But it is not only revolutionary movements that leave behind more permanent organizational traces. More modest reform movements may give rise to new organizations as well. All of the labor unions one finds in the United States and Western Europe are the legacy of those countries' labor movements. Though a product of the women's movement, the National Organization of Women (NOW) appears well on its way to becoming a permanent organizational fixture on the national political scene. The NAACP made that transition roughly three-quarters of a century ago. Many other established organizations began life as movement groups, among them the Sierra Club, the Boy Scouts, and the YMCA.

To this list of organizational survivors we can add most of the great religions of the world, which started life as social movements. This includes Islam, Catholicism, and the various Protestant denominations. The establishment of the Mormon Church—the Church of the Latter-Day Saints—is but the most recent example of a process that has been repeated dozens of times in history. Like the Christians and Protestants before them, the Mormons began life as a small, persecuted sect that achieved institutional respectability only over a long period of time. In doing so, however, it helped transform the organizational profile of American society, much as social movements have always done.

The discussion of movement outcomes brings to a close our treatment of the social movement. At this point, the literature on social movements shades rather abruptly into the study of more institutionalized forms of behavior. For example, the field of organizational sociology becomes increasingly relevant at the point when movements give rise to more permanent organizations. As sects become established churches, the sociology of religion provides the analytic framework for further study. As SMOs become established as permanent interest groups, the perspectives of political sociology and political science become useful in studying the ongoing dynamics of lobbying and interest-group formation.

We have now come full circle. As social movements emerge out of and seek to challenge the existing institutions of a given society, they also modify those institutions and provide new structures and targets for yet another generation of social movements. In the life cycle of the social movement, then, we see reflected the never-ending tension between order and change in social life. Social movements begin as relatively spontaneous, emergent expressions of a desire for social change. Predictably, those expressions tend to be resisted both by those who stand to lose by the changes and by those who find change stressful in general. Movements, then, face formidable odds in their quest for change. On occasion, however, the opportunities for change and the skills of the activists are so great as to overcome that resistance. When this happens, societies can be changed, either entirely or in part, by the force of the movement. The result is a new order, a new set of political and economic arrangements that, in time, are likely to be as deeply entrenched and institutionalized as those the movement originally opposed. Once in place, the new order provides new targets for challenge by groups who see themselves as disadvantaged by the "system." The cycle begins anew.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Having to this point concerned ourselves with surveying the field of collective behavior, it is only fitting that we close on a more speculative and, we hope, provocative note. Specifically, we want to take up two general questions. First, why should we care about the field of collective behavior in the first place? What is the significance of fads, disasters, and social movements for our lives? And second, what future patterns or trends might we expect with respect to collective behavior? But before considering these more speculative questions let us summarize some of the central ideas we have covered.

The field of collective behavior involves the study of diverse behaviors, processes, structures and contexts. Among the topics included are crowds, fads, disasters, and social movements. Topics that could not easily be studied as conventional social structure or from a perspective of cultural definitions have fallen to collective behavior.

One way to organize this diversity is to consider behavior on a continuum from emergent to institutionalized across a number of dimensions. Collective behavior involves emergent group behavior in settings where cultural guidelines are nonspecific, inadequate, or in dispute.

Among some of the most important dimensions of the range from emergence to cultural specificity are means, ends, and rules, membership, division of labor, role expectations, relations between groups, and temporal and geographical boundaries.

Emergent behavior appears in highly organized settings and cultural elements in the most emergent settings. Many situations such as contests, celebrations, and disasters fall between the extremes of clearly defined and highly specified cultural dictates and the absence of any guidelines. Even the most emergent activities and settings are likely to be strongly influenced by culture,

and situations of great cultural specificity are likely to have some openness and emergence.

It is not that organization is absent in collective behavior but rather that a significant amount of the behavior that appears (whatever its degree of organization) develops out of interaction on the spot rather than being in response to prior, highly specific cultural directives.

Collective behavior must not be confused with the setting in which it occurs. To study a crowd or a mass is not necessarily to study collective behavior. Conversely, to study a formal organization or to use the concepts and perspective of organizational sociology does not preclude the study of collective behavior.

Beyond helping to separate collective behavior from conventional behavior, degree of emergence can also help distinguish among types of collective behavior. Fads and crowds tend to show a much higher degree of emergence than do social movements.

