Our hypothetical example helps illustrate this idea. Suppose, in addition to the march, organizers have planned an illegal occupation of the administration building to dramatize their opposition to apartheid. Now imagine that there are two individuals who are equal in their support for the aims of the march and are well linked to others who are involved. Suppose we now add to our description of the first person that he is a student who is neither married nor employed. Clearly the costs and risks he must weigh before deciding to participate are much less than they would be for the second individual, a part-time student and single mother of two children who works on campus to support her family. To the emphasis on social-structural links to the movement, then, we must add information on the biographical circumstances of a person's life. All other things being equal, the extent and nature of an individual's biographical constraints should also effect his or her willingness to participate in collective action.

We have covered considerable ground in our review of these two major explanations of movement participation. It is possible, however, to distill from what has been discussed a broad perspective on the topic. While the simple psychological or attitudinal accounts of activism may lack strong empirical support, they nonetheless underscore the importance of individual factors in movement participation. Psychological factors or particular attitudes may not directly cause activism, but they certainly encourage or discourage a person from getting involved. In this sense, psychological and attitudinal factors can be thought of as creating "pools" of potential activists.

Ultimately, however, it is the social-structural factors reviewed above that determine which individuals in the pool actually take part in the movement and which ones do not. Lacking either organizational or personal ties to the movement, and saddled with a host of major biographical constraints, it is less likely that an individual will come to be involved, regardless of his or her level of affinity—either psychological or attitudinal—with the movement. On the other hand, another person, perhaps even one with less affinity for the cause, may come to be involved as a result of a combination of strong ties to the movement and fewer responsibilities to impede his or her participation. It is this combination of psychological/attitudinal affinity and social-structural availability, then, that is especially productive of movement involvement.

Thus far we have focused our attention on the early stages of a social movement. Specifically, we have reviewed some of what is known about the origins of a social movement and the recruitment of individuals to collective action. The dynamics of social movements change as the movement progresses from emergence to maturity. In the next chapter we shift our focus to the latter stage.

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR IN OPPOSITIONAL SETTINGS: THE MATURE MOVEMENT

In the previous chapter we looked at the beginnings of a social movement at both the individual and societal levels. At the societal level, we sought to identify those factors that enable movements to arise. At the level of the individual, we offered various explanations for why one person gets involved in a movement while another does not. We also stressed the emergent, somewhat spontaneous character of both of these phenomena, noting that it is the social movement in its early stages that most closely resembles the other forms of collective behavior.

But what about the mature movement? Is the labor movement in the United States emergent? Can we really describe the actions of a seven-year veteran of the National Organization of Women (NOW) as spontaneous? In point of fact, once a movement has been in existence for a while, studying it exclusively within the traditional collective behavior perspective usually becomes more difficult. Over time, then, the study of social movements begins to shade into the analysis of other more institutionalized forms of behavior. Social movements begin to look more like formal organizations, public-interest lobbies, or even religious or political institutions. In this chapter we discuss in detail the two factors that appear to be especially critical in shaping the ongoing development of the movement. The first centers on the actions of other powerful groups in society with whom the movement must interact; the second, the goals and tactics the movement espouses. We then close by briefly sketching some of the typical effects that successful social movements may have on the larger society. But before taking up these topics, we begin by noting the key differences between the emergent and mature movements.

How can we distinguish the mature from the fledgling movement? We began the previous chapter with eyewitness accounts of the beginnings of the Free Speech

movement in Berkeley and the 1989 Chinese student movement in Beijing. Those excerpts capture nicely the emergent, relatively unstructured, spontaneous quality of early collective action. Compare those accounts to the following descriptions of a 1910 demonstration in Berlin and the early days of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, 1963 civil rights campaign in Birmingham, Alabama.

> Berlin's [Socialist] Party leadership called on party members to attend an electoral law demonstration in Treptow Park set for March 6th. The park was a favorite spot for workers' meetings and well known to Berlin and Treptow police. On March 5th the park had already been ringed and occupied by police. But to their surprise, only a handful of strollers appeared [on the 6th]—and not the hundred thousand they expected. Berlin's [SPD] organization had functioned perfectly. Its 2,500 District Chiefs had redirected the "Electoral Stroll" without the police catching the slightest wind of it. By word of mouth, the message had traveled around: "Everybody meets at the Reichstag." ...The lone policeman making his rounds along the Konigplatz was no doubt perplexed: 150,000 Berliners gathered there. Orderly and disciplined, without controls and interference from the police, they carried through their protest demonstration. After more than two hours they dispersed—just as the first police arrived, charging up on foam-bedecked horses. (Quoted in Tilley, et al. 1975: 193)

> [On] April 3, 1963...[the Birmingham campaign] swung into action, and the planned confrontation was under way. Between the third and the sixth, limited sit-ins and picketing at segregated lunch counters in several department stores and drugstores were carried out. No mass arrests or marches were to occur during that first phase. In addition to the sit-ins, SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership Conference] leaders attempted to start negotiations with Birmingham economic elites, while simultaneously mobilizing the black community and implementing the economic boycott.
>
> Shortly after the sit-ins began, thirty-five of the demonstrators were quietly arrested on trespassing charges. This was the low-keyed but important beginning. At the end of the first day of sit-ins the mass meetings began. "After the first day we held a mass meeting," King wrote, "the first of sixty-five nightly meetings conducted at various churches in the Negro community. Through these meetings we were able to generate the power and depth which finally galvanized the entire Negro community." (Morris 1984: 261–262)

Several things differentiate the events described here from those reported in the previous chapter. One obvious difference is the degree to which the various demonstrations were spontaneous. Obviously, none were purely spontaneous or purely planned. The degree of planning, however, was much greater in the case of the Berlin and Birmingham protests than it was at either Berkeley or Beijing. The contrast is greatest when we compare Berkeley and Birmingham. At Berkeley, little of what took place was planned, beyond the initial act of setting up tables in defiance of the university's edict against solicitation for political purposes. For all intents and purposes, everything that happened thereafter—the speeches, the assembling of a crowd, the mass march into the administration building—was unplanned and largely spontaneous. By contrast, all aspects of the Birmingham movement had been subjected to painstaking scrutiny in the months leading up to the campaign. As Morris (1984: 159-60) writes:

> The SCLC planned the boycott and demonstrations well in advance. ...The project...was prepared according to a precise timetable designed to produce maximum drama. Phase I would kick off...and last for several days. During this period the economic boycott would be implemented, and small groups of demonstrators were to sit in and picket at downtown stores. The Phase II plan called for mass marches on City Hall by waves of demonstrators. "D" Day would signal the beginning of Phase III, when grammar school, high school, and college students would begin going to jail in staggering numbers. Through all phases the economic boycott was to be maintained. Such were the plans of Project "C." As [SCLC leader Wyatt] Walker stated, "It was just a matter of unfolding our plan progressively and we were in charge of the timetable."

