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An Overview of Decision Making | ||||
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Decision Making Processes | ||||
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Rationality | ||||
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Rational / Classic Model of Decision Making | ||||
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Bounded Rationality & Satisficing by Simon (These are components of the Admin Model) | ||||
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The Orgl Env, Technology & Decision Making | ||||
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Administrative Model of Decision Making by March & Simon | ||||
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Organized Anarchies | ||||
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Garbage Can Model of Decision Making | ||||
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Consequences of the Garbage Can Model of Dec Mking | ||||
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Recognition Primed Decision Making | ||||
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A Comparison of Rational Decision Making & Recognition Primed Decision Making | ||||
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Intuitive Decision Making | ||||
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The Role of Information & Decision Making | ||||
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Organizational Power | ||||
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Power & Decision Making | ||||
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Strategic Decisions | ||||
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Organizational Goals & Decision Making | ||||
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Escalating Situations | ||||
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Ethical Decision Making: Boundary Dilemmas | ||||
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The Options for Dealing w/ Unethical Behavior |
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- Bibliography | ||||
BOUNDED RATIONALITY DENOTES THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE APPLICATION OF RATIONALITY TO ANY DECISION | |||||
There is a limited amount of rationality available in the decision making process | |||||
In 1957 Simon developed the important concept of Bounded Rationality which lead to a Nobel Prize in Economics | |||||
Bounded rationality denotes the inability of any system to provide maximum or even adequate information for decision making & to the inability to process even the available, inadequate info | |||||
Bounded rationality denotes that the ability to reason is constrained by the limitations of the mind itself & of the ability for people to work together & combine their knowledge in a social, orgl, etc. env | |||||
The more important the decision, the greater the number of factors affecting the org & the outcomes of the proposed course of action | |||||
It is often impossible for decision makers to simultaneously consider all the info relevant to a decision & use all this info to make an optimal choice | |||||
The bounded rationality perspective applies mostly to nonprogram decisions | |||||
The novel, unclear, complex aspects of nonprogram decisions mean hard data & logical procedures are not available | |||||
POST MODERNISTS & OTHERS FEAR THE POTENTIAL POWER OF TOTAL RATIONALITY IN DEC MKING | |||||
The ability to handle multitudinous factors in decision making is still not available today to the degree that those affected by the decision would desire | |||||
Such an ability to address multitudinous factors would allow the prediction of social / human behavior, thus the desire of the rationalists is to gain this power, & the fear of the post modernists is that fallible, self interested people will gain this power | |||||
Simon, building on the idea that leaders recognize that they are making decisions based on limited, incomplete info, do not attempt to maximize outcomes | |||||
For Simon, leaders, decision makers & even orgs attempt to satisfice | |||||
SATISFICING DENOTES THAT DEC MKERS SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE A SATISFACTORY DEC, NOT AN OPTIMAL ONE | |||||
Satisficing is the orchestration of an outcome that is less than perfect but satisfactory given the unknown, dynamic conditions | |||||
Satisficing is the searching for & choosing acceptable responses to problems & opportunities that are not necessarily the best possible responses | |||||
When the concept of satisficing replaces the concept of maximizing in econ analysis, the entire predicted behavior based on classical econ / business models changes dramatically | |||||
THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL DENOTES THAT PEOPLE LOOK PRIMARILY AT STANDARD SOLUTIONS TO ANY PROBLEMS WHICH ARE FOUND IN THE CAN, INSTEAD OF SEEKING NOVEL SOLUTIONS | |||||
Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972, built on Simon's ideas: the garbage can model of decision making has been developed in light of bounded rationality & satisficing |
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The garbage can model demonstrates that orgs have a repertoire of responses to problems which are located in the org's or individual's garbage can | |||||
If a problem arises, orgs look in the garbage can for one of their standard responses, & if the response appears to be satisfactory, it is applied to the problem | |||||
A weakness of this model is that orgs frequently do not recognized a problem that they can deal w/ until it matches one of their standard responses ("a problem looking for a solution") | |||||
People don't "look outside the box (garbage can)" | |||||
Masuch & LaPotin, 1989, demonstrate that decision making is a symbol driven search activity; we look for familiar symbols | |||||
The garbage can approach stresses that we look for the familiar symbols that we have used in the past | |||||
While there are obviously severe limits on the utilization of rational decision making in orgs, Grandoci, 1984, claims decision makers classify degrees of uncertainty & conflicts of interest of a situation, eliminate strategies that are unfeasible, & select a feasible course of action | |||||
Nutt, 1984, sees decisions as solution centered, thus restricting innovation & limiting the number of alternative considered | |||||
But despite the position of those examining the intuitive decision making process & the effect of power on decision making, Levitt & Nuss, 1989, note that there is a "lid on the garbage can," i.e., decision making & access to decision making are constrained by forces in the org's & by institl envs | |||||
Thus, Simon began an analysis that demonstrates that variance in rationality is the norm in most decision making |
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TECH IS UNIQUE IN DEC MKING BECAUSE IT IS HUMAN CREATED, CAN BE TRANSFORMATIVE, OFTEN NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, & MAY CONTAIN UNKNOWN BENEFITS / COSTS | |||||
Technology is a basic envl condition for the dev of orgs because to a certain extent tech itself offers limits & opportunities for orgl dev |
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Orgs operating in an uncertain & dynamic techl env have different structures from those in techly stable envs |
