Internal
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Outline on Workplace
Interventions
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External
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WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS ARE ANY ACTION BY MGT, THE UNION,
OR BOTH TO TRY & IMPROVE A CONDITION, OFTEN PRODUCTIVITY, BY ADDRESSING
A PROBLEM OR WEAKNESS IN THE WKPLACE |
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Workplace interventions are initiated at the plant or office
level, they may reside in a single location, w/ a single union, or they
may be part of a larger joint union mgt program |
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Link
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The Figure:
The Cooperation Continuum demonstrates that the range of coop available
to wkplaces today is very diverse |
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Workplace interventions often aim to improve product quality, productivity,
profitability, enhance job security, & ensure continued the operation
of the firm |
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Workplace interventions often lead to new designs for work & org
through the use of team based methods, lean production, cell mfr, self
directed work teams, job enlargement, etc. |
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Workplace interventions increase workplace flexibility for the
employer which will increase productivity & also increase job security
for the wkrs |
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Pay programs are changed so that wkrs share in productivity
or profitability gains & reduce employers' risks during downturns |
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WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS TIE WKRS PAY MORE TO THEIR SKILLS
& PERFORMANCE THAN TO THEIR JOB TITLE OR SENIORITY |
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Link
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The Table:
Incidence of Cooperative Clauses in Private Sector Collective Bargaining
Agreements 1997 - 2007
shows that unions have been involved in many
workplace interventions focusing on employee involvement & cooperation
btwn labor & mgt |
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Link
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The Table: Comparative
Analyses of Workplace Interventions demonstrates that the many
types of cooperative workplace interventions vary along several important
dimensions including philosophy, goals, level of participation, the ability
to make suggestions, the role of the supervisor, the role of mgrs, bonus
formulas, frequency of pay outs, role of union, impact on the mgt style |
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The Table: Type
& Extent of Joint Programs across Manufacturing demonstrates that
the prevalence of workplace interventions vary widely |
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Most joint programs focus on product quality & productivity
& most frequently addressing these issues w/ work teams |
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Productivity & labor mgt climate are usually handled by
committee structures |
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Most programs were initiated w/o outside assistance, but the fed
govt was the most frequently used outside help |
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Workplace interventions can be divided into gain share & non
gainsharing place |
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Gainsharing plan increase pay when labor becomes more productive |
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Non gainsharing plans include changed rewards during the intervention,
but it is not proportional to productivity |
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Typical workplace interventions include:
- Scanlon Plans
- Rucker Plans
- Impro Share Plans |
- Quality Circles
- Quality of Work Life Programs
- Total Quality Mgt Programs |
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If gainsharing plans are implemented at the same time that base
pay levels are reduced, grater proportions of an employee's pay would
be at risk |
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ORGL COOPERATION IS NOT WIDESPREAD IN US IND BECAUSE BOTH
MGT & UNIONS WOULD RATHER OPERATE IN TRADL AUTHORITARIAN MODES |
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US employers basically oppose unions, esp their involvement
in decision making |
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For 60 yrs, union mgt cooperation programs have been tried, but most
have not been sustained |
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Since the 80s, more cooperation programs have been bargained into contracts
& improved productivity & job security in about half of all
unionized firms in the private sector |
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Link
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Figure: Bucket Bargaining Process
depicts
how the five types of bargaining issues, including minor issues, past problems,
change issues, discussion issues, & econ issues are divided into 5
'buckets' of update, repair, redesign, discussion, & econ |
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In bucket bargaining, negotiators begins w/ the update issue, &
then moves in order to the other issues, ending w/ econ issues |
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Link
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Figure: Bargaining Economics
depicts
how settlement guidelines set the stage for joint agreements btwn mgt &
the union & some issues are decided by mgt or the union |
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In joint discussions over econ issues, the core process is the:
1. establishment of an econ package
2. framing issues
3. ranking the issues
4. defining the unit cost in each issue
5. defining the interests of mgt & the union in the
econ package
6. agreeing on the tools to shape the final econ package |
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In joint discussions over econ issues, the tools include:
a. drawing up a straw design, a prototype
b. sitting an expert panel
c. problem solving |
