred among equals, but today it is believed that most exchanges occur in a context of power differentials | |||||
Some exchanges might be unequal, but that does not stop exchanges from occurring | |||||
Exchange oriented theories imply that orgs are rationally attempting to maximize their advantages | |||||
All the problems of rat decision making apply to exchange oriented theories on IORs; i.e., they have the same problems | |||||
See Also: Decision Making | |||||
Perceptions of resource dependence encourage the formation of IORs | |||||
Resource dependence encourages IOR commo, transactions & consensus | |||||
Monetary transactions & client referrals involve unique types of exchange IOR as compared to typical resource exchanges or sales | |||||
3. IOR FORMALIZATION | |||||
IOR formalization is the degree to which the interdependency among orgs in a network is given official sanction by the parties involved | |||||
See Also: Orgl Formalization | |||||
IOR formalization may be written, & even contractually binding | |||||
Formal IOR agreements are often based on exchange, though they may also be mandated | |||||
IOR formalization changes the IOR since relations are now routinized & not simply ad hoc, making the transaction more efficient, but less flexible | |||||
IOR formalization is often done to secure a domain in that the relations w/ an org or orgs becomes contractually binding & exclusive | |||||
4. IOR MANDATEDNESS | |||||
IOR mandatedness is the degree to which relationships are governed by laws or regs | |||||
Laws & regs are imposed on orgs by legislative, judicial, or admin rulings | |||||
Govt reg agencies are mandated to interact w/ businesses & public orgs | |||||
Examples of govt mandated IORs in VA include the FCC's reg of Adelphia Cable Co & SHEV's reg of UVaWise | |||||
City & county govts are mandated to interact w/ state & fed agencies | |||||
Examples of govt mandated IORs in ID include the cooperation of the State of ID FS & the USFS | |||||
A mandated IOR may place an org in a contradictory position where compliance may disrupt normal ops, but compliance is necessary to receive funding, certification, or some other vital resource | |||||
Mandated IORs may lead to conflict because they often force actors to interact w/ domain dissensus, interpersonal conflict, etc. | |||||
Unless there is some sort of enforcement mechanism, orgs may ignore a mandate | |||||
Orgs often receive contradictory or overlapping mandates in that different govt agencies may all require a report w/ similar components | |||||
Mandated IORs often have a big impact on orgs | |||||
Mandated collective bargaining led to subunit power w/in orgs | |||||
W/o the certification or other types of positive review given by govt agencies, orgs are often not legally allowed to op |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
Interorganizational relationships (IORs) always have a content whether it be something tangible like physical goods or people, or something intangible like money, knowledge, info, or certification |
|
||||
IOR Resource Interdependence |
|
||||
Resource interdependence occurs when 2 or more orgs are dependent upon one another or another org |
|
||||
Interdependence may occur w/ respect to inflows or outflows of info, money, social support, clients, even facilities, etc. |
|
||||
Orgs which have intersecting domains are often more interdependent |
|
||||
Orgs are usually not capable or controlling all the resources they require & an interorgl div of labor can assist in providing particular resources |
|
||||
In IORs w/ an interdependent flow, each org becomes dependent upon the other in the div of labor just they way people in general are, given the mod div of labor |
|
||||
See Also: Durkheim: The Div of Labor |
|
||||
Orgs tend to resist dependence & to make other orgs dependent upon them |
|
||||
IOR Intensity |
|
||||
IOR intensity is the level of resource investment required of the orgs involved in the network |
|
||||
For service orgs, the higher the level of referrals, services provided, staff support, facilities, etc., the greater the intensity |
|
||||
The proportion of the org's resources involved in the relationship is one factor in determining the intensity |
|
||||
IORs often are concerned w/ resource exchange of which the intensity varies | |||||
Intensity varies from casual to all consuming | |||||
Frequency of interaction is one factor of intensity, but even frequent interactions can be casual or all consuming | |||||
Dyadic relationships, networks , & orgl sets can all vary in intensity | |||||
Interactions become more intense in a crisis | |||||
Joint Programs, Joint Ventures, & Strategic Alliances | |||||
Joint programs are collaborations on only one program or one part of an org's focus | |||||
Joint ventures are collaborations on one of, or the major program or part of an org's focus | |||||
Strategic alliances are long term collaborations involving the major foci of the org, & are very similar to partnerships except that legally the orgs remain separate | |||||