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To deal w/ orgl uncertainly, orgs often estb separate divisions including R & D, indl engineering, mgt info systems |
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Tech is usually something external to an org, i.e. a resource, opportunity, threat, etc. that exists in the orgl env, but some tech orgs have tech as an internal factor over which they have greater control |
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Because tech & new ideas are part of the env, & since the sciences have norms of distribution, knowledge & scientific developments take a particular course to become useful to an org |
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Tech also exists in the managerial & administrative sciences in the form of the social sciences |
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Because orgs do not respond to tech through simple absorption, the control & dissemination of knowledge is a political process operating both in the env as well as in the org |
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Orgs have forces for stability & change & thus have their own internal "radical" & "reactionary" responses to tech, knowledge, etc. |
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In relation to the interorganizational relationships of orgs (IORs), orgs in highly complex techl envs are known to each other & can rank each other's performance |
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THE ADMIN MODEL OF DEC MKING HOLDS THAT DEC MKRS SEEK TO SATISFICE BECAUSE OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON DEC MKING IN LARGE ORGS | |||||
The administrative model of decision making holds that actors try to make rational decisions, & thus they do follow the steps of the rational decision making model to a certain degree, but because of constraints (discussed below), actors seek satisfactory outcomes on some of the steps of the rational model rather than optimal outcomes; i.e. actors satisfice | |||||
While the rational model of decision making is prescriptive (it explains how decision making should be done), the admin model of decision making is descriptive (it explains how people actually make decisions) | |||||
The model is called admin because it was discovered through the study of administrators | |||||
The admin model of decision making holds that people respond to a simplified & approximate view of a decision situation | |||||
The admin model of decision making acknowledges that decision makers try & do follow some of the steps of the rational model | |||||
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While people try to use systematic, rational procedures to arrive at good decisions, many factors push actors to used the admin or bounded rationality model of decision making |
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The steps of the rational model that people follow depend on their unique definition of the situation which is shaped by the cognitive ability (bounded rationality) of themselves, their group, or their org, by social constraints, by psychological constraints, & by ethical constraints | |||||
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BOUNDED RATIONALITY CONSTRAINTS ON DECISION MAKING INCLUDE: TIME, COMPLEXITY, ILL DEFINED PROBLEMS, LIMITED CAPACITY |
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Bounded rationality constraints on decision making include: | |||||
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- time pressure: many decisions must be made very quickly & therefore actors do not have time to adequately perform all the steps in the rational model |
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- the large number of internal & external factors affecting a decision make the situation too complex for the rational model |
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- that the ill defined nature of many problems makes systematic analysis impossible |
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- the fact that actors have only so much capacity to study every goal, problem & alternative |
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RATIONAL DEC MKRS OFTEN IGNORE THE FACT THAT THERE ARE SOCIAL & PSYCL CONSTRAINTS ON DEC MKING | |||||
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Social constraints on decision making include: |
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- the need for acceptance |
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- the need for agreement |
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- developing a shared perspective |
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- the ability to cooperate |
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- the support available for a decision |
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- the orgl culture |
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- ethical values |
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Psychological constraints on decision making include: |
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- the desire for prestige & success |
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- peoples' personal decision style |
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- the need to satisfy emotional needs | ||||
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- the ability to cope w/ pressure | ||||
- the need to maintain self concept | |||||
IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE RAT DEC WHEN GOALS ARE AMBIGUOUS OR UNCLEAR | |||||
Ambiguous / unclear goal constraints on decision making include: | |||||
The administrative model of decision making emphasizes that decision makers satisfice | |||||
See an Overview of Simon for more on satisficing | |||||
Satisficing occurs when people choose satisfactory, rather than optimal, decisions because they are limited by incomplete info, psychological & social process, & their own cognitive abilities | |||||
ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RAT DEC MKING OFTEN EXPAND THE POOL OF THOSE INVOLVED & AFFECTED BY THE DEC, MKING THE DEC MORE SOCIAL & LESS INDIVIDUAL | |||||
Ethical constraints on decision making include: | |||||
- the fact that decisions can't always be optimal because they must be ethical, promoting the well being of workers & others | |||||
- thus the nature of 'the optimal choice' must be considered by asking 'optimal for whom?'.... the owners, the workers, the community, the nation, the world, & various other actors | |||||
- the ethical dimension of decision making that enters via the administrative model of decision making & the concept of orgl social responsibility | |||||
- the concept of social responsibility denotes that people struggle to meet their own needs, as well as the needs of other actors impacted by the decision | |||||
- in most utilitarian orgs, this means that the goals of profits & market share must be considered along side of the goals of the workers, the community, & other actors | |||||
- sometimes the line btwn ethical & unethical decisions is not clear |
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ORGANIZED ANARCHIES ARE ORGANIC IN THAT THEY ARE FLEXIBLE, ADAPTIVE, NONHIERARCHICAL, & DECENTRALIZED | |||||
Cohen, March & Olsen developed the concepts of the org as an organized anarchy & the garbage can model of decision making | |||||