Four major ways that collective behavior and formal organizations may be intertwined are (1) the conduciveness of organizational settings to mobilization for collective behavior unrelated to the organization (e.g., the diffusion of a fad or providing demonstrators); (2) organizations as sources of problems and discontent, which may lead to collective behavior; (3) the direct role of organizations in producing collective behavior; and (4) collective behavior as a source of changes in, or the appearance of new organizations and organizational forms.

Understanding social life requires focusing on social structure as well as social process. The field of collective behavior gives particular attention to issues of process and change. It emphasizes the dynamic and fluid quality of behavior that appears as a result of the interactions of individuals and broader social factors. A focus on developments over time is central.

While there are probably few processes that are unique to collective behavior, it is possible to identify frequently occurring processes. Many students of collective behavior are interested in these processes, rather than in a particular form of behavior. Communication processes are illustrative of this. This book has examined rumors, ideology, and social influence.

Collective behavior settings often contain the conditions associated with the rise and spread of rumors: ambiguity, lack of clarity, stress, and weakened social control.

Social researchers have studied how rumors are disseminated, how they might change as they are told and retold, and what their social consequences can be. The fate of rumors depends on factors such as personal anxiety and uncertainty, the degree to which the teller finds the rumor to be trustworthy and the relevance of the rumor to the listener. Rumors can be a way of providing meaning in unclear situations and can help define what is occurring and what should be done. Like ideology, they can serve to fill in cognitive gaps in situations where the conventional culture offers inadequate or unsatisfactory guidelines.

Rumors may precipitate collective behavior, as well as grow out of situations where it is already present. Individuals may serve as originators, carriers, or

receptors for rumors. Rumors may emerge spontaneously or through manipulative action.

Ideologies help mobilize persons for collective action. They can serve as a cognitive map and a spur to action. They mix verifiable with unverifiable elements. They may explain what is wrong and what is to be done. Ideology may shift the source of a problem away from the individual to the social order. Ideologies can help redefine personal identity and supply meaning and direction for persons and organizations. The ideology along with a movement's slogans and symbols tell what a group is about.

Ideologies can be systematically analyzed as cultural forms apart from the individuals who adhere to them. Social analysts draw a basic distinction between ideologies that seek to radically alter the social order and those that seek to reform it. The latter have been more pronounced in the United States than in Europe, as have religious based movements. Some seek to revitalize the society and to return it to a prior state while others seek to create a new order. There is also an important distinction between ideologies that emphasize individual change and those that seek changes in the social order.

In seeking to understand why individuals in a group setting sometimes act in ways they would not act as individuals, researchers have studied face-to-face interaction in crowds and audiences. A number of general processes of social influence have been identified, regardless of the type of crowd or behavior in question. These processes are not necessarily found in such settings, nor are they necessarily lacking in other settings.

The presence of large numbers of persons may help legitimate the behavior in question. There may be an illusion of unanimity in which even those who do not support the behavior go along with it because they perceive (sometimes incorrectly) that everyone else supports it. With large numbers of people present, responsibility may be diffused. The anonymity of the setting may reduce feelings of personal accountability. There may be strong feelings of social solidarity. The presence of an audience may encourage individuals to greater and different actions than they would undertake alone. Through a process of convergence, those drawn to a crowd may be predisposed to a given line of action.

Our definition of collective behavior stresses its relative independence of, or its opposition to, traditional culture. Much of what sociologists study as collective behavior occurs within settings where traditional cultural explanations are not applicable or are contested. As illustrative of these concerns we considered fads, disasters, and protest movements.

Fads are a type of collective behavior about which traditional culture is tolerant or indifferent. Fads fall within a broad zone of cultural indifference, in that vast area about which culture is very general or silent. This may stem from the impossibility of offering detailed cultural specification or from a value commitment to freedom, diversity, and discretion. Thus, the culture specifies that people wear clothes. But within this, there is much room for individual taste, preference, and expression, even if there are broad constraints (for example, the expectation that

clothes will be gender appropriate). Other areas, such as how people should spend their leisure time, are even less defined. The culture allows for innovations such as hula-hoops, stuffing phone booths, and for varying hair and skirt lengths. This openness of culture (and sometimes even a preference for diversity) creates a vacuum. It is within these "optional" areas that many of the fads and fashions studied by sociologists appear. Cultures vary with respect to the breadth of their "zones of tolerance" and the extent to which entrepreneurs seek to generate novel behavior. In a market economy such as in the United States, with elaborate product differentiation and channels for diffusion, fads are very common.