Joint programs focus on resource flows in a context of interdependency & on resource commitment & collaboration | |||||
Joint programs involve an investment of resources & an intense relationship | |||||
Some joint programs exist for decades | |||||
Joint programs tend to foster other joint programs since the IORs estbed by the joint program grew relationships in scope & depth | |||||
Joint ventures often are created to advance R & D since that is such a specialized endeavor that is critical to the success of the orgs, the implicit div of labor can be very beneficial | |||||
Joint ventures & strategic alliances are always long term & involve the core of the org's op |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
IORs are interaction processes btwn orgs, w/in networks, & w/in sets which can take forms, or be structured, in many different ways |
|
||||
IORs can be structured in the form of formalization, standardization, importance, cooperation, conflict, conflict resolution, reciprocity, symmetry, power differentials, power equality, coordination, & more |
|
||||
1. IORs can be highly formalized or have ad hoc relationships |
|
||||
2. IORs can be standardized or unique in each encounter |
|
||||
3. IORs can be important or simple convenient or even simply a kind gesture |
|
||||
4. IORs can be frequently in conflict or frequently in cooperation |
|
||||
5. IORs can be based on conflict around a shared or common task or based on cooperation around a shared or common task |
|
||||
The dev of conflict or cooperation is based on power differences & reciprocity in the interactions themselves | |||||
The dev of conflict or cooperation is based on differences in operating phils | |||||
6. IORs can be based on conflict resolution | |||||
7. IORs can be based on reciprocity, which may entail an action reaction relationship, or on symmetry where the transaction btwn the involved orgs is relatively equal |
|
||||
Orgs may try to maintain some level of reciprocity in an IOR w/ another org in that they will offer a better deal to a 'partner' that they would to other orgs in order to maintain the relationship & or health of the 'partner' |
|
||||
Orgs may try to maintain some level of symmetry in an IOR w/ another org in that they will try to maintain a standard balance that they have had in the past |
|
||||
Reciprocity in an IOR does not imply equality, just that the actors give or take about what they have in the past, while symmetry in an IOR implies some level of equality or fairness |
|
||||
8. IORs can be based on power differentials that range of very hi to relative equality |
|
||||
In IORs, the centrality of orgs in a network or in an org set gives them power |
|
||||
In IORs, a small org may have power over a large org if the small org has something the large org needs & there are no alts |
|
||||
In IORs, large orgs may play the role of the big brother w/ any number of small orgs w/ the aim of nurturing several useful IORs | |||||
9. IORs can be based on coordination in that many orgs will try to coordinate services or production to provide the customers or clients w/ a package of service or products that fill there needs | |||||
An example of a coordination based IOR can be seen in software & hardware computer mfrs who often share there most valuable product secrets so that the ultimate product they produce is the strongest product it can be | |||||
An example of a coordination based IOR can be seen in wildland firefighters who coordinate smokejumpers, helitack, air tankers, & air attach in order to provide a district w/ a full service fire suppression effort |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
- Project: Interlocking Directorates |
|
||||
In advanced capitalism, most corporations are interlocked | |||||
Interlocks, a.k.a., interlocking directorates, occur when corporate directors sit on the boards of several corporations, & thus interlock them together | |||||
Interlocking directorates are an example of a powerful type of interorganizational relationship (IOR) where a member or members of the boards of directors or trustees of one org also serve on boards of other orgs | |||||
Much of the upper class has been reduced to "investor status" while the corporate class wields even more power than their % of ownership indicates | |||||
The concept of interlocking directorates holds that the linking of two or more corporations through at least one of their board members increases power, control & networking of both corps | |||||
There are direct & indirect interlocks among corps | |||||
Direct interlocks occur when a board member sits on the boards of two or more corporations, linking them | |||||
Indirect interlocks are two corporations tied by their board members through a third corporation | |||||
Direct interlocks between competing corporations such as Wendy's & McDonalds are illegal, but both may own frozen food processing corporations | |||||
The structure of the corporate class is one of interlocking directorates
giving unity & class consciousness in the corporate class through SEVEN
processes:
1. Owning stock in several other corporations Banks & insurance companies own stock in many other corporations 2. Influencing major corporations & government 3. Establishing economic concentration 4. Dominating the mkt through establishing a large market share, oligopolies or oligopsonies 5. Creating networks of directors & managers at the corporate level 6. Magnifying the size of major corporations through interlocks 7. Ranks are more permeable than the old upper class, allowing more networking |
|||||
On average, corporate boards of directors have 12 people who control the corporation | |||||
The board has the
- authority to hire & fire management - set broad policy - approve acquisitions/divestitures |
|||||
Board members come from inside corp mgt, outside the corp but inside the corporate network, & from outside the network | |||||
Compared to board members, most individual stockholders are widely dispersed & have minor amounts of stock | |||||
There are ELEVEN major effects of interlocking directorates
The effects of interlocking directorates are to: 1. reduce competition & generally increase cooperation 2. increases econ concentration 3. represent outside influences 4. share info: the business or envl scan: SWOT 5. provide unity ( like other networking devices ) 6. provide "coordination" in the economy 7. provide unity in corp dealings w/ govt 8. increases influence over govt 9. secure good relations w/ sources of capital 10. maintain or create mkt relations w/ other firms 11. provide another means ( in addition to stock control and credit ) for board influence ( used extensively by banks ) |
|||||
|
Allen found that the top 250 corporations averaged 10 interlocks |
|
|||
A study by US Senate Committee on Govt. Affairs ( SCGA ), 1978, found that each of the top 123 corps was linked w/ 62 others [This is the most recent, exhaustive, govt analysis] | |||||
The SCGA found that the largest 13 corps had links w/ 70 % of other corporations | |||||
In 1989 the top 1% of the population owned
- 47 % of all stock - 73 % of all bonds - 53 % of all trusts |
|||||
|
Allen demonstrates that interlocks create the possibility for financial corporate dominance |
|
|||
The inner group of the corp class is made up of elite board
members & top corporate officers
The ELEVEN qualities of the inner group are that they 1. tend to have more positions on corporate boards 2. are more likely to be board members on large corps 3. often represent large banks on corporate boards 4. belong to social clubs 5. have worked way up rather than starting at the top 6. represent corp interest in other institutions: foundations, universities, govt, etc. 7. like most interlocks, are accounted for by a relatively small number of people 8. tie large corps more closely together 9. represent one set of common interests in the political environment 10. are international players 11. are more able to speak for corp interests as a whole rather than just one corporation |
|||||
In 1913 Sup Ct Justice Louis Brandeis warned that interlocks contain many evils, such as the suppression of competition | |||||
Interlocks are seen as the means by which elites maintain their position & exercise societal control | |||||
Interlocks, like any IOR, help orgs control uncertainties & are a valuable source of info | |||||
In the basic form of an interlock, a an officer or member of the board of directors of one org is a member of the board of another org | |||||
Another form of an interlock is where members of two orgs sit on the board of a third org | |||||
Since orgs cannot merge w/ all orgs because of limited resources & fed merger restrictions, an interlocking board of directors is an indirect way to link orgs | |||||
Interlocking directorates provide opportunities for collusion, co-optation, monitoring, legitimacy, career advancement, & social cohesion | |||||
Financial instits are the dominant actors in the network set of interlocking directorates | |||||
Commercial banks, & ins corps are the most likely to have their members of the boards of other types of orgs | |||||
Some theorists conclude that the corp sys is dominated by a handful of NY fin instit | |||||
In the past, railroads were at the center of the network set of interlocking directorates | |||||
Railroads, telegraphy & coal corps were at the core of the network set of interlocking directorates circa 1886 to 1905 | |||||
RRs were very powerful as the US industrialized & moved west | |||||
Interlocks allow orgs to manage uncertainty in their envs | |||||
Interlocks provide access to resources & can influence decisions | |||||
Some orgs mandate an interlock w/ another org, thus lowering the autonomy of the latter org | |||||
Interlocks are purposive for both parties | |||||
Orgs that are experiencing fin probs may seek out director from a bank, & conversely, banks seek out directors from corps that are expanding & may need capital | |||||
Public orgs such as colleges also seek out interlocks from local political & community orgs | |||||
Orgs in the public sector engage in the same kinds of interlocks through their boards | |||||