The garbage can model of decision making is used, whereby decisions are almost randomly made by matching solutions & problem, because the org is viewed as experiencing extremely high uncertainty |
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Organized anarchies are viewed as extremely organic orgs in an env of highly uncertain conditions |
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Organic orgs have
- a loose, flexible mgt that recognizes the unstable nature of the external env - systems marked by free flowing adaptive processes - an unclear hierarchy of authority - a decentralized decision making process |
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Org anarchies do not rely on the normal vertical hierarchy of authority & bureaucratic decision rules |
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THE WEAKNESSES OF ORG ANARCHIES ARE THAT THEY HAVE PROBLEMATIC PREFERENCES, TECH PROBLEMS, & HAVE HIGH TURNOVER RATES | |||||
Orgs morph into organized anarchies when they have problematic preferences, unclear, poorly understood tech, & turnover |
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1. Org anarchies have problematic preferences when goals, problems, & solutions are ill defined & ambiguity characterizes each step of a decision process |
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Note that preferences may be clear to one actor or grp while being unclear to another, depending on their power, position, knowledge, experience, etc. |
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2. Org anarchies have unclear, poorly understood tech when cause & effect relationships w/in the org are difficult to identify |
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Org anarchies have unclear, poorly understood tech when an explicit data base that applies to decisions is not available |
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3. Org anarchies have turnover when orgl positions experience a high turnover rate, or actors are busy & have only limited time to allocate to a problem |
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Org anarchies have turnover when actors commitment & involvement in any given decision are fluid & limited |
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Org anarchies are often characterized by:
- rapid change - a collegial env - a non bureaucratic env - dec mking under problematic circumstances |
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Few orgs act as org anarchies all or most of the time, but many orgs experience significant periods of anarchic operation |
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THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL OF DEC MKING HOLDS THAT BOTH PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS ARE IDENTIFIED & MATCHED UP, PRIMARILY IN A RANDOM MANNER | |||||
Cohen, March & Olsen developed the garbage can model of decision making | |||||
The garbage can model of decision making (GCM DM) views the org as a garbage can into which problems, solutions, choice opportunities, participants are dumped, & to which the overall pattern of orgl dec mking takes on a random quality as these components are drawn out & utilized |
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The GCM DM is often employed in orgs that are characterized as organized anarchies by Cohen, et al | |||||
See Also: Organized Anarchy | |||||
When a problem, solution, & a participant connect at one point, a decision may be made & the problem solved, but if the solution does not fit the solution, then the problem will not be solved |
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The GCM DM embodies the orgl maxim of "garbage in, garbage out," what is put into the garbage can, i.e. the org, is everything that is available whether it is valuable, useful or not |
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Every problem, every possible solution or idea, chances for decisions, all the orgl actors are mixed in the org in a relatively random manner & then the org more or less matches these components up in a trial & error manner in order to take action |
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The GCM DM embodies the orgl maxim of "give the org a hammer, & everything becomes a nail" in the sense that when a program or idea is viewed as a solution, then it will often be implemented in relationship to all problems, where in some cases it will succeed, while in others, it will not succeed |
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THE GCM DM IS MORE LIKELY TO COME TO THE FOREFRONT IN CONDITIONS OF HIGH UNCERTAINTY | |||||
When in the view the of the org there is a high level of uncertainty, this is where there are problems that are not solved & solutions tried that do not work |
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Org dec are disorderly & not the result of a logical, step by step sequence |
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Events may be so ill defined & complex that decisions, problems, & solutions act as independent events where if they connect, some problems are solved, but many are not |
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While the outcomes of the GCM DM have not been empirically examined, many theorists view them in a less than favorable light |
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To view organized anarchies & the GCM DM in a favorable light, one must be aware that frequently these orgs are dealing w/ the most uncertain, volatile, high risk conditions & the more rationalized models of operation are either ineffective or too slow |
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Some high reliability orgs (HROs), esp emergency services & the military, operate effectively as org anarchies |
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- Project: Your Recognition Primed Decision |
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RPDM IS WHERE THE DEC MKR ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, INTUITIVELY RECOGNIZES THE SOLUTION & THEN RATIONALLY SCANS IT TO DETERMINE IT'S VALIDITY | |||||
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Recognition primed decision making (RPDM) is a method of decision making where in the decision maker utilizes a first impression visa vie intuitive or blink decision making, to develop an alternative which is then analyzed to develop the final decision which is implemented |
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RPDM was developed by Schmitt & Klein as an alt to the rational model of dec mking by codifying the way dec mkrs actually make decisions | |||||
The stages of RPDM include the:
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While the stages of RPDM appear as discreet stages, several of them may occur nearly simultaneously, esp the situation awareness stage, the recognition stage, & the course of action stage | |||||
1. THE DECISION NECESSITY STAGE IS WHERE ONE PERCEIVES THE NEED FOR A DECISION, I.E. THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM | |||||
In the decision necessity stage, the dec mkr perceives that a dec must be made | |||||
A dec mkr may perceive from the env that a dec must be made, or they may be commanded to make a dec from higher ups in the org | |||||
The dec mkr tries to understand the mission, or goal of the dec as delineated by superiors while also deciding how to proceed | |||||