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In joint discussions over econ issues, problem solving methods include:
a. developing options
b. agreeing on standards
c. applying the standards |
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Link
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Figure: A Model of the Effect
of Cooperation on Performance & Labor Relations Outcomes demonstrates
that several factors affect cooperation, including orgl structure, power
of the union, power of the corp, the structure of labor mgt relations,
orgl constraints, orgl envl constraints, the cooperative structure, &
orgl performance |
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The model of cooperation depicts the relationship among the cooperative
structure & the power of mgt & the union, & how the intensity
of cooperation is shaped by orgl constraints, resulting in changes in labor
mgt relations & company performance |
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Internal
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Figure:
The
Cooperation Continuum
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External
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- FULL COOPERATION |
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- Decisions on strategic issues |
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- High Performance practices |
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- Guarantees of employment security |
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- Decisions on traditional issues |
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- Committees to review mutual concerns that arise |
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- INTENT TO COOPERATE |
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Figure: The Cooperation Continuum demonstrates that the range
of cooperation available to wkplaces today is very diverse |
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Source: GR.. Gray, DW. Myers, and P.S. Myers, "Cooperation
Provisions in Labor Agreements: A New Paradigm?" Monthly Labor
Review 122, no. 1 (1999), p. 31. |
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Table:
Incidence of Cooperative Clauses in Private Sector Collective Bargaining
Agreements 1997 - 2007
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External
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Provision
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Number of Contracts
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% of all Contracts
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% of all Employees
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| Total in Sample |
1,041
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100.0
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100.0
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| All Contracts w/ Coop Provisions |
485
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46.6
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46.2
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| All Contracts w/ Explicit Coop Language |
286
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27.5
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29.2
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| Stage 1: Statement of Intent to Coop Only |
150
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14.4
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9.6
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| Stage 2: Joint committees to review issues |
163
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15.7
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16.0
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| Total at stages 1 and 2 only |
160
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15.4
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13.1
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| Stage 3: |
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| Drug Problems |
72
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6.9
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4.7
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| Health Care |
16
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1.5
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2.2
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| Human relations |
106
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10.2
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10.9
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| Safety |
261
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25.1
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28.8
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| Stage 4: |
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| Favored "nation" |
46
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4.4
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3.2
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| Neutrality toward organizing |
49
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4.7
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4.6
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| No layoff |
22
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2.1
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2.8
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| No subcontracting |
14
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1.3
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0.7
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| Stage 5: High performance work practices |
154
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14.8
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19.1
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| Stage 6: Strategic decision making |
27
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2.6
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4.4
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| Table: Incidence of Cooperative
Clauses in Private Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements 1997 - 2007
shows
that unions have been involved in many workplace interventions focusing
on employee involvement & cooperation btwn labor & mgt |
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| Source: GR.. Gray, DW. Myers, and P.S. Myers,