This is not to say that there were no spontaneous elements in the Birmingham movement. Obviously, movement leaders did not know exactly how the Birmingham police or local blacks were going to react to the actions they had planned. So both the actions—marches, demonstrations, and so on—themselves and the movement as a whole had an emergent quality to it. But both occurred against a backdrop of detailed planning and centralized direction.

This brings us to a key difference between mature and emergent movements. While the latter may be rooted in stable institutions, such as churches or schools, or established groups of people—neighborhoods, for example—they tend *not* to be directed by formal organizations. So in Beijing, the initial marches were organized and led by ad hoc groups of students. At Berkeley, established student groups were involved from the very beginning of the movement, but they did not so much organize the early incidents in the escalating conflict as seek to exploit them after the fact (Heirich 1968). In contrast, the protests in Berlin and Birmingham were planned and directed by *formal* movement organizations. In Berlin, the Socialist party performed this function; in Birmingham, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

When compared to the early movement, then, the mature movement is likely to be larger, less spontaneous, better organized, and largely led by formal organizations that have gradually come to replace the ad hoc committees and informal groups that directed the movement at the outset. To illustrate this transition, imagine the rise of a movement on some campus in response to a 50 percent hike in tuition costs. A group of friends read about the tuition increase in the campus newspaper and decide to do something about it. They decide to stage a sit-in inside the administration building. The next morning they take up positions and are soon joined by several dozen students who have gotten wind of what is happening. The campus police are called but are unable to persuade the group to leave. By now a sizeable crowd has gathered to watch the unfolding events. Campus police confer with members of the administration, and it is decided that the group will be given one hour to disperse before police begin arresting demonstrators. As the deadline draws near, some students do, in fact, leave, but at least fifty remain. True to their word, at the close of the hour, campus police begin arresting the seated protestors. Several resist arrest, and one woman is dragged down the steps leading into the building, hitting her head several times in the process. Angered by this, a number of bystanders start pelting the police with food. Rocks are also thrown at police cars. In response to the barrage, several officers wade into the crowd, attempting

to make additional arrests. Some pushing and shoving ensues, and several students and one policeman are knocked to the ground.

In all, a couple of dozen students are arrested while several others sustain minor injuries. Word of the incident spreads quickly, and a coalition of student groups calls for another demonstration the following day. Several hundred students show up, and this time the police refrain from making arrests. A group of demonstrators is barred from seeing the dean of students, who indicates he will meet only with duly authorized student leaders. Angered by the rebuff, the delegation returns to the demonstration site and reports on what has happened. After much discussion, the main body of demonstrators adjourns to a vacant lecture hall to weigh options and designate leaders to negotiate with the administration.

The transition is underway. After only two days, pressures from inside and outside the movement converge to compel the creation of a more enduring, formal organization to direct the affairs of the movement. Internally, the pressure stems from the difficulty of coordinating the activities and reaching decisions among a large and rapidly expanding group of student activists. So long as the movement was small and centered in a group of friends, problems of coordination and decision making were fairly minimal. Having outgrown that original base, there is a need to create some sort of organizing structure to provide the leadership and direction originally furnished by the group itself.

Externally, the dean of students' refusal to deal with anyone except "duly authorized student leaders" only adds to the pressure to put the movement on a more formal footing. In effect, the dean has asked the movement to create a formal leadership structure as a prerequisite for negotiations. Over time, similar pressures are likely to be imposed on the movement by other outside groups. For example, the campus, and perhaps even local newspapers can be counted on to seek out "movement leaders" as spokespersons as the conflict unfolds. When combined with the internal pressures for more routine decision-making processes, these external demands for an accountable movement leadership are likely to prove decisive. In short order, most successful movements *do* create organizations to take over the leadership and decision-making functions originally performed by the informal groups or ad hoc committees out of which the movement arose.

Two cautions are in order at this point. First, it should not be assumed that all movements undergo the transition described here. Indeed, it is only those movements that experience some early success that confront the need to do so. The vast majority of movements die aborning, having failed to generate enough support and attention to make the issue of formal organization a relevant one. Imagine, for example, how different the outcome of our hypothetical tuition protest movement would have been had only a few protestors showed up the first day and then been ignored by students and police. The movement would likely have withered away, never having had to confront the issues of formal organization and centralized leadership with which a successful movement has to contend.

Second, a successful movement should not be equated with formal movement organizations. There is always more to a social movement than the formal movement

organizations that claim to represent it. While groups such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) are an important part of the contemporary women's movement in the United States, they are by no means all there is to the movement. Of the women (and men) who identify with and in some way support the movement, far fewer are members of these organizations than are nonmembers. Movements tend to be highly amorphous undertakings that permit varying degrees of affiliation and participation, only some of which depend on the direction and planning of formal movement organizations.

At the same time, it would be hard to overstate the importance of movement organizations in the development of the movement. While a movement may be more than the sum total of the organizations that represent it, these organizations are what make the movement a potent force for political, social, economic, or religious change. It is difficult, for example, to imagine what the civil rights movement could have accomplished in the absence of the so-called Big 4: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). More recently, it would be hard to think of Poland's movement for democratic reform without thinking of Solidarity; the pro-choice movement without the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL); or the environmental movement in the absence of the Sierra Club or Greenpeace. For this reason, our discussion of the mature movement will focus heavily on the role of formal organization in the ongoing development of collective action. One of the major challenges confronting these groups comes in trying to mediate the conflicting demands that are likely to be imposed on them by a wide variety of outside groups.

THE MOVEMENT AND ITS ENVIRONMENT

For all their inherent drama, social movements are rarely masters of their own fate. Instead, they must also rely on the power, resources, and political support of other groups in society. At the same time, they are also subject to the power, resources, and political clout of groups who oppose them. Put simply, most social movements represent new entrants into an established political pecking order. Those groups who see in the movement a way to advance their own interests or place in the pecking order are likely to support it. Those who view the movement as a threat to their interests are likely to oppose it. This mix of support and opposition among third parties in society is likely to go a long way in determining the fate of the movement. In the following sections we consider four such parties and the important role they often play in shaping the fate of social movements. We begin with arguably the most important of these groups, the state.

The State

The penetration of government into virtually all areas of life in modern society means that for most social movements—especially the political movements we have

consciously focused on here—the state serves as the principal target of movement actions (Tilly 1978). Pro-life advocates flood Congress with letters and petitions calling for an end to federally funded abortions. South Korean students stage angry demonstrations to protest government-imposed restrictions on political freedom. In the former Soviet republic of Georgia, insurgents assault government buildings in an effort to drive the first democratically elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, from power. U.S. peace activists march to protest the war in the Persian Gulf. Had it taken place at a public institution, even the tuition protest movement described earlier would have been aimed at the state. After all, school officials are themselves state employees. So too are the members of the board of regents or other governing body that would have had to approve the tuition hike that triggered the movement. Finally, there is the legislature that created the state budget that made the rise in tuition necessary. In all these cases, the state winds up being heavily implicated in the fate of the movement, both as the source of redress for movement demands as well as the party most responsible for exercising control over the movement.