2. THE SITUATION AWARENESS STAGE IS WHERE ONE PERCEIVES A RAPIDLY CHANGING ENV | |||||
In the situation awareness stage, the dec mkr experiences the situation as a changing context | |||||
The situation or context is perceived as either typical or atypical | |||||
3. THE RECOGNITION STAGE IS WHERE ONE PERCEIVES A SOLUTION OR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM | |||||
Whether the situation is typical or atypical, the dec mkr will either develop a dec or solution that is analogous to a known, similar situation, or develop a new prototypical or solution from a combination of dissimilar situations | |||||
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W/ the RPDM model, the decision maker draws upon their experience to identify a situation as representative of or analogous to a particular class of problem |
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If an analogous situation cannot be found then the dec mkr either cannot or does not make a dec or they construct a prototypical solution from a combination of situations which they are familiar w/ | |||||
If the situation is perceived as too atypical, a significant amt of analysis might precede any recognition of a course of action (COA) stage | |||||
The RPDM model does not freeze a dec mking team into a single strategy; rather, it enables the dec mking team to search for options if the situation is so unfamiliar that the dec mkr cannot recognized what to do | |||||
The recognition of a solution builds on experience & expertise | |||||
4. THE COURSE OF ACTION STAGE IS WHERE ONE PERCEIVES EXACTLY WHAT TO DO | |||||
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W/ RPDM, the dec mkr's recognition of a situation leads to a course of action (COA) either directly when prior cases are sufficiently similar or by adapting previous approaches |
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The dec mkr then evaluates the COA through a process of "mental simulation" |
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A primed COA is a key stage that conceptually differs the most from the rational dec mking model in that the dec is made in an intuitive or blink mode | |||||
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Dec mkrs identify their preferred COA so that staff can work on detailing & improving it |
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Identifying a base COA early can guide mission analysis |
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If the dec mkr does not identify a base COA, the staff can ask for suggestions |
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Dec mkrs can choose to do an initial conceptualization of a COA on their own or w/ a small grp of key subordinates |
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5. THE TEST & & OPERATIONALIZATION STAGE IS WHERE ONE PERCEIVES HOW ONE IS GOING TO DO WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE & POTENTIAL PROBLEMS / OPTIONS |
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The test & operationalization stage allows the dec mking team to:
- prepare implementation plans - find flaws that disqualify the COA - contrast options - imagine consequences |
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In the RPDM model, testing & operationalization is not done along a common set of abstract dimensions, but again, in a blink mode of dec mking | |||||
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6. THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE IS WHERE ONE FOLLOWS THE COA & ADJUST FOR PROBLEMS |
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Developing implementation plans is often a cut & paste procedure since this work began during the testing & operationalizing of the COA |
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7. THE EVALUATION STAGE IS WHERE ONE PERCEIVES THE SUCCESSES / FAILURES, OPTIONS, PROBLEMS, ETC. OF THE COA | |||||
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Killion modified the simple RPDM model to include a stage wherein the COA or COAs can be evaluated & revised during the testing & operationalization stages or during the implementation stages either via a blink methodology or via a rational decision making matrix |
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Factors characterizing naturalistic decision making via RPDM include:
- time pressure or constraints - ill structured problems - uncertain, or dynamic env - shifting, ill defined or competing goals - multiple event feedback loops - high stakes - knowledge rich env - high decision complexity |
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In general, strategic & operational levels allow more time & have greater resources for mking the dec | |||||
However, dec mking at the implementation level has less time & fewer resources of mking the dec | |||||
THE OUTCOMES OF RPDM INCLUDE ATTN TO CUES, A COA, GOAL CHOICE, GRP EXPECTANCIES | |||||
There are FOUR outcomes of RPDM including: | |||||
- attention to relevant cues on which to base the dec | |||||
- a practical or typical course of action | |||||
- the creation of plausible goals related to the outcome of the course of action | |||||
- the generation of expectancies related to the outcome of the course of action |
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- Project: Power & Orgl Power in Your Org |
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ORGL POWER IS THAT POWER EXERTED BY MEMBERS W/IN AN ORG & BY THE ORG OVER OTHERS | |||||
Orgl power is power that is circumscribed by the rules & culture of an org, which is the ability to affect the actions of people & grps w/in the org as well as to control the org to such an extent that it may be directed to affect the actions of people, grps, & orgs outside the org | |||||
All power has both individual & orgl aspects which cannot be separated in practice |
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Power in formal orgs is usually influence power |
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Influence is the the authority that is accepted as a decision is made, usually in a formal orgl setting | |||||
While influence is the primary form of power that is used in decision making in orgs, the other forms of power, e.g. authority, political pwr, coercions, control of info, econ pwr, are also used | |||||
Influence is the primary form of power utilized in an org, & in a rational org it should be the primary form of power utilized because it is power used, contained w/in the proper orgl context of actors, rules, env, etc. | |||||
Influence is not the only form of power utilized in orgs because even in the most rationalized orgs, the maximization or rationality is not possible because there are always unknown factors in decisions per bounded rationality | |||||
See Also: Rationality | |||||
See Also: Decision Making | |||||
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGL POWER INCLUDE THAT IT:
1. HAS A BASIS IN RATIONALITY, TRADITION/AUTHORITY OR CHARISMA 2. IS AFFECTED BY INTERNAL FACTORS: STRUCTURE, CULTURE, ECON POWER, ETC 3. IS AFFECTED BY EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN THE ORG'S CONTROL 4. HAS ORIGINS WHICH IMPACT POWER'S LONGEVITY 5. USUALLY HAS THE CHARACTERISTIC OF OLIGARCHY: IE A CABAL OR GRP OF POWER HOLDERS |