"Cooperation Provisions in Labor Agreements: A New Paradigm?" Monthly
Labor Review 122, no. 1 (1999), p. 33. |
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Table:
Comparative
Analyses of Workplace Interventions
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External
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Gainsharing
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Non gainsharing
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| Program Dimension |
Scanlon |
Rucker |
Impro Share |
Quality Circles |
Labor Management Committees |
Quality of work life
Projects |
Self Managed Work Teams |
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| Philosophy / Theory |
Share improvements; people willing to make suggestions, want to make
ideas work |
Primarily economic incentives; some reliance on employee participation |
Economic incentives; increased performance |
People capable/willing to offer ideas/make suggestions |
Improve attitudes; trust |
Improve environment (physical, human, systems aspects) |
Reduce layers of management; increase employees' control over work
environment |
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| Primary Goal |
Productivity Improvement |
Productivity Improvement |
Productivity improvement |
Cost reduction, quality |
Improve labor management relations, communications |
Improve psychological well being at work; increase job satisfaction |
Productivity improvement; reduce levels of supervision |
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| Subsidiary Goal |
Attitudes, communication, work behaviors, quality, cost reduction |
Attitudes, communication, work behaviors, quality, cost reduction |
Attitudes, work behaviors |
Attitudes, work behaviors, quality, productivity |
Work behaviors, quality, productivity, cost reductions |
Attitudes, communication, work behaviors, quality, productivity, cost
reduction |
Worker autonomy, quality, cost reduction, flexibility |
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| Worker Participation |
Two levels of committees: screening (1), production (many) |
Screening committee, production committee (sometimes) |
Bonus committee |
Screening (1); circles (many) |
Visitor subcommittees (many) |
Steering committees; ad hoc to work on problem; informal |
Control over work assignments, production methods |
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| Suggestion Making |
Formal system |
Formal system |
None |
Context of committee |
None, informal |
Possibly informal, depending on project |
Determined within team |
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| Role of Supervisor |
Chair, production committee |
None |
None |
Circle Leaders |
None |
No Direct Role |
No Supervisor |
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| Role of managers |
Direct participation in bonus committee assignments |
Ideas coordinator evaluates suggestion, committee assignments |
None |
Facilitator evaluates proposed solutions |
Committee members |
Steering committee membership |
Communications with work team on production targets; problem solving |
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| Bonus Formula |
Sales/payroll |
Bargaining unit payroll/ Production value (sales materials, supplies,
services) |
Engineered std. x BPF/ Total hours worked |
All savings/improvements retained by company |
All savings/improvements retained by company |
All savings/improvements retained by company |
All savings/improvements retained by company |
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| Frequency of pay out |
Monthly |
Monthly |
Weekly |
Not applicable |
Not applicable |
Not applicable |
Not applicable |
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| Role of Union |
Negotiated provisions, screening committee membership |
Negotiated provisions, screening committee membership |
Negotiated provisions |
Tacit approval |
Active membership |
Negotiated provisions, screening committee membership |
Job design negotiated into collective bargaining agreement |
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| Impact on Mgt Style |
Substantial |
Slight |
None |
Some |
Some |
Substantial |
Substantial |
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| Table: Comparative
Analyses of Workplace Interventions demonstrates that the many types
of cooperative workplace interventions vary along several important dimensions
including philosophy, goals, level of participation, the ability to make
suggestions, the role of the supervisor, the role of mgrs, bonus formulas,
frequency of pay outs, role of union, impact on the mgt style |
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| Source: Expanded from M. Schuster, Union
Management Cooperation: Structure, Process, and Impact (Kalamazoo,
MI: WE. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1984), p. 73. |
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Figure:
Bucket
Bargaining Process
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Figure: Bucket
Bargaining Process depicts how the five types of bargaining issues,
including minor issues, past problems, change issues, discussion issues,
& econ issues are divided into 5 'buckets' of update, repair, redesign,
discussion, & econ |
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Figure:
Bargaining
Economics
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Figure:
Bargaining
Economics depicts how settlement guidelines set the stage for joint
agreements btwn mgt & the union & some issues are decided by mgt
or the union
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Figure:
A
Model of the Effect of Cooperation on Performance & Labor Relations
Outcomes
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Figure:
A
Model of the Effect of Cooperation on Performance & Labor Relations
Outcomes demonstrates that several factors affect cooperation, including
orgl structure, power of the union, power of the corp, the structure of
labor mgt relations, orgl constraints, orgl envl constraints, the cooperative
structure, & orgl performance
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Internal
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Outline on Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
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External