Official efforts to control movements can take a wide variety of forms. The Vietnam antiwar movement serves as a good illustration of this. Among the various means used by the federal government to defuse or damage the movement were

- the revocation of the tax-exempt status of groups engaged in antiwar activities
- harrassment and intimidation of movement leaders
- infiltration and disruption of antiwar groups
- arrest of antiwar demonstrators
- prosecution of antiwar activists on a variety of charges
- imprisonment of movement leaders
- surveillance against movement activists in an effort to generate information that would damage or discredit the individuals in question
- court injunctions prohibiting marches and demonstrations

On occasion, even violence was used against the movement and its supporters. The deaths of four students and the wounding of others by National Guardsmen at Kent State University on May 4, 1970, is perhaps the best known of these instances.

The fact that the antiwar movement grew despite these various efforts hardly diminishes the formidable control the state has at its disposal. For its part, the federal government can use congressional hearings; Justice Department prosecutions; or investigations by the IRS, FBI, or Treasury Department to control or damage a movement (Balbus 1973, Marx 1974, 1979, Handler 1978). Or the president can appoint a fact-finding commission in an effort to convince the public that "something is being done," thereby undercutting support for the movement. Much the same effect can be achieved by keeping the details of government policy secret. This seems to have been a prime motivation for those involved in the diversion of profits from the Iran arms sales to the Contras in Nicaragua. Knowing that support for the Contras was controversial, the key players in the diversion wanted to maintain the secrecy of the operation to ensure that the anti-Contra forces did not grow stronger. President

Nixon's 1970 decision to maintain the secrecy of illegal bombing raids against North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia was probably similarly motivated.

Government efforts to control opposition movements are not limited to efforts by federal officials, however. State and local officials are often involved in these efforts as well. In 1963, Alabama governor George Wallace became a national symbol of resistance to integration when he blocked the entrance to the University of Alabama to prevent the registration of the first black students there. In 1968, then-governor Ronald Reagan ordered helicopters to spray demonstrators with tear gas to stop a rally protesting closing of "People's Park" in Berkeley, California. At the local level, it was the mayors and police chiefs of countless southern cities who were the immediate adversaries of the civil rights movement. In Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley drew national criticism for the "police riot" that broke up antiwar protests outside the 1968 Democratic National Convention. This list of examples could be expanded indefinitely. The point is, officials at *all* levels of government can participate in efforts to control, channel, or defuse social movements.

Does this mean that the state acts only in opposition to social movements? The answer is no. To the extent that movements represent a challenge to the political status quo, authorities more often act to oppose rather than support social movements. Nonetheless, there are a number of ways in which the state may act—intentionally or otherwise—to promote the aims of particular movements.

Some of the help given movements by government officials may be unintentional and often stems from either the relaxation or intensification of social-control efforts. In previously repressive situations, the relaxation of social control often has the unintended consequence of fueling protest activity. Much to their dismay, government officials may find that instead of mollifying the citizenry, reforms merely fuel the fire by allowing the angry expression of grievances once too dangerous to voice. This is certainly what Mikhail Gorbachev found to be true in the Soviet Union. Instead of orchestrating a peaceful transition to a more open society, Gorbachev's reforms led to massive popular protest and the breakup of the former Soviet Union.

But the reverse may occur as well. While the state is charged with the responsibility of maintaining public order, it can generate sympathy and political support for a movement if it is seen to be acting overzealously in the exercise of this responsibility. So, for example, the grass-roots movement seeking the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos as president of the Philippines grew stronger in the wake of the assassination of Marcos' longtime political rival, Benigno Aquino. It was widely suspected that Marcos had ordered Aquino killed, thereby overstepping the proper bounds of the state's legitimate authority to maintain order. The women's suffrage movement in England also benefited from the public outcry that greeted police treatment of the suffragettes during a series of demonstrations prior to World War I. Those demonstrations and the public reaction to them put decisive pressure on the government to accede to movement demands. In this country, national attention and support for the civil rights movement grew with each celebrated instance of police brutality. In Birmingham, in 1963, the use of fire hoses and police dogs against peaceful demonstrators provoked national outrage and increased political

support for civil rights legislation (McAdam 1982: 178). Two years later the brutal beating of several hundred marchers in Selma, Alabama, again mobilized support for the movement and for legislation designed to counter the effects of segregation (Garrow 1978). This aided passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Finally, the 1989 massacre of prodemocracy demonstrators by Chinese Army units clearly generated worldwide support for the movement. As yet, however, it is too early to tell whether that support will prove decisive against a Communist party elite clearly willing to use massive force to remain in power.

Besides these examples of unintended support, government officials may also act intentionally to aid a movement. President Bush's public opposition to abortion provided a powerful impetus to pro-life organizing in this country. Officials in the Kennedy administration worked hard to convince several foundations to increase their financial support for civil rights groups engaged in voter registration activities (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). The environmental movement appears to have received crucial early backing from figures in the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nixon administration (Gale 1986). Finally, it would be hard to overstate the importance of the Supreme Court's decision in the 1954 case of *Brown* v. *Topeka Board of Education* in helping trigger the civil rights movement. By declaring segregation in schools to be unconstitutional, the court provided a powerful impetus to the movement by legitimating efforts to eliminate segregation (McAdam 1982: 110–12).

As these various examples suggest, it would be a mistake to see the various components and branches of the state as always acting in consort either to oppose or support a movement. More recent scholarship on state/movement relations has instead focused on divisions within the state and efforts to exploit these divisions. For example, scholars of the American civil rights movement (Garrow 1978; McAdam 1982, 1983, Barkan 1985) have demonstrated the necessity of examining the interplay of different branches and geographical units of government in accounting for the success or failure of movement campaigns. The actions of southern sheriffs and voter registrars often triggered Justice Department suits. Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus's defiance of court-ordered school desegregation prompted President Eisenhower to send federal troops to Little Rock to resolve the crisis. This is not to say that federal authorities were aggressive advocates of movement goals. On the contrary, federal support was most obviously forthcoming on those occasions when movement forces were able to provoke southern authorities into well-publicized and extreme violations of black civil rights. This response gave movement forces sufficient leverage to achieve significant civil rights gains.

Similarly, different branches of government may be at odds with one another or may afford movements better or worse opportunities to pursue their goals. In a system of divided power, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches may at times represent different interests and therefore be pitted against one another when it comes to a particular social movement.