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1. IDEALLY ORGL POWER IS BASED IN RATIONALITY, BUT IN PRACTICE ALL FORMS OF POWER COME INTO PLAY IN ORGS, EG: TRADITION/AUTHORITY & CHARISMA | |||||
Because of the orgl factors that lie outside of rat dec mking, i.e. the context of bounded rat, some part of the decision, some part of the power utilized may be based on authority, politics, coercion, control of info, econ pwr, & not exclusively on the factors influencing the decision / use of pwr | |||||
Individuals acquire power both from their own unique attributes( charisma, tradition, knowledge, etc.), & also from their organizational attributes ( authority, organizational resources, etc.) | |||||
Analysts look not only at individual power, but also at the power that comes in the positions & roles that people fill in orgs |
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Interdepartmental power is primary which is to say that important power laden conflict often exist btwn depts |
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Power is an act btwn people: most often from different departments |
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Power is used to signify power: increase awareness of others of ones power |
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The point of view of the one who is being affected by power is crucial in determining if a power play has occurred |
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If the one affected believes a power play has occurred, then it has |
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Organizational power varies according to internal & external factors |
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2. ORGL POWER IS AFFECTED BY MANY INTERNAL FACTORS OF THE ORG INCLUDING STRUCTURE, CULTURE, ECON POWER, ETC. |
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An internal orgl power base consists of the EIGHT resources
held that permit the exercise of power, including
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Depts capable of dealing w/ uncertainty have more power |
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Depts w/ nonsubstitutible resources such as irreplaceable skills which are central to the work flow have more power |
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Thus power shifts depending on how well depts & individuals cope w/ the demands of the env |
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In uncertain situations, or situations where nonsubstitutible resources come into play, the established horizontal hierarchy & degree of centralization is often ignored |
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But the vertical hierarchy is often still as important as it was where power is concerned |
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In extreme situations, even the vertical hierarchy may come into play where power is concerned |
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Wamsley (1970) holds that organizational power is variable
because of SIX factors, including that power
a. varies by hierarchic level b. is situationally specific c. is surrounded by checks & balances d. makes one interdependent e. players may utilize negotiation & persuasion f. varies as coalitions change |
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3. EXTERNAL FACTORS WHICH AFFECT ORGL POWER MAY BE TOTALLY OUT OF THE CONTROL OF THE ORG, OR THEY MAY BE PARTIALLY CONTROLLABLE |
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A network creates power for an org | |||||
See Also: A Network is an association of similar orgs, including
but not limited to
Suppliers Users of output Regulatory agencies Similar orgs |
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TWO General External Economic Conditions impact an org's power
- On the Demand Side, the products' markets & price are the most important - On the Supply Side, price & source of material & labor are the most important |
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Secondary General External Economic Conditions also influence an org's
power
a. interest rates b. amount of debt holdings by the govt, corps, consumers, etc. c. vitality of the stock market, etc. |
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Working together (cooperation) increases power for all | |||||
Amount of power increases w/ a joint cooperative agreement | |||||
Lammers, 1967, found that in a joint project, managers & workers influence each other more effectively & create joint power & are more effective | |||||
Factors Causing Power to Vary in Orgs: | |||||
Power does not generally vary dramatically from situation to situation & at any one point in time, the amount of power is fixed: zero sum game | |||||
But power may change radically over time | |||||
Power levels changes in orgs through external & internal changes | |||||
The external expansion of power into org's env | |||||
The internal expansion of power through changed structural conditions expediting interaction & influence among all & motivational conditions result in increased interest by all & greater willingness to be controlled | |||||
External development affects social & psychological process w/in the org conducive to a high level of internal control | |||||
External & internal power are mutually supporting: | |||||
As external power increases, org members are more willing to submit to internal power | |||||
4. THE ORIGINS OF POWER OFTEN AFFECT WHETHER IT WILL BE LONG LASTING OR NOT | |||||
Some depts are delegated important task in first place & these types of moves are often a power play to begin w/ | |||||
Once a dept gains power, it tries very hard to keep power | |||||
Powerful depts receive more resources: the rich get richer & poor get poorer, maintaining the incumbency of power | |||||
The power distribution impacts the distribution of resources e.g., rewards, budgets, etc. | |||||
The reverse is also true, the distribution of resources impacts the power distribution | |||||
Power's distribution, effect etc., in voluntary orgs is in some ways the same & in some ways different | |||||
Volunteer orgs need volunteer members participation | |||||
The importance of democratic process increases in voluntary orgs because members & voluntary & expect more participation | |||||
The democratic form of power tends to increase continued participation | |||||
Volunteer orgs need increased permeability to new ideas & interests if democracy is to be maintained | |||||
5. OLIGARCHY IS THE POWER OF A SMALL, CLOSED, NETWORK OF PEOPLE, I.E. A DOMINANT COALITION, WHO COOPERATE TO CONTROL AN ORG | |||||
Thus prevention of oligarchy is especially important in volunteer orgs | |||||
Michels developed the Iron Law of Oligarchy which demonstrates that oligarchic power emerges & is maintained through FIVE processes, including |
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a. the delegation of authority or tasks | |||||
b. those in power having access to resources ( info, $$, etc.) that those in power do not have | |||||
c. those in power having both legitimacy & a sense of obligation of the followers | |||||
d. incumbency | |||||
e. human "self interest:" once power emerges, people & organizations seek to preserve & then expand it |
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THE EXERCISE OF POWER IS IMPORTANT IN DEC MKING FOR BOTH AUTHORITARIAN ORGS WHO CENTRALIZE PWR, AS WELL AS DEMO ORGS WHO SHARE PWR | |||||