Beyond cultural indifference, a second area for collective behavior research involves contexts where the cultural guidelines are inadequate. Disasters often embody this situation. It is not that culture is permissive as above but that it is inadequate in some objective way. In many crisis situations, major elements of the social order break down. The system is disrupted. Traditional rules or resources are simply unable to cope with some new situation, though in the absence of the crisis, cultural guidelines were adequate. Within such settings, collective behavior may be adaptive and problem solving (involving innovations and heroic actions) or opportunistic and exploitive (looting and predatory violence).

A third area for collective behavior research involves situations of disagreement, where persons reject some of the dictates and operation of the dominant culture. Social movements fit here. We identified several types of social movements but focused the lion's share of our attention on political movements. In such cases cultural directives (or their meaning) are disputed. The movement may directly challenge that which is disputed. It may use unconventional or noninstitutionalized means as a bargaining resource and to publicize the issue.

Protest movements tend to arise, not when people are angriest, but when the system is newly vulnerable or otherwise "receptive" to challenge. The effect of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies in stimulating social-movement activity throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union affords a recent and significant example of this dynamic.

At the individual level social-movement involvement clearly reflects the values and attitudes of those involved. But far more people agree with the general goals of a given movement than actually participate in its activities. Mediating between attitudes and activism are the structural and biographical circumstances of the individual's life. To get involved, the individual must have the opportunity to do so. And this requires a certain "structural proximity" to the movement. Typically, this means knowing someone who is already involved, being a member of an organization with strong ties to the movement, or, at a minimum, being geographically proximate to a setting in which an activity takes place.

Finally, an individual's willingness or ability to get involved also depends on his or her stage of life and demands on his or her time. So, for example, relative freedom from adult responsibilities—full-time employment, parental duties, and so on—helps explain why college students have long been overrepresented in the

ranks of activists relative to other, more biographically constrained segments of the population.

The preceding is an overly brief reprise of the principal themes of Chapters 1 through 5. But it would be premature to end on that note. The utility of any field of sociological study depends on its ultimate significance for social life and the ability of its practitioners to use what is currently known to tell us something about what we can expect in the future. We want to close, then, by taking up these two questions. What is the significance of collective behavior for society? What predictions would we hazard about the extent and nature of collective behavior for the future?

WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

The question of why we should care about collective behavior is a reasonable one. At first blush the cluster of phenomena grouped together under this heading may appear esoteric and irrelevant to one's daily existence. Fads can be fun, but of little consequence. Disasters, one hopes, are a rare phenomenon. Even social movements, for all their sound and fury, would seem to only lightly touch our lives. So, beyond an intellectual curiosity rooted in an interest in the bizarre and the unusual is there any reason why we should care about collective behavior? It should come as no surprise that our answer is a resounding yes. Collective behavior is far more consequential for social life than the above characterization would suggest. In this section, we hope to persuade you that we are right.

Take, for example, the fad. Arguably it is the least significant of the behavioral forms we have touched on in this book. But even here a good case can be made for its importance to social and individual life. At the societal level, fads alter the social and cultural landscape, leavening the otherwise predictable routines of daily life. Imagine a world bereft of fads—a world in which styles of dress, music, food, and art never change—and one begins to appreciate the significance of fads as a general phenomenon. Any given fad may be trivial, but fads as a general social phenomenon are clearly not.

Just as important as the broader societal significance that attaches to these forms of behavior are the implications they have for each of us individually. Collective behavior affords individuals the opportunity to step out of behavioral routines and to varying degrees reshape the contours of their lives. As such, collective behavior highlights the possibilities for personal transformation present in social life. Faced with seemingly inflexible daily routines and structures in the classroom, at work, and even at home, these possibilities often seem more illusory than real. But the study of collective behavior tells us otherwise. Quite unexpectedly, the predictable, routine character of social life can be disrupted, granting the individual more latitude for novel thought and action. These periods may be experienced as among the most exhilarating, stressful, and, above all else, authentic in one's life; periods when the possibilities for behavior are shaped as much by personal decision and circumstance as by established norms and roles. Anyone who

has ever taken part in a spontaneous demonstration, lived through a major hurricane or earthquake, or gotten caught up in a suddenly exultant crowd at a concert or athletic event has at least glimpsed the possibilities for personal and social change that lie just below the surface of daily life.