This was certainly the case with the civil rights movement. Because of the traditional Republican weakness in the South, Democratic representatives and senators were typically reelected time and time again. When coupled with the

congressional system of seniority, this granted southern senators and representatives enormous power and influence within both houses of Congress; so much so that Congress functioned historically as an opponent of *any* civil rights legislation. By contrast, after 1940, the U.S. Supreme Court functioned as a real ally of the movement, ruling time and time again in favor of expanded rights for blacks and other minorities. During this same time period, the executive branch assumed a more ambiguous stance, midway between the position of the Court and Congress. Every president from Rutherford B. Hayes to Herbert Hoover could be classified fairly well as a segregationist (Sitkoff 1978, McAdam 1982). Then, as the importance of the so-called black vote grew in presidential politics, politicians with national ambitions were forced to assume a more favorable stance in regard to the civil rights movement. Accordingly, when pressed, presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did take more supportive action than had their predecessors (McAdam 1982: 84–86). At the same time, then, that civil rights activists were battling segregationists in the South, the various branches of the federal establishment were fighting with one another over the direction of U.S. civil rights policy.

Countermovements

In challenging the status quo, social movements invite opposition. To the extent that opposition takes on an organized, relatively enduring character, we can say that a countermovement has developed. *A countermovement is thus an organized collective effort designed to defeat or destroy a social movement.* The composition of the countermovement depends to a large extent on the nature and extent of the threat posed by the original movement. Revolutionary social movements attempt to drastically alter state policies or overthrow regimes. In such cases, the state itself becomes the countermovement. But most social movements do not represent regime challenges; their goals are far more limited. Instead, they threaten some groups or classes and not others. The result is often a contest among groups over specific policy outcomes and generalized political influence. Should a countermovement arise in this situation, it is bound to be more limited in scope and membership than those that arise to challenge revolutionary movements.

Some examples of countermovements will help illustrate the concept and the role they play in shaping the fate of social movements. A good example of a contemporary countermovement is the pro-life movement. Most observers attribute the rise of the movement to the 1973 Supreme Court decision in *Roe* v. *Wade* that firmly established a woman's right to an abortion. Outraged by the decision, pro-life advocates have been active ever since in various efforts to try to overturn or otherwise undermine the ruling. One might even term the prowar demonstrations that developed during the Persian Gulf War a countermovement. At least it appeared as if the demonstrations were organized primarily *in response to* the sizeable antiwar marches that characterized the first week or so of the war.

Under what conditions are countermovements likely to arise? There is no clear-cut answer to this question, but quite often the emergence of a countermovement would seem to be associated with a clear expression of support for the fledgling movement by some powerful and influential group. In the case of the Nicaraguan Contras, for example, it would be hard to overestimate the importance of U.S. support in triggering the movement. The same could be said for the role of the Catholic Church in encouraging the pro-life movement in this country. Then too, the so-called southern resistance that sprung up in opposition to the civil rights movement seems to have grown in response to acts of defiance by political figures. So Arkansas governor Orville Faubus's 1957 refusal to integrate Central High School in Little Rock helped catalyze southern opposition to integration. So too did Alabama governor George Wallace's campaign promise to "stand in the schoolhouse door" if necessary to prevent the desegregation of Alabama schools. When Wallace then acted on the promise in a futile symbolic effort to prevent the registration of the first black student at the University of Alabama, the southern resistance movement received yet another shot in the arm. Eventually, of course, the southern countermovement failed, as it would seem most such movements do. But while they are active, they constitute an important force with which the original movement must contend.

Competing Social Movement Organizations

Earlier we emphasized the crucial transition that elevates formal organizations to preeminent positions in the life of the later movement. Nothing ensures that a single organization will come to exercise exclusive influence over the affairs of the mature movement, however. Instead, it is more likely that a number of organizations will vie with one another for influence within a given movement. The term *social-movement industry* (SMI) is used by McCarthy and Zald (1973) to describe the full complement of social-movement organizations (SMOs) that may arise in a particular movement. Exactly which types of movements and under what conditions they are most likely to give rise to competing SMOs is not clear, though certainly older or larger movements seem to be especially fertile ground for the development of a full-blown SMI.

Examples of movements that are blessed (or cursed, depending on one's point of view) with multiple SMOs are easy to think of. The environmental movement in this country affords a contemporary example. While the Sierra Club may be the best known group in the movement, they are by no means the only one. Organizations such as Greenpeace, Earth First, the Nature Conservancy, and the National Wildlife Federation, among others, compete with the Sierra Club for influence and with the attention with policymakers and general public alike. Historically, it is very difficult to think of any major movement that did not at some point give rise to a number of roughly equivalent and often competing groups. We no longer think of Christianity as a social movement, but that is exactly what it began as. And until the Council of Nicaea unified the Church in A.D. 352, the movement was little more than a congeries of competing groups and sects. Closer to home, both the labor and civil rights

movements featured numerous competitors for organizational dominance. Among the most prominent SMOs to vie for members and influence in the labor movement were the International Workers of the World (IWW), the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). At the height of the civil rights movement, the lion's share of attention and credit went to the Big 4 civil rights groups: the NAACP, CORE, SNCC, and SCLC (McAdam 1982: 153–55).

So the fate of a movement may rest as much on internal organizational competition as on opposition from outside groups or forces. Let us return to our example of the tuition protest movement. Imagine that the meeting of students following the second day's demonstration features a marked disagreement over the course of action the movement should take next. One group of students, drawn largely from fraternities and sororities, argues for the suspension of demonstrations in favor of the type of negotiations the administration had alluded to. Another group with strong ties to campus political groups favors stepped-up demonstrations and a general student strike. Amidst cries of "sell-out" and "radical," the meeting breaks up with both factions declaring themselves the rightful voice of the movement.

In succeeding weeks, the course of the movement's development will turn as much on the outcome of this factional dispute as on any negotiations between the movement and the administration. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the more moderate of the two factions would reach some agreement with the administration only to see that agreement ignored by supporters of the other faction. Even more likely, the conflict between the two factions could grow so intense as to overshadow the tuition issue and lead to the demise of the movement. Certainly, history does not lack for examples of movements that succumbed to internal dissension and bitter infighting. In particular, revolutionary movements have always been especially vulnerable to factionalism. In France, the onset of the revolution in 1789 and the establishment of the Legislative Assembly two years later led to a period of bitter infighting between various factions intent on directing the course of the struggle. In contemporary South Africa, violent clashes between supporters of Nelson Mandela's African National Congress and Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's South African Black Alliance continue to mar the drive for an end to apartheid.

Two of the most prominent movements in recent U.S. history were rent by and ultimately succumbed to intense factional conflict. The New Left broke apart amidst bitter sectarian infighting that peaked in the early 1970s. The black power movement experienced similar internal divisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, on at least one occasion, rival black power groups—Black Panthers and US (United Slaves)—engaged in a shoot-out in San Diego that left at least two people dead. It is interesting to note that this incident was sparked, in part, by clandestine law enforcement efforts to stir up trouble between the two groups (Marx 1979). This should serve to remind us that the line between internal and external conflict is often a hard one to draw. What appears on the surface to be a purely internal conflict may well have its roots in the conscious efforts of external groups to destroy a movement from within.