The exercise of power is an important component of decision making | |||||
Power is structured into most orgs in that most orgs have an authoritarian structure where the top level mgr holds all the power, & merely delegates power to subordinates | |||||
While some independence of power / action does exist even in these authoritarian orgs, subordinates are frequently unwilling to oppose the top level mgr. because they are hired, fired, & evaluated by the top & because of the coalitions that are formed at the top of most orgs | |||||
People are typically reluctant to oppose the leader, the coalition at the top of an org, or even their supervisor | |||||
The purpose of bureaucracy is to "rationalize power," i.e. make power into authority which is subject to the limitations of the merit system, rules etc. | |||||
In practice, because of the intricacies of most orgs, leaders & other power wielders find it possible to exercise power, ignore merit, bend rules, etc. | |||||
INTEREST GRPS W/ VARIED IDEOLOGIES & VALUES, ETC. COMPETE W/ POWER OVER PARTICULAR DECISIONS | |||||
Ideologies & values commonly enter the decision making process (Beyer, 1981) | |||||
Hage, 1980, Bacharach & Lawler, 1980, note that decisions are made by coalitions of interest groups | |||||
Interest group interests may or may not coincide w/ the interests of the org | |||||
Interest group interests & the interests of the org may or may not coincide w/ those not in power | |||||
Milgrom & Roberts, 1988, conclude that those in power have an economic incentive to manipulate info to influence the decisions they favor | |||||
WHEN CONFLICT IS HI OR CONDITIONS ARE DIFFICULT, POWER RATHER THAN RAT DEC MKING PROCESS WILL DOMINATE THE DECISION | |||||
Hills & Mahoney, 1978, found that under adversity, decisions are shaped by power rather than by bureaucratic considerations | |||||
In times of affluence, a bureaucratic approach is acceptable, but in times of adversity, power is more likely to come into play | |||||
Pfeffer, Salancik, & Leblebici, 1978, found that social influence & familiarity were more important during adverse times | |||||
While most strategic decisions are made at the top of the org, at times subordinates are brought into the process | |||||
Participation by subordinates has mixed consequences for the org in decision making | |||||
Alutto & Belasco, 1972, show that participation is dysfunctional if participants feel satisfied or saturated w/ their role in decision making | |||||
If orgl actors feel deprived before the decision, participation will increase involvement & acceptance of the decision | |||||
Heller, 1973, says that if a decision is important for the org, a non participative style is likely to be used | |||||
If a decision is important for the subordinates, a participative style should be taken | |||||
Withen notes in his study of wildland fire fighters, that subordinates offer innovative ideas, processes, etc. & thus have an important strategic impact on the org, whether the leaders recognize it or not |
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PROBLEMS W/ GOALS OFTEN CREATES PROBLEMS W/ DECISIONS | |||||
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There may be a problem w/ goals & decisions along several dimensions including ill defined goals, unclear goals, lack of consensus on goals, overly complicated goals, & contradictory goals | ||||
Outcomes preferences or goals are a major issue in which power is exercised over & over, & thus conflicts repeatedly occur, inevitably affecting decisions |
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Pinford, 1986, notes TWO kinds of decision making including programmed & unstructured decisions |
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Programmed, or structured, decision making occurs only when there is agreement on goals |
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Problems arise in structured / programmed decision making when participants or the env change leads to a failure of agreement on goals or when these types of dec are made w/o agreement on goals |
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GOALS ARE SOMETIMES NON EXISTENT, ILL DEFINED, UNCLEAR, COMPLICATED, CONTRADICTORY, WEAK, WRONG FOR THE ORG, ETC. | |||||
Anarchic decision making occurs when there is no agreement on goals |
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Thus both rationality & power are variables which affect decision making in the determination of goals... & other components in the decision making process | |||||
Ill defined goals create problematic decisions because goals are used to set the objectives for a decision, & w/o goals & objectives, the dec mking process & dec itself will be likely to fail |
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Ill defined goals may be the result of simple lack of definition or by a failure to communicate the goals clearly to the dec mkr |
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Unclear goals are goals that are well defined, but have not been communicated to the dec mkr |
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A lack of consensus on goals occurs when either goals setters or dec mkrs, or both, do not agree on the goals |
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A lack of consensus on goals can cause several problems including unclear goals, conflicting goals, dec that contradict the goals, dec that are counterproductive, & more |
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Overly complicated goals are those that are simply too large or encompassing for a given situation, implying that they should be determined or implemented at another level of the org, or subdivided among several depts of the org |
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Contradictory goals occur when a dec mking unit is responsible for contradictory goals from several depts or when orgs have contradictory goals originating from strategic, middle, or lower levels of the org |
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Many orgs have "classic contradictory goals" such as safety & efficiency, quality & quantity, or innovation & stable levels of production |
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Contradictory goals may lead to bad decisions when a dec mkr follows one set of goals, while the other set is ignored such as when efficiency is pursued in an unsafe manner |
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ESCALATION OCCURS IN DEC MKING WHEN COMMITMENT, RESOURCES, TIME, & OUTCOMES BECOME INCREASINGLY LINKED TO THE DECISION | |||||
Escalating situations occur when people become ever more committed to a course of action, whether that course is a losing or winning situation (Straw & Ross, 1989) |
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Escalation situations occur in FOUR situations when: |
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- orgl projects have little salvage value |
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- decision makers want to justify their own past behavior |
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- people in a project are bound to each other |
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- occurs when orgl inertia & internal politics combine to prevent a project from being shut down |
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In order to avoid the pitfalls of escalation, many orgs will set up subsidiary orgs to try out new projects |