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Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are profit sharing plans
in which wkrs acquire part or all of the shares of stock in a private sector
org |
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An ESOP is often structured as a wkr benefit program |
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ESOPs allows wkrs to own part or all of a firm's stock, but in general,
wkrs are only allowed to own a small, non controlling share of a
firm |
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An ESOP is designed to encourage productive wk & reward length
of service |
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Louis Kelso, an American lawyer & investment banker, created the
ESOP concept during the 1950s |
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In 1974, Congress passed the first of several laws that provide tax
incentives for firms that form ESOPs |
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ESOPs were first permitted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) of 1974 |
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Under ERISA wkrs may receive their firms stock through profit share,
productivity gains, or subtractions from wages |
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Since the early 1980s, several firms such as Chrysler have paid wkrs
w/ stock in exchange or concessions |
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The linking of ESOPs & other employee involvement programs (EI)
to concessions, speed ups, lay offs, surveillance, & other wkr unfriendly
mgt tactics makes many unions & wkrs reluctant to embrace them
despite their positive possibilities |
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In some firms such as Weirton Steel, the wkrs became majority
stockholders |
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Northwest Airlines wkrs agreed to take stock & have their
pres join the board of directors in return for wage concession |
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Unionized wkrs at United Airlines purchased a majority of the stock
from stockholders |
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ESOPs do not in themselves improve productivity |
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Employee owned firms in Israel don't function much differently
than privately owned firms, but pay, productivity, & job security are
somewhat higher |
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Ownership affect attitudes through greater influence & control
& the financial value of ownership |
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Wkrs may not automatically favor ESOPs because the governance role
involved in ESOPs may induce fear & anxiety as well as expanded
commitment |
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Where performance of the firm is linked to retirement security,
wkrs may wish to avoid ESOPs because their investments lose substantial
diversification |
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While wkrs view mgt & union officer leadership of general committees
as generally positive, wkrs viewed mgt & union leadership in administering
ESOPs as weak |
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In 1991, 11 mm US wkrs, about 10% of the wkforce participated to some
degree in ESOPs (Census, 1993e) |
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Today, the US has about 7,000 ESOPs, w/ about 10 mm participating wkrs |
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Union initiated ESOPs have gained importance in rescuing failing
firms in order to save jobs |
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Another form of participation occurs in wkr owned cooperatives
in which wkrs not only own the firm, but also actively manage its day to
day affairs (Russell, 1992) |
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Wkr buyouts have provided an important counter balance to the
tendency of conglomerate firms to shout down or reduce their labor forces |
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In 1993, the 79,000 unionized wkrs of United Airlines purchased the
firm, making it the largest employee owned firm in the US (Moberg,
1994) |
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Wkr buyouts of existing firms have often been initiated in a effort
to preserve jobs (Sirianni, 1987) |
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Wkr ownership offers no necessary panacea to troubled firms,
but even test in this harsh env, it has had a good record of success |
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In the Boston area about 90 boats make a living off lobsters |
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The lobster boats were being priced off the docks by condominiums,
office complexes, & yacht marinas, but w/ the help of the Boston archdiocese,
these fishing families leased their own dock & estbed a coop that is
flourishing (McManus, 1987) |
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While most ESOPs come into existence in order to save jobs by rescuing
a distressed firm, they still have a better than average record
of success when compared to traditional buyouts |
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Despite their success, using ESOPs as a exit strat for trad mgt
is not a good strategy for labor |
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ESOPs could be much more effective & powerful if the labor mvmt
& wkrs were more proactive & pursued the employee ownership
strat in firms before they became distressed |
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The use of ESOPs & other employee buyout strats runs counter to
the strat of both the Labor Mvmt, w/ its Business Approach, & the the
GLC, as well as against mgt which has always opposed employee owned or
run firms |
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ESOPs are also often utilized to the detriment of wkrs in that little
control of firms accompanies stock purchases unless control is specifically
negotiated |
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Thus many ESOPs bring a limited form of ownership where financial
risks & rewards are purchased, but control or mgt of those risks &
rewards is not |