But if all collective behavior did were to enliven social life with periodic infusions of new cultural material and, through the disruption of "normal" life, grant the individual more "room to move," one might still be justified in questioning the overall importance of the phenomena. But that is not all that collective behavior does. Most important, collective behavior—and especially the social movement—can serve as a major vehicle of social change in modern society. Even the most cursory survey of contemporary American life quickly establishes this fact. Take politics, for example. Our very form of government grew out of the American Revolution. The current composition of the electorate was shaped, in turn, by a series of social movements—abolition, women's suffrage, civil rights—which succeeded in extending the franchise to new groups of voters. Our current presidential primary process dates to the turbulence of the 1960s and the efforts of reformers to take the nominating process away from party "insiders" and return it to "the people."

Even the Republican dominance of the White House during the 1970s and 1980s bears the imprint of a recent social movement. Prior to the rise of the modern civil rights movement, the Democrats—or Dixiecrats as they came to be known—functioned as a virtual one party system in the South. This meant that the Democratic presidential candidate had merely to gain enough electoral votes outside of the South to be elected. Ironically, the success of the southern civil rights movement in expanding voting rights for blacks also had the effect of crippling the Dixiecrats and revitalizing the two-party system in the South. The result was growing Republican strength in the region and the loss of the "solid South" as a predictable component of the traditional Democratic coalition. By formulating their own "southern strategy," the Republicans were able to exploit this opportunity and parlay southern and western votes into a major electoral coalition that with the exception of the Carter presidency, held until Clinton's election in 1992.

But it isn't only in the area of electoral politics that the impact of social movements can be seen. Clearly the "gender revolution" currently underway in this country owes much of its impetus to the rebirth of feminist activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Curbside recycling programs—unthinkable a generation ago—attest to the impact of the environmental movement over the past two decades. Significant declines in fur sales over the past few years suggest the effect of the animal rights movement in shaping consumer behavior.

The colleges and universities you currently attend bear many curricular reminders of the movements that arose during the 1960s. Programs in peace, women's, African-American, environmental, and Hispanic studies are institutional reminders of the power of social movements to reshape mainstream institutions. Current efforts to promote "multiculturalism" and diversity on campus are but the contemporary manifestations of many of these earlier movements.

One can find the "trace elements" of prior or contemporary social movements everywhere. So far, the examples we have cited have been drawn exclusively from the American experience. But the point is no less true for the world as a whole. Reflect for just a minute on the momentous changes wrought by the democracy movements of Eastern Europe and the various independence movements operating in the former Soviet Union. Together these movements are redrawing the geopolitical map of the world. Elsewhere, changes of an equally momentous sort are underway. The antiapartheid movement in South Africa appears poised to dismantle the system of caste restrictions that have been in place since 1948. In South and Central America, guerrilla movements continue their drive for political power. In Israel, rival social movements—one seeking Palestinian independence, the other the extension of Jewish settlements—collide. Throughout Western Europe the rise of neo-Nazi and other nativist groups threatens to disturb a fragile domestic peace already strained by record immigration levels.

THE FUTURE

So what does the future portend? Sociologists (and social scientists more generally) have been notoriously bad prognosticators. This is especially true in the case of collective behavior. Some of this owes to the very nature of the behaviors in question. Spontaneous fads are especially difficult to predict. Natural disasters may well prove amenable to prediction, but by seismologists, meteorologists, and other natural scientists rather than sociologists. Of the forms of collective behavior touched on here, the social movement appears to offer the best potential for prediction. Even here, though, we should keep our predictive expectations low. The models reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 remain far too preliminary to promise much.

Still, if we trust our models at all, we should be prepared to offer at least some speculative hunches about future social movements. In that spirit, we close with six predictions about the future course and nature of social movements.

1. *Entering period of heightened movement activity.* In Chapter 4 we sketched, among other theories, a political-process model of movement emergence. The central tenet of that model is that movements emerge during periods when political systems are newly vulnerable or receptive to challenge. The rash of independence movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can easily be interpreted in light of this theory. The argument is that Gorbachev's reforms and stated refusal to intervene militarily to support communist regimes elsewhere encouraged the mobilization of opposition movements throughout the Eastern bloc and ultimately the former Soviet Union itself.