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Pilot projects, or pilot orgs, are subsidiary orgs whose purpose is to try out new projects |
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Pilot projects generally have clearly defined "sundowns" or dates by which judgments will be made about the success or failure of the project |
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Escalating situations are similar to, but not the same as cascading situations |
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CASCADING SITUATIONS OCCUR IN DEC MKING WHEN ONE DEC OUTCOME CREATES A NEW SITUATION(S) WHERE MORE DECISIONS ARE NEEDED OR WHERE OUTCOMES ARE ALREADY A FOREGONE CONCLUSION | |||||
Cascading situations occur when mechanical or automatic systems function to increase the power or commitment to a course of action |
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In most cases, cascading situations do not require any increase commitment, but rather are the result of standard operating procedures, or what seems to be at the time, the only course of action |
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The most frequent type of cascading situation is the cascading error, where one mistake or malfunction leads to another |
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Cascading situations are the classic case of falling dominoes | |||||
An example of a cascading error is when a fire in a power plant or airliner begins to burn wiring which is necessary for the computer control of the system |
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TO MAKE ETHICAL DECISIONS, KNOW YOUR VALUES, GOALS, ALTERNATIVES, INFO, OUTCOMES, & ACTIONS | |||||
Because the future is unpredictable, there is no such thing as a perfect choice |
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Some options are better than others & finding the right choice for each situation can make life less stressful & more successful |
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In relation to ethics & boundaries, essentials factors in decision making include: |
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1. knowing your values |
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2. establishing your goals |
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3. expanding your alternatives |
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4. seeking info on each alternative |
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5. predicting outcomes for the alternative |
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6. taking action |
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The values one chooses depend upon the situation one faces |
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Values should be the things important to the person, not those important to significant others |
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When estbing values, one must be honest w/ oneself |
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Evaluate goals according to how it satisfies values |
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Good decisions move one closer to their goals |
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Short term goals should lead toward long term goals | |||||
Alternatives developed to address problems/ goals are the heart of the decision making process | |||||
The more alts developed w/ which to address problems, the better the chances of making a good & ethical decision | |||||
Identify the factors in a situation & devise alts to address each of the factors | |||||
Collect as much info about each alt | |||||
Keep an open mind as info is gathered & note that other alts may develop | |||||
Info sources often lead to other sources | |||||
The more facts, the better the chances of being aware of all the alts | |||||
In relation to dec mking, the more facts the better, so don't make assumptions | |||||
Separate facts from opinion by being a critical listener | |||||
In dec mking, in choosing an alt, there is no perfect alt, so settle for the best choice | |||||
Predict outcomes for the various alts, considering the desirability, probability & weaknesses of each alt | |||||
Consider each alt before narrowing the list | |||||
In dec mking, any choice is risky & the future is unpredictable | |||||
In dec mking, involve the emotional, intuitive, imaginative right side of your being | |||||
After the choice of the best alt, for a plan of action & prepare to see that choice through to the end |
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- Project: Options for Dealing w/ Unethical Behavior |
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THE OPTIONS FOR DEALING W/ UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR INCLUDE:
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In 1985 there were over 1300 scholastic articles in print in the area of ethics in administration, mgt, business & public admin, business etc., focusing on what was ethical or unethical in typical business practices |
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Richard Nielson (1987) focuses on what people in orgs can actually do when they believe behaviors / practices are unethical |
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While it is important to know what is or is not ethical, it is just as important to know what to do when confronted w/ unethical behavior |
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1. DON'T THINK ABOUT IT |
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Not thinking about unethical beh avoids a zero sum game btwn superiors & peers |
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Not thinking about, not engaging in a zero sum game avoids getting into the situation where someone has to win & someone has to lose |
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Not thinking about one path of action makes one more susceptible to go down the wrong path, strategically or otherwise |
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One risks becoming similar to the good Nazi as one tries to make the best of a bad situation, but participating in the evil policy / practices |
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The bad Nazi may be kind, even reluctant, but ultimately they are involved in evil policy / practices | |||||
The ability of people to compartmentalize, to not think about what is going on, questions the validity of assuming that all mgrs naturally understand what is right or wrong; there are powerful pressures to obey orders & not think about what is going on | |||||
2. GO ALONG & GET ALONG |
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Going along has the same advantage as not thinking about unethical behavior: one avoids the situation where someone has to win & someone has to lose |
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Going along means that one must think about the unethical beh at least for a while |
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Thinking about & going along unethical beh has the quality of an injury or illness as it slowly bleeds the individual conscience or as guilt consumes one like a cancer |
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Under constant pressure, mgrs & wkrs simply give in & become good 'organization people' |