To this point we have emphasized the negative effect of conflict between competing factions or SMOs within a single movement. Quite often, however, the

presence of more than one SMO proves beneficial to the movement. Multiple groups often take on distinctive identities that serve to broaden a movement's appeal. So in the civil rights movement, SNCC and CORE's reputation as the most radical of the Big 4 groups made them magnets for students and others with liberal or leftist political views. SCLC, on the other hand, appealed to those with strong religious backgrounds. Finally, older, more conservative persons tended to be attracted to the traditional legalistic approach of the NAACP (Clark 1970: 295, McAdam 1982: 154–56).

The presence of a number of SMOs in a single movement is also likely to make it more difficult for opponents to defeat or destroy the movement. Rather than having to eliminate a single group, opponents find themselves confronting a number of challengers. Finally, a movement that boasts a number of SMOs spanning a wide political spectrum may be able to benefit from what has been termed the "radical flank effect" (Haines 1988). The term is used to describe one effect that often follows from the presence of "extremist" SMOs within the same movement with other more "moderate" groups. As Haines (1988) shows in his analysis of changes in the funding of the major civil rights organizations, such a situation is likely to benefit the moderate SMOs. In the case of the civil rights movement, the growing radicalism of SNCC and CORE encouraged increased funding support for the more moderate groups (NAACP, Urban League) as a way of undercutting the influence of the "extremists." Jasper and Nelkin (1992), offer a contemporary example of this dynamic drawn from their study of the animal rights movement. The author's show that the threat of raids by "radical" groups such as the Animal Liberation Front has prompted universities, cosmetics companies, and other testing facilities, to engage in good-faith negotiations with such "moderate" groups as PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals).

A similar dynamic may also characterize state/movement relations. Increasingly, the demands of movements are being adjudicated by representatives of the state. To respond to a movement, these representatives must focus on the movement leaders and organizations that seem to speak for the movement and yet who are perceived to be reasonable coalition partners. In such a situation, the presence of extremist SMOs can actually help legitimate and strengthen the bargaining hand of more moderate SMOs. This does not happen in all cases, however. Sometimes the actions of extremists precipitate a backlash that undercuts the leverage and sympathy previously enjoyed by more moderate elements within the movement. Indeed, this dynamic may help explain why moderate civil rights groups found their access to the president and other elected officials gradually reduced as the 1960s wore on. The rhetorical militancy of the Black Panthers and other black power groups so angered lawmakers and public alike that all manner of civil rights leaders found doors closed to them (McAdam 1982: 205–27). No public official wanted to be identified with an issue that had been discredited by the actions of extremist elements within the movement.

Mass Media

One other group that often has a profound effect on the development of a movement is the media (Molotch 1979, Gitlin 1980). Given that most movements are

small and localized to begin with, if they are to grow, they must be able to attract the attention of a broader audience. This requires that the movement have some means of disseminating information about itself. The mass media will not, however, be involved in all cases or at all stages of a movement. In fact, at the very outset of most movements, word of mouth and other informal means of communication are likely to prove very functional. Our hypothetical tuition protest movement is a good case in point. Most college campuses are ideally suited for the rapid spread of information, with or without the cooperation of the mass media. Imagine if a group of students were to stage a demonstration in front of the administration building on your campus. Wouldn't you be likely to hear about the demonstration fairly soon after it happened? The answer, we suspect, is yes. The point is: college campuses are crisscrossed with well-established lines of communication that makes reliance on the mass media unnecessary. So for a student movement to grow *on a given campus*, the media need not be involved.

But what about *between campuses*? If a movement is to grow beyond its localized beginnings, the media is almost certain to be implicated in the process. This does not mean that the other more informal means of communication will no longer be used. But, almost certainly, they will diminish in importance. Specific instances of student protest activity can be cited as examples of this process. Following the February 2, 1960, initiation in Greensboro, North Carolina, of lunch counter sit-ins by four students at North Carolina A&T, the movement spread rapidly to most black colleges in the South. Informal ties between schools close to one another played a role in this process (Oppenheimer 1989), but so too did television and newspaper coverage of the demonstrations. Julian Bond, one of the leaders of the movement in Atlanta, describes the beginnings of events there:

> On about the third day of February, 1960, I was sitting in what was then Yates and Milton's Drugstore…which was sort of a student hangout. …Sitting in the back there, just doing nothing, I guess, by myself. A fellow came over whom I knew to be Lonnie King. …And he came up to me and he showed me a copy of the Atlanta *Daily World*. …I know it was the third or fourth of February because the headline said, "Greensboro Student Sit-In, Third Day."
>
> He said, "Have you seen that?" And I was sort of irritated and I said, "Yeah, you know, I read the papers." And he said, "What do you think about it?" And I said, "Well it's all right, pretty good stuff." And he said, "Don't you think it ought to happen here?" And I said, "It probably will." And he said, "Let's make it happen." …And he said, "You take this side of the drugstore and I'll take the other and we'll call a meeting for Sale Hall Annex [a building on the campus] for noon today to talk about it." So I took half the drugstore, and he took half, and we had a meeting of a small group of people, about twenty people. And the next day enlarged it to more and more, and that began the student movement. (Quoted in Raines 1983: 84)

The spread of campus antiwar protests in the late 1960s also reflected both personal and media influences, as did the proliferation of student strikes in the aftermath of the killings at Kent and Jackson State. But the media may well function as more than simply conduits of information on behalf of a given movement. Through the tone of its coverage, the media may shape public opinion and, in so doing, constrain the ways in which officials and opponents respond to the movement.

Such was the case in the Birmingham campaign described earlier in the chapter. There, after several days of uncharacteristic restraint, Birmingham's notorious commissioner of public safety, Bull Connor, trained fire hoses and unleashed attack dogs on peaceful demonstrators. The resulting scenes of demonstrators being slammed into storefronts by the force of the hoses and attacked by snarling police dogs were picked up and broadcast nationwide on the nightly news. Still pictures of the same events appeared in newspapers and magazines throughout the nation and the world. The former Soviet Union used the pictures as anti-American propaganda at home and abroad. Thus, the media's coverage of the events in Birmingham succeeded in generating enormous sympathy for the demonstrators and putting increased pressure on the federal government to intervene on behalf of the movement.