Interlocks are affected by local ties through the interactions at upper class clubs, or the presence of corp headquarters | |||||
In 1980, of the 797 largest US firms, only 62 had no interlocks & there is a large number of fin instits interlocked | |||||
Interlocks are the most common in concentrated industries where monopolies almost exist | |||||
Highly interlocked firms have greater econ effectiveness | |||||
Interlocks are used to prevent hostile takeovers | |||||
The poison pill defense against a hostile takeover gives a network of stockholders, usually dev in relation to the interlocks of all involved corps, the opportunity to buy the corps stock at a discount | |||||
W/ the poison pill defense, the option to buy discounted stock spreads rapidly through the network set & prevents the hostile takeover | |||||
Some studies have found that interlocks do not constrain one another across industries | |||||
Social status w/in a community is imp for interlocks in that the socially elite individuals who are assoc w/ large corps are disproportionately represented on other boards | |||||
Orgs tend to interlock w/ those of equal social standing | |||||
Both econ "clout & grace" contribute to the densest interlocks because these attributes make board members attractive to one another | |||||
Some believe that the power of boards is limited, relying on the managerial thesis to support their view that mgrs, not boards are in control of corps today | |||||
Often, the CEO & other top tier mgrs have more knowledge of the op of the org than do board members | |||||
On the other hand, the board can replace mgt | |||||
The presence of external influences, i.e. interlocked directors, was found to have little influence on a board or the mgt of the org | |||||
But the board of a corp is the apex of pwr in the org & there is a natural jousting for power | |||||
Top mgrs want to maintain their pwr & prefer a passive board while active boards want a mgt who will faithfully execute their directives | |||||
Since the corp scandals of the early 00s, i.e. Envron & WorldCom being the two largest corp scandals in hist, Congress has enacted legislation making directors more responsible, & more liable, for the ops of their corps | |||||
The legislation enacted by Congress to limit corp corruption has served to increase the power & reach of boards | |||||
Ornstein (1984) concluded that corp imperatives & class solidarity factors op in interlocks encouraging them to make decisions in the interest of the up class | |||||
Kerbo & Fave (1983) found that an intercorp complex of major corps, w/ banks in a central coordinating position formed an inner group of the corp class that provides the human linkages | |||||
It was found that in the 1980 Congressional elections that corp contributions to PACs were based on ideological conservatism | |||||
PAC contributions in 1980 were based on interlocks as structured by class wide rational actions | |||||
Class interests are exercised through powerful orgs in mod society which are structured around interlocking directorates | |||||
IN 92 Mizruchi examined 1576 dyads among 57 large mfr firms & found that membership in the same ind was related to similarity of pol behavior |
Links |
|
Links |
|||
Perceived effectiveness of interorganizational relations (IOR) can be assessed from the standpoint of actors w/in each org, the org as a whole, clients, customers, the community, legislators, regulators, the network, the network set, & more |
|
||||
Measuring orgl outcomes is influenced by pol pwr, resource dep, moral choice, & so on |
|
||||
Little is actually known about IOR outcomes because it is such a complex phenomenon to study |
|
||||
In relations to IORs, what is good for one actor may be bad for another actor |
|
||||
One of the outcomes of IORs in the service ind, is that there is a general improvement of the delivery of services |
|
||||
One of the outcomes of IORs in relation to interlocking directorates is that pwr & influence is concentrated at the apex of the corp network |
|
||||
Examples of the ultimate effects of IORs can be seen in cases of Am regulation & deregulation of ind which limited & expanded IORs w/in those particular ind | |||||
It is clear that the regulation of the phone companies, which ultimately created "Ma Bell," i.e. one big phone company resulted in societal advantages | |||||
The results of the breakup of Ma Bell are not clear in relation to lowering prices, but it is definitely clear that service & convenience have decreased | |||||
In the breakup of Ma Bell, it is not clear if innovation increased because of the breakup or because of technological breakthroughs | |||||
The mixed results of the break up of Ma Bell may also be seen in the breakup of other Am regulated monopolies such as Standard Oil, the railroads, etc. | |||||
However, the mixed results for each type of monopolistic breakup vary on different dimensions | |||||
The destruction of IORs through monopolization also has mixed results in that there are societal gains & losses associated w/ regulated monopolization |
The End
|