   But the proliferation of independence and nationalist movements is not likely to be confined to the former Warsaw Pact nations. At least that is the implication of the political-process model. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact alliance has destabilized power relations not only within the former pact nations but worldwide as well. Any nation formerly dependent on the Soviet Union and its allies has been weakened by the collapse. The potential for the emergence of opposition movements is thus increased in countries such as Afghanistan, Cuba, and Vietnam, which were once squarely within the Soviet orbit.

Ironically, though, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc may introduce new opportunities for change into countries aligned with the West as well. Put simply, the collapse of the Soviet Union has lessened many nations' military and political dependence on the United States and thus left them freer to pursue their own economic and political course. In turn, this greater independence may encourage the mobilization of opposition movements previously held in check by the logic of Cold War alliances. In summary, then, we expect the immediate future to be characterized by political instability and the rise and fall of movements, not only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but in all regions effected by the thaw in East-West relations.

2. *"The continuation of ideology."* In a widely read 1960s book, sociologist Daniel Bell proclaimed the "end of ideology." He was not alone. As the 1960s dawned, a good many social scientists believed we had reached a stage in the development of society where ideological conflict would gradually be replaced by a more pluralistic, pragmatic consensus. Bell and his colleagues could not have been more mistaken. Within a few years of the publication of his book, the country was rent by urban riots, antiwar demonstrations, student strikes, and political assassinations. On a global level, student movements proliferated; in France, Mexico, Italy, Germany, Spain, Japan, Pakistan, and numerous other countries. In Czechoslovakia, an effort to reform and "humanize the face of communism" was brutally suppressed by Soviet forces. Military coups became commonplace throughout the world.

   Besides illustrating the poverty of many sociological efforts at prediction, the "end of ideology" story also seems to serve as a cautionary tale to any who would proclaim an end to something as ubiquitous as ideology and social conflict. It is surprising, then, that the dissolution of the Soviet Union occasioned yet another flurry of predictions regarding the "end of history" or ideological conflict as we know it. At the eye of the storm was a state department official, Francis Fukuyama, who, in several articles published during 1989, declared that the end of the Cold War marked as well the end of history; the ultimate triumph of that most advanced form of political thought, "democratic-egalitarian consciousness."

   We do not share Fukuyama's confidence. The history of political and social commentary is littered with the bones of those who saw in the events of their day the "ultimate triumph" of this or that ideology or political movement. Not only did the international and domestic turbulence of the 1960s disprove the "end of ideology" thesis, but the similarly confident predictions of the imminent demise of capitalism occasioned by the events of that period now seem hopelessly unfounded. In our view, *all* such dramatic pronouncements are bound to fail. Ideological disagreement and political conflict are ubiquitous features of contemporary social life. The growing gap between rich and poor, domestically and worldwide, probably only insures the continuation—and perhaps intensification—of these processes.

3. *The globalization of protest.* We also expect that social movements will take on an increasingly international character in the future. In fact, this trend is already embodied in organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace and is clearly evident in such broadly global campaigns as the anti-nuclear and environmental movements.

   At least three contemporaneous processes underlie the globalization of protest. The first is the international character of many social problems. Consider environmentalism. Given the interdependent nature of the earth as an ecological system, it is becoming increasingly difficult to think environmentally only at the national level. What good does it do for the United States to implement curbside recycling programs if no effort is made to protect the rainforests that moderate global temperatures, spawn weather systems, and harbor much of the species diversity left on earth. Conversely, how hollow the environmental victory if Brazil suspended clear-cutting its rainforests only to have the United States and other industrialized nations persist in the manufacture and use of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons? Aware of this interdependence, environmental activists increasingly pursue global goals in consort with their counterparts in other countries.

   A second trend encouraging the international coordination of protest efforts is the growth in global or regional political institutions. The postwar founding of organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the World Court created international bodies to whom activists could direct their appeals. In all likelihood, this trend will continue. Indeed, the unprecedented efforts of the European Community to fashion an integrated economic and, to a lesser extent, political community can be expected to accelerate the creation of broadly regional geopolitical jurisdictions. In turn, activists can be expected to increasingly direct their activities and frame their appeals in terms of these broader geographic units.