Indeed, this appears to have been the intent of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in organizing the demonstrations (Hubbard 1968: 5, Watters 1971: 266, McAdam 1982: 178). The Birmingham campaign took place shortly before Bull Connor was to be replaced as commissioner of public safety. The natural question to raise is why didn't the SCLC wait until the violence-prone Connor was out of office before initiating demonstrations. The likely answer is that they hoped Connor would respond with the kind of violence that would attract the level of media attention needed to pressure President Kennedy to act. And act he did, first by pressuring city officials to negotiate a settlement that brought an end to the demonstrations and later by sponsoring the strengthened bill that was to become the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Another example of an SMO that has used sympathetic media coverage to generate support for itself and its program is the direct-action environmental group Greenpeace. In recent years, Greenpeace has shown considerable skill in orchestrating confrontations between its own small boats and the much larger whaling ships and naval vessels of several nations. The ostensible goal of these confrontations has been to disrupt the whaling operations or nuclear tests that were planned. When covered by the media, however, the confrontations serve a more general educational and propaganda function. By depicting the confrontations as a kind of modern-day version of the David and Goliath story, the media has generated a great deal of support and attention for Greenpeace while also increasing public opposition to whaling and nuclear test practices.

There is no guarantee, however, that the media will respond favorably to a movement. It is as likely that the media will ignore it or depict it as a disruptive social force, thereby lessening public support and legitimating official efforts to curb or destroy it. Imagine what the fate of our hypothetical tuition protest movement would be if the campus and local newspapers were to severely criticize the demonstrators for resisting arrest and battling with police. This editorial tone would almost certainly discourage many other students from getting involved, arouse the ire of many in the community, and embolden the administration to take harsh punitive action against the student "radicals." The impact of these effects on the fledgling movement could only be negative.

There is no shortage of examples of the media playing this type of role in the case of real-life movements. During the later years of the black struggle, media

coverage of the Black Panthers tended to focus on the group's violent rhetoric and militant posturing rather than on the actual activities in which the group engaged. These activities were generally far more reformist or ameliorative in nature than the group's image as violent revolutionaries would lead one to suspect. For example, the Panthers concentrated much of their time and energy on a hot-breakfast program in the Oakland schools as well as in coordinating unarmed auto patrols to monitor police behavior at accident or crime sites. The media's coverage of the group, however, went a long way toward creating an image of violence and in so doing, granting law enforcement officials a great deal of leeway in repressing the Panthers. In the years immediately following World War I, the popular press helped fuel the so-called Red Scare with sensationalist stories that warned of the rising tide of Bolshevism in the United States. One causality of the scare was the radical wing of the labor movement, whose decimation by government repression was legitimated by the yellow journalism of the period.

Even when the media does not intend to damage a movement, it may do so by the very nature of its coverage. Sociologist Todd Gitlin (1980) has argued that television coverage in the 1960s and 1970s damaged the New Left by trivializing the issues the movement sought to address and by elevating certain figures to the status of "movement stars," thereby creating jealousies within the movement. The extraordinary media attention granted Martin Luther King, Jr., seems also to have rankled other civil rights leaders and contributed to the growing dissension within the movement as the sixties wore on.

Mature movements, then, confront a variety of other groups who have varying and often contradictory stakes in the movement. How well the movement, or rather its specific SMOs, are able to negotiate these conflicting demands will go a long way toward determining the fate of the movement.

MOVEMENT GOALS AND TACTICS

Faced with these pressures from other groups, SMOs face an uphill battle to survive, let alone change existing social, political, or economic arrangements. At the same time, SMOs are not entirely powerless in their dealings with these other groups. Perhaps the most powerful means of influence they have at their disposal are the goals they choose to pursue and the tactics they utilize in this pursuit. Both are used to compete with other SMOs, persuade authorities, neutralize opponents, and gain access to the media. In effect, an SMO uses its goals and tactics to mediate between the conflicting demands imposed on it by these various groups. Let us briefly discuss each of these means.

Goals

Social-movement organizations can pursue a seemingly endless variety of goals, and each distinct goal can be expected to elicit very different responses from the other parties to the conflict. Let us return to the example of the tuition protest movement. As the movement develops, it is possible that any number of goals will

be pursued by the two factions that have emerged. The most immediate goal would be the revocation or reduction of the tuition hike. But other goals would likely emerge as well. An obvious one would be the suspension of all disciplinary action against the students involved in the demonstrations. But one could imagine other goals being pursued as well. Some students might call for an investigation into the actions of campus police during the demonstrations. Others might demand the resignation of the campus police chief or the administrator who called the police in. One could also imagine the movement addressing goals far removed from the tuition issue. For example, the movement might call for the addition of student members to the board of regents, or a general review of the workings of student government. In general, as the students begin to challenge their lack of power or influence in campus matters, there is a good chance they will start addressing a variety of grievances—inadequate parking, overcrowded classes, working conditions of student employees, poor academic counseling—harbored for a long time.

Nothing about this scenario is far-fetched. The evolution of movement goals is an inherently unpredictable process. Many movements that start out with very modest reform aims over time come to embrace much more radical goals. The civil rights movement is a good case in point. Many date the beginning of that movement to the 1955–56 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama. The original goals of the boycott—the hiring of black bus drivers, courtesy to all passengers, a seating arrangement that would allow black passengers to occupy the first empty seat behind the last white passenger—were modest indeed (King 1958). By the late 1960s, the goals of the black movement had changed dramatically to stress the need to achieve fundamental political and economic equality with whites. Among the specific goals voiced at the time by some black leaders were the demand for billions in reparations from white America and the annexation of land within the United States to create a separate black nation.

The reverse may happen as well, with broad revolutionary aims giving way to more modest reform goals. The women's rights movement that began in the United States in the 1840s initially addressed an array of very radical goals ranging from the establishment of property rights for women to the abolition of sexual monogamy. After its hiatus during the Civil War, the movement reemerged as the women's suffrage movement, having substituted the single reform goal of female enfranchisement for the range of radical goals voiced before the war.

If the evolution of movement goals is a somewhat unpredictable process, we *can* say something more definitive about the type of goals movements may pursue and the relationship of each to the chances for movement success. In doing so, we employ two distinctions suggested by Gamson (1990: 41) to differentiate various types of movement goals.

1. *Single versus multiple goals.* One decision SMOs must make is whether to pursue a single goal or a variety of goals. Should the tuition protestors seek only the repeal or reduction of the tuition hike or address a wide range of student grievances under the unifying banner of the movement? There might appear to be a virtue in the second approach, promising as it does to draw more people to the movement than the single

tuition issue might. Then too a single-issue organization that succeeds in achieving its goal faces extinction. Not so with a group pursuing many goals; if it achieves a particular goal it can simply shift its energies to a number of other issues.

On reflection, however, it is clear that there are drawbacks with the multiple-goal strategy as well. For one thing, the pursuit of a number of goals promises to spread thin the already precious resources and energies of the SMO. If spread too thin, the organization will likely be able to accomplish little or nothing. Just as dangerous is the impetus to internal dissension and factionalism that the pursuit of many goals may furnish. Who gets to decide who will work on what goals and what resources will be expended for which purposes? If an SMO settles on a single issue, it eliminates a number of potentially divisive issues such as these.