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Conforming might affect areas of dec mking & action unrelated to the unethical beh as it reigns in thinking, initiative, enthusiasm, etc. & deprive mgrs & wkrs of info | |||||
3. PROTEST | |||||
An advantage of protesting is that one can feel good about making an effort to stop the unethical beh | |||||
The disadvantage of protesting is that the org can usually disregard objections & punish those who objected | |||||
4. CONSCIENTIOUSLY OBJECT |
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Conscientiously objecting to unethical beh means that one refuses to participate in it in any shape, manner, or form | |||||
Conscientiously objecting makes a clear statement to the org that at least one person considers the beh unethical & refuses to participate in it | |||||
Like protesting, conscientiously objecting makes one feel good about oneself as one stands up for what they believe | |||||
Consc obj may encourage others by example | |||||
If the org recognizes the right to consc obj, then one may also be able to keep one's job | |||||
Because very few orgs recognize the right to consc obj, one is likely to lose one's job, & thus the org loses an important voice against the unethical beh | |||||
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By protesting or consc objecting one often loses the ability to advance | ||||
5. LEAVE | |||||
Leaving gives a signal that it will lose good people if it continues unethical beh | |||||
If we leave & work for a competitor we help a more ethical org gain mkt share | |||||
We feel better because we had the courage not to cooperate w/ unethical beh | |||||
The disadvantage of leaving is that most wkrs are very replaceable & so the org loses an ethical voice when we leave | |||||
If the situation was a zero sum game, then mgt might see wkrs / mgrs leaving as a victory; the opposition has retreated / surrendered | |||||
If we leave & someone else cooperates, we have only helped ourselves | |||||
The example one sets is that if one encounters unethical beh & leaves, that is the only / best option | |||||
Leaving sets up the 'love it or leave it' mentality in the org | |||||
At some point we may realize that we did not have the courage to stay & fight | |||||
"The courage to be is the ethical act in which
man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of existence which
conflict w/ his essential self affirmation"
Tillich, 1952
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Leaving cuts off dialogue & thus the org & even the person loses the chance to learn more about the situation | ||||
There are limits to dialogue in a zero or negative sum game in that everything one says can be used against one if people are not interested in transforming the situation into a positive sum situation | |||||
Dialogue has little utility unless one is solely focused on the phil / spiritual transformation that can be a part of peacemaking as an end in itself (Brinton, 1973; Buber, 1965) | |||||
6. SECRETLY BLOW THE WHISTLE | |||||
Blowing the whistle can be very effective if the org is likely to react to publicity, public pressure, govt intervention, profl accreditation orgs, the courts, etc. |
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An advantage of blowing the whistle is that the whistle blower cannot be retaliated against | |||||
A disadvantage of blowing the whistle is that one might feel dishonest, cowardly, traitorous, paranoid of being caught, etc. | |||||
Secretly blowing the whistle can create an atmosphere of distrust in the org & create a 'witch hunt' mentality w/in the org | |||||
Because many orgs investigate leaks, the secret whistle blower may have to face additional ethical questions bout whether to tell the truth in the leak investigation | |||||
If the secret whistle blower is discovered, they may be fired, or they may find it difficult to be trusted by other mgrs, wkrs, clients, etc. | |||||
7. PUBLICLY BLOW THE WHISTLE | |||||
Publicly blowing the whistle can be just as effective as secretly blowing the whistle | |||||
People who publicly blow the whistle are often treated both as heroes as well as pariahs | |||||
The major disadvantage of publicly blowing the whistle is that the org may retaliate w/ a legal suit, firing, transfer, smear campaign, etc. | |||||
Publicly blowing the whistle makes it difficult to interact w/ the people one is criticizing | |||||
Publicly blowing the whistle makes colleagues feel betrayed, attached, harmed it | |||||
Publicly blowing the whistle does not help the reputation of the org, & may even put it out of business | |||||
8. SECRETLY THREATEN TO BLOW THE WHISTLE | |||||
Secretly threatening to blow the whistle has all the advantages of secretly blowing the whistle w/ the additional advantage that, when it works, i.e., when the org changes its unethical beh, the org doesn't have to be hurt by bad publicity & / or sanctions that could follow | |||||
Secretly threatening to blow the whistle has the disadvantage of secretly blowing the whistle in that it does not permit dialogue btwn the unethical people & the whistle blowers | |||||
9. SABOTAGE | |||||
Sabotage in the face of unethical beh usually entails hurting or destroying the larger program in which the beh is found so that mgt shuts it down | |||||
The advantage of sabotage is that it can be effective & ones identity is protected | |||||
The disadvantages of sabotage are that one may be caught, one may feel guilty, there is often an investigation, innocent people may be hurt, etc. | |||||
The biggest disadvantage of sabotage is that there is no dialogue so there is no opportunity for real change | |||||
10. NEGOTIATE & BUILD CONSENSUS FOR CHANGE | |||||
Because in general when one person opposes a group of people in cooperate beh, that one person is likely to lose, it is difficult for one person in an org to bring about change | |||||
The advantages to building consensus for change are that
- there is strength in numbers - the org is less likely to retaliate against a grp - it builds a cooperate climate |
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The best negotiation strat for change is the tit for tat ( TFT ) strat where the change agents respond to positive moves by the other side w/ positive moves, and response to negative move w/ negative moves | |||||
The difficulty of the TFT strat is that the change agents might not have positive or negative responses available, while the org has nearly unlimited options | |||||
It is not uncommon for people who are pursuing bad / unethical goals to use bad / unethical methods to cover them up or punish those that threaten them | |||||
Negotiating & building consensus are more likely to be successful when the org is accustomed to positive sum solutions to problems | |||||
Unfortunately many mgrs are only accustomed to negative sum solutions where they attempt to win & punish the loser | |||||
It is only natural to have the 'fight or flight' reaction, even in orgs wherein when one is confronted w/ a threat at work, one often wants to leave or attack rather than calmly negotiate & build consensus | |||||
An additional reward to negotiating & building consensus is that for many, these activities are in themselves satisfying; negotiating & peacemaking can be empowering, transformative, & satisfying |
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