   Finally, the dramatic improvements in communication technology in the last few decades have made it not just possible but ever easier to coordinate an international movement. The advent of fax machines, VCRs, low-cost copiers and personal computers, and improvements in telecommunications have greatly increased the efficiency and feasibility of international communication. Add to that the development of instantaneous global news reporting—who among us did not watch live news reports during the Gulf War?—and yet another important source of information on events elsewhere is available, as well as a means by which activists can seek to convey their message to a global audience. All of these trends, then, make the internationalization of movement activity ever more likely.

4. *Continued salience of race within the United States.* The trend discussed above does not mean that truly domestic movements are a thing of the past. On the contrary, for many issues the nation will remain the relevant locus of action. Within the United States a number of issues are likely to remain or grow more salient in the coming years. Among these are abortion, euthanasia, gun control, and health care. But in our view, the issue that has the most potential to stir passions and trigger renewed protest activity is that of race; specifically the enduring chasm between black and white in American society.

   In 1980, sociologist William J. Wilson wrote an influential book entitled *The Declining Significance of Race.* Central to Wilson's argument is the contention that the elimination of explicitly racial barriers in employment, housing, education, and other areas of American life would gradually make class rather than race per se the key determinant of the life chances of black Americans. There is much to recommend Wilson's argument. In this country there is, in fact, a large and growing black middle class whose lives are far less constricted by race.

   But for the majority of blacks, race and class continue to converge in ways that consign them little but the "leavings" of American society; the worst jobs, the worst housing, the worst public schools. And this "bottom-rung" existence continues to make race the political flashpoint that simmers just below the surface of American society. The anger so evident in recent "black" films and in rap music is but the tip of a potentially volatile iceberg encompassing large segments of the black community.

   But as emphasized in the discussion of the emergent social movement, anger alone does not a movement make. Instead, successful collective action is most likely when a combination of strong organization among the aggrieved and a political system newly vulnerable or receptive to challenge by the movement are present. It is the second of these factors—the lack of significant political leverage by blacks—that, until recently, was lacking. The key institution in this regard is the presidency. So long as the White House was occupied by a Republican with no political debt to black voters, the chances

for successful collective action were slim. Given President Clinton's 82 percent share of the black vote, this period of inactivity could well be at an end.

5. *The proliferation of nationalist movements.* As we have stressed throughout the book, the various forms of collective behavior tend to be related to one another or at least to occur together. So social movements may give rise to ideas or material cultural items that spread in fadlike fashion. Of a social movement's features, perhaps the most important one that may quickly diffuse to other movements is the set of legitimating ideas around which the movement is organized. Snow and Benford (1988) have termed this set of ideas a "master protest frame." They argue that most periods of heightened protest activity are set in motion by a highly visible, successful movement whose legitimating frame is quickly adopted by other challenging groups. Snow and Benford cite the civil rights movement as a prime example of such a movement and the civil rights ideology it spawned as the "master frame" animating many of the discrete movements—women's liberation, gay rights, handicapped rights, and so on—that emerged during the 1960s.

   A similar dynamic was evident in the former Soviet Union as ethnic nationalist movements proliferated following the collapse of communism. In effect, ethnic nationalism has functioned as the "master frame" structuring collective action in virtually all of the former Soviet republics. We expect this trend to continue, not only in the former Soviet Union, but in many areas of Eastern Europe as well. This prediction draws on two findings from the literature on social movements. The first concerns the aforementioned tendency for movements to proliferate in a given era based, in part, on their appropriation of a dominant "master frame." So to the extent that nationalist movements in the former Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were seen to be successful, they have served to function as models for mobilization by emergent movements throughout the former Soviet Union.

   Second, studies of social movements have shown that collective action tends to develop within existing groups or established communities. The Soviet Communists understood this and sought through repression and forced internal migration to destroy traditional forms of social organization. Thus, many of the institutions within which movements have tended to develop in the West—churches, labor unions, opposition parties, universities—are not as available to the citizenry of the former Soviet Union. The one basis of social solidarity that was not effectively eradicated by the Soviet regime is ethnicity. So it is not surprising to see ethnic nationalist movements emerging as the principal parties to the restructuring of the new political order throughout the whole of the former Eastern bloc.