Gamson empirically documents the greater problems posed by the multiple-issue approach. In his book *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Gamson sought to determine which characteristics of fifty-three SMOs were related to success. One of the characteristics he looked at was the distinction between single and multiple issues. His findings show clearly that single-issue groups are more likely to be successful than SMOs addressing a range of goals (Gamson 1990: 44–46).

2. *Displacing versus nondisplacing goals.* Besides the number of goals being pursued by an SMO, Gamson also looked at the nature of those goals. Specifically, he distinguished goals on the basis of whether or not they require the replacement of the group's opponent. Obviously, all revolutionary groups seek to overthrow established political authority. For more moderate reform groups, however, the issue of displacement is often a very real one as well. For example, in seeking the franchise for women, suffrage organizations generally did *not* call for the ouster of elected officials who had opposed them. In the civil rights movement, however, the so-called Big 4 were united in their call for the replacement of southern registrars with impartial federal registrars. Among the various goals listed for our hypothetical tuition protest movement, some, such as the reduction in the fee increase or amnesty for all student demonstrators, are clearly nondisplacing goals, while others—for instance, the ouster of the administrator who called the police in—would require the displacement of movement opponents.

It should be fairly obvious which of these types of goals is more likely to be achieved. To pursue displacing goals is to threaten some entrenched—and probably powerful—group or individual. This means displacing groups are almost certain to face stronger and more determined opposition than are nondisplacing groups. Gamson's findings are consistent with this view. Of the SMOs he studied, those that pursued nondisplacing goals were far more likely to be successful than those who sought to replace an opponent (Gamson 1990: 41–44).

Tactics

Not only the goals of an SMO but its tactics shape the nature and extent of the opposition it encounters. The ongoing interaction between an SMO and its opponents resembles a giant chess match. Each move the SMO makes constrains the responses of its opponents. This is especially true in democracies where the political rights of most groups are well established. The state or other opponents can respond to movement groups only within narrowly prescribed limits. The strategic choices made by the SMO largely determine what those limits are.

We can better understand this idea by first listing the social-control options available to movement opponents and then discussing how appropriate each is in light of the major strategic choices open to the SMO. Generally, opponents—especially the state—have three types of controls at their disposal.

1. *Normative or symbolic.* Why do we ordinarily abide by the normal routines of everyday life? The simple answer is that we have come to accept those routines as somehow proper or legitimate. It rarely occurs to us to do any differently. That is because we have been so well socialized into these routines that we tend to carry them out more or less unconsciously in our everyday lives. This is true in regard to political life as well. Every society devises "proper channels" to routinize political decision making. These channels tend to be dominated by and therefore to favor those in power. The first line of defense, then, against those who would challenge the status quo are these proper channels and the norms and symbolic controls that prompt people to abide by the "rules of the game."

2. *Material or political.* Movement opponents generally have an array of material or political incentives that they can employ to control the actions of movement groups. These incentives can either be positive, as in the case of jobs or the granting of new political rights, or negative, as in the threatened loss of employment for political activity.

3. *Physical control.* As a last resort, movement opponents can always seek to control a movement by physical means. These means include infiltration and subversion as well as the use of violence (Marx 1974, 1979). The use of these controls, however, poses serious risks for any opponent besides the state. Theoretically, only the state has the legitimate right to use physical force to maintain order. Historically, however, one can point to any number of instances in which private parties have successfully used these same controls against particular social movements. During the early days of the labor movement, firms often hired their own private armies to break up strikes. For years, southern segregationists used lynching as the ultimate weapon to deter political and economic challenge by blacks. In general, though, the private use of these controls is illegal and subject to punitive action by the state.

The above represent an impressive array of controls. For their part, movement groups typically have far fewer options and resources at their disposal than do their opponents. So how do SMOs ever prevail in their confrontations with state and private opponents? They do so by choosing tactics that restrict the control options that can legitimately be used by their opponents. To illustrate this dynamic, let us return to the tuition protest movement and walk through the strategic choices that student leaders must make. Specifically, they confront at least three decisions.

1. *Institutionalized versus noninstitutionalized.* Any group trying to advance its interests must first decide whether or not to do so within "proper channels." If the group opts to stay within those channels, it is not a social movement by our earlier definition.

   But what if, as was true with the tuition protestors, the group chooses to organize outside the established decision-making channels? What if it decides to forego the institutionalized forms of political action in favor of demonstrations, mass marches, and other similar tactics? This choice effectively eliminates normative or symbolic controls from the arsenal of the group's opponents. The first line of defense against tactical challenges to the status quo has been breached. Instead of lodging formal complaints with the dean of students or having the student senate draft a resolution condemning the tuition hike, the protestors have bypassed the normal channels within which they exercise so little leverage. By stepping outside those channels, they have also reduced the number of control options available to the administration, while raising the costs of those controls available. Dealing with complaints transmitted through "proper channels" costs little; putting down an emergent protest movement is likely to prove considerably more expensive.

2. *Legal versus illegal.* The next strategic choice the movement must make is whether or not to break the law in pursuit of its goals. For example, student protestors may decide to illegally occupy the administration building to protest the tuition hike and to pressure the administration into meeting with movement leaders. Such an action would obviously raise the costs of controlling the movement beyond what they had been previously. The costs in this case would now include the disruptive effect of the occupation on university business, the attendant publicity to the school, and the expense of clearing the building and prosecuting the protestors.

   From a strategic point of view, the interesting point about the escalation in the students' tactics is that it grants the administration no greater leeway to control the movement. Indeed, if anything, the range of controls open to the administration is once again narrowed. Not only has the students' action eliminated normative and symbolic controls as an effective response to the movement, but it has also rendered the threat of legal punishment less effective. Having broken the law, students have shown that their fear of arrest is not sufficient to keep them in line. And yet, despite the escalation in the students' tactics, as long as the demonstrations remain peaceful, the administration will be unable to use serious force or violence to control the movement. Thus, through their actions, the tuition protestors have once again restricted the social controls available to their opponents while simultaneously increasing the cost of those controls.

3. *Nonviolent versus violent.* The final decision any movement group must make is whether to employ violence in the service of its goals. If it does, it will have to contend with the violent reprisals that its actions are almost certain to provoke among opponents. Imagine, for example, what would happen if the tuition protestors not only occupied but cleared the administration building and destroyed the school's financial records. No longer would the use of official force be viewed as illegitimate in controlling the protestors. Whatever popular sympathy the protestors might have been able to arouse among students and the general public would almost certainly evaporate in the face of this action. And with that sympathy would go any protection from force on the part of the administration or local law enforcement officials. Instead of restricting the controls available to its opponents, the actions of the demonstrators would legitimate an expansion in the controls that could be used to curb the movement.

   Though based on a hypothetical example, this discussion helps explain outcomes observed in real life. For example, it helps account for the notable successes achieved by nonviolent protest movements. Movements as diverse as Gandhi's Indian independence movement, the American civil rights movement, and the women's suffrage struggle in England were able to overcome much stronger opponents through the use of tactics that effectively neutralized the opponents' superior control capabilities. This is the unique genius of illegal, yet nonviolent movements. They neutralize the most common controls—normative, legal—while restraining the use of violence by opponents. Should frustrated authorities then resort to violence, public sympathy and support is likely to accrue to the movement.

   This dynamic is applicable, however, only in nominally democratic societies. As long as a system of governance rests, at least in theory, on the consent of the governed, then nonviolent movements stand to benefit from the unrestrained use of force or violence against activists. Nondemocratic states, on the other hand, are less vulnerable to this dynamic. Since such states do not claim to govern on the basis of popular consent, they can repress a popular movement with considerable impunity. This, of course, is what happened in Beijing in the summer of 1989. Whether the massacre of Chinese students will, in the long run, weaken the Chinese Communist state remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the event did not immediately

benefit the movement, as it no doubt would have had it occurred in a democratic society.

MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

Movement groups, then, are not powerless in the face of the state, countermovements, or the media. Instead, through the choices they make regarding goals and tactics, they help shape the likely responses of these groups. Should movement groups be able, then, to reconcile the conflicting demands placed on them by these other parties, they may actually survive long enough to become a force for significant social change. This raises the question of outcomes. Besides achieving specific goals, what are the more general consequences that may follow from a successful social movement? We can identify at least four that seem to be especially important.

1. *New political or economic changes.* One outcome of certain successful movements is the provision of new political or economic benefits. Indeed, on rare occasions, the two have gone hand in hand. The civil rights movement granted southern blacks the vote and ultimately a greater share of electoral power in the region. The movement also benefited blacks—especially middle-class blacks—economically by ending certain discriminatory employment practices and establishing affirmative action programs to stimulate minority hiring. Gandhi's movement on behalf of India's untouchables resulted in a similar mix of economic and political benefits, as caste restrictions were relaxed or eliminated, paving the way for more political and economic opportunities for group members.

   Other movements have resulted in either one or the other type of benefit. The women's suffrage movement gained women the vote but did little to change the economic circumstances of their lives. To date, the democracy movements of Eastern Europe and the various independence movements in the former Soviet republics have had similar effects. Citizens in the former Warsaw Pact countries have political rights and freedom unprecedented under communism, but with little consequent improvement in their economic status. In contrast, the women's movement in the United States appears to have had more of an impact economically than politically. While feminists have played an ever more active role in electoral politics, the main achievements of the movement seem to have come in the area of employment discrimination and job opportunity.

   The political and economic effects of movements may, however, extend well beyond the extension of specific benefits to the challenging group. One of the most dramatic and significant of the possible outcomes of a social movement is a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power in society. Such a redistribution can come about in several ways. First, most successful revolutionary movements entail a dramatic and thoroughgoing transformation of a country's political and economic system. Revolutions have been the vehicles by which the Communists came to power in Russia, the founding fathers threw off British rule in the Colonies, and the Sandinistas expelled Somoza from Nicaragua. In all of these cases, the result was a fundamental change in the composition of those holding political and economic power in society.

   On a less dramatic scale, particular reform movements may also affect the structure of political power in a given country. For example, during the 1930s the U.S. labor movement succeeded in establishing itself as a partner in the Democratic party coalition that would remain—with the exception of the Eisenhower years—in power until 1968. In effect, the movement transformed a previously powerless sector of American society into one of the major interest groups shaping public policy in the country.

In similar fashion, the civil rights movement affected the distribution of political power in the United States in three important ways. First, the establishment of voting rights for blacks in the South paved the way for greater black electoral representation in the region. Second, blacks took advantage of the momentum generated by the movement to become a major force in urban politics throughout the country. Finally, by breaking the electoral monopoly enjoyed by Democrats in the South, the movement paved the way for Republican gains not only regionally, but nationally as well. Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush all benefited from sizeable electoral majorities in a region once controlled by the Democrats.

On a much smaller scale, the gay rights movement has succeeded in establishing homosexuals as a powerful interest group in San Francisco and several other cities nationwide.

2. *Specific legislation.* Other successful movements do not so much extend new benefits to particular groups as result in the passage of legislation affecting everyone. The Temperance movement provides a good example of this second type of outcome. Though the effect proved to be short-lived, Temperance forces were successful in pressing for the ratification of the 18th Amendment, which for a period of years made illegal the manufacture, sale, or consumption of alcoholic beverages.

   The turn-of-the-century Progressive movement resulted in the passage of numerous pieces of reform legislation, among them bills to regulate the meat-packing industry and to provide for the removal of corrupt public officials by means of the recall process. Over the past twenty years, environmental movements in several Western democracies have enjoyed notable success in pressing for new legislation regulating all manner of environmental hazards. In this country, the struggle between pro-life and pro-choice forces is precisely over this kind of legislative outcome. Both sides seek the passage of laws (and their legal ratification) that would proscribe a set of reproductive practices for all.

3. *Changes in public opinion and behavior.* Another way in which the effects of a given social movement can be felt throughout society is through a gradual process of education and resocialization that results in more general shifts in public opinion and behavior. The contemporary women's movement provides a number of examples of this type of indirect effect. Over the past twenty years, the impact of the movement and the feminist consciousness it has inspired has filtered into virtually every area of life in the United States. Child-rearing practices, television advertising, household labor, and occupational expectations all bear the imprint of the women's movement. By changing the way women and men view themselves, the movement has had a far-reaching effect on virtually all aspects of life in the United States.

   Though perhaps not as dramatic, the environmental movement has also given rise to a popular consciousness in this country that, in turn, has been responsible for significant shifts in attitude and behavior on the part of many Americans. From recycling to the purchase of smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, life in 1990s America bears the stamp of this environmental consciousness.

4. *The creation of new organizations or institutions.* Finally, social movements may give rise to new organizations or entire institutions. Revolutions represent the most extreme case of this process, as new economies and systems of government are created to replace the "old order." In the newly created United States, a federal government was established to take the place of the old colonial assemblies and governor's councils that had ruled prior to the revolution. Under Fidel Castro, Cuba has witnessed the transformation of its economic, political, educational, and cultural institutions. The same process occurred on a much larger scale in China in the 1940s, as the last vestiges of Western influence and imperial rule were replaced by a centralized state structure fashioned along Marxist–Leninist lines. Today, throughout Eastern Europe, reformers are engaged in the opposite kind of struggle, as they seek to dismantle Soviet-style political and economic systems in favor of parliamentary democracies and modified market economies.