6. *The locus of movement emergence.* Finally, we conclude with some thoughts on where, in the United States, one might expect future social movements to emerge. In making these predictions we once again take as our point of departure the observation that social movements tend to arise within the established organizations of stable communities. Keeping that empirical observation in mind, where would you expect social movements to develop? For our part, we will identify four likely seedbeds for future social movements.

   The first of these, the church (or other religious institutions), has been the most common locus of incipient social movements throughout American history. The civil rights struggle, pro-life movement, abolitionism, temperance, the American pacifist tradition, and many other movements have been rooted, organizationally and ideologically, in church or other religious structures. Given the continued high levels of reported church attendance and religiosity—levels that are unique among Western industrialized nations—we can expect this pattern of church-based activism to continue in this country, and with it the distinctive religious "vocabulary" of American, as opposed to European, social movements.

Notwithstanding the contemporary quiescence of American campuses, it does not take a rocket scientist to include college and universities on the list of most likely institutional locations for future protest activity. One would be safe in making that prediction based on history alone. College students have historically been among the most active segments of the population in their rates of movement participation.

But there are other more substantive reasons for advancing this hypothesis. Perhaps most important, as an ecological setting, the college campus is uniquely suited to the mobilization of collective action. This is especially true of residential campuses in which large numbers of students reside in a relatively small area, thereby facilitating the rapid spread of information and encouraging the kinds of crowd or other "assembling" behavior (McPhail 1991) that often presages the rise of protest activity. Then too, students find themselves far more available for movement involvement than many other groups in society. For one, they are relatively free from the yoke of parental supervision. Second, they are not yet saddled with the kinds of adult responsibilities that raise the costs associated with activism. And third, they enjoy considerable autonomy and control over the structure of their days, thereby granting them a great deal of discretionary time to spend on political activities. Add to these two factors the general "liberalizing" effect of a college education, and it should come as no surprise that students have played such a conspicuous role in so many movements, not only in the United States, but throughout the world.

Stable residential neighborhoods share many of the same ecological characteristics that college campuses do. Once again, a fairly large number of people are living in close proximity to one another. In addition, the residents are likely to be linked to one another through a variety of voluntary associations and informal friendship networks. In such settings, then, the combination of geographic proximity and dense networks of interpersonal ties are likely to facilitate collective action. This has certainly been true historically, with neighborhoods serving as the basic building block of many a social movement (see Boyte 1982: Gould 1991). This tendency is just as evident today in the rash of neighborhood movements protesting the siting of this homeless shelter, or that toxic waste dump, or any of the myriad other facilities that may arouse community concern. Commentators have dubbed these movements the NIMBY (not in my backyard) phenomenon. But there is really nothing new about such reactive community-based movements or about neighborhood activism in general. Home is not just where the heart is but quite often where the action is.

Our fourth and final setting affords a stark contrast to the traditional bases of activism noted above. Indeed, it is less a setting than a modern, bureaucratic model for pursuing social change. We refer to formal social-movement organizations such as Common Cause, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the Sierra Club, and the like. In their organizational form and operating procedures, these groups more closely resemble traditional lobbies than emergent, grass-roots movements. But their bureaucratic style should not blind us to the important role they play in the broader movements of which they are a part. Indeed, some scholars believe that these bureaucratic change organizations constitute a modern social movement form that is gradually replacing the more traditional grass-roots efforts (see McCarthy and Zald 1973). We do not share this view. While conceding the importance of this more formal bureaucratic approach to political action, we see it as more a supplement to rather than replacement for the emergent, grass-roots campaign. So long as people remain embedded in established, local institutions—churches, neighborhood associations, work settings, colleges and universities—the possibilities for grass-roots organizing will persist. It is the settings that structure people's daily lives that have long served, and will continue to serve, as the primary seedbeds for revolt.

So much for our predictions. But what do you think? We hope we have aroused in you an interest in these forms of collective behavior and provided you with some conceptual tools to make a few predictions of your own. What issues do you see generating sufficient public interest to produce a movement? What groups in society appear well enough organized to mobilize? Where will the next great fad come from? Such questions are fun to play with and argue about. But there is a serious side to such questions as well. For irrespective of our answers, we can be sure of one thing. Whatever specific forms future episodes of collective behavior take they will dramatically reshape the contours of our lives in much the same way that past fads, disasters, and movements have structured the social worlds in which we presently live. That is the power of collective behavior and, in the final analysis, the rationale for studying it.