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The optimal ESOP gives wkrs ownership which entails the financial
risks & rewards in the form of dividends, stock splits, & capital
growth, as well as control of mgt through election of the Board
of Directors & top mgt |
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Many ESOPs are formed by borrowing money from a bank or other
commercial lender to buy stock in the company |
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It repays the loan from money the company contributes to the ESOP out
of earnings & profits |
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The company may deduct a certain amount of the ESOP payments from its
annual taxable income |
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Every year, the ESOP gives participating employees shares of the cash
& stock it has acquired in the previous year |
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The number of shares each wkr gets is based on the % of his or her
salary compared to the total amount of salaries of the employees in the
ESOP |
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A trust holds all the cash & stock paid to the ESOP |
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Generally, wkrs gain possession of their stock when they retire
or otherwise end their employment |
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In some plans, they may hold the stock as long as they wish & get
any dividends the company pays on it |
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In some plans, the wkrs also may sell or transfer ownership of the
stock |
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The worth of the stock is determined by its fair mkt value |
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In some ESOP's, the company must buy the stock from former wkrs who
want to sell it |
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ESOP's differ from one another according to four main elements
which are: |
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1. the amount of worker ownership of the company |
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2. whether workers have voting rights for their stock |
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3. the degree of wkr control of the board of directors |
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4. the degree of labor mgt cooperation to achieve goals |
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Internal
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Outline on Areawide
Labor Mgt Committees
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External
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AREAWIDE LABOR MGT COMMITTEES ARE ORGS OF INDL & UNION
LEADERS IN A GEOG REGION W/ THE GOAL OF DEALING W/ COMMON CONCERNS,
LABOR MGT COOP, JOB SECURITY & COMPETITIVENESS |
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Areawide labor mgt committees (AWLMCs) are jointly sponsored orgs w/in
a geographic area designed to advise on jointly experienced employment
issues |
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AWLMCs do not engage in bargaining nor form bargaining units |
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AWLMCs are typically a response to significant regional employment
problems, reduced profits, job security, or any joint issue, &
have historically been concentrated in the Northeast & Midwest which
have experienced deindustrialization & the relocation of plants to
other areas |
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An example of an AWLMC was a healthcare labor mgt council in Minneapolis
St. Paul w/ the help of the MN Bureau of Mediation Services, which faced
adversarial union mgt relations, managed to built trust to improve labor
mgt relations |
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Labor & mgt in an AWLMCs pressure each other to identify sources
of problems & use cooperative methods to reduce or avoid conflict |
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AWLMCs are managed by an exec director hired by top level corp
& union leaders |
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AWLMCs CONDUCT SOCIAL EVENTS, ESTB LABOR MGT COMMITTEES,
NEGOTIATE,
& FOSTER ECON DEVELOPMENT |
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AWLMCs engage in FOUR activities including: |
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1. the sponsorships of social events to improve
labor mgt commo |
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2. the estb of labor mgt committees in local plants |
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3. assistance in negotiations |
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4. the fostering of local econ development |
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AWLMCs aim to create an env suitable for problem solving & an apparatus
for labor mgt cooperation |
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AWLMCs need the backing of major firms who have visibility in the community
& the backing of competent executive directors who are willing to stay
in the post for an extended period of time |
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AWLMCs usually are implemented during times of econ decline |
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An example of an AWLMC was a Buffalo, NY in plant committee
established to facilitate negotiations in a utility company undergoing
a 17 week strike in four cargo handling firms faced w/ declining business |
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The Buffalo AWLMC managed to improve business volume & efficiency |
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A Jamestown, NY AWLMC was formed in small & mediums sized
plants but could not get the largest corps to participate |
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The Jamestown AWLMC improved productivity & reduced overhead, but
because implementation was weak, it mostly failed |
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Internal
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Outline on Team
Based Approaches
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External
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WORK TEAMS ARE GRPS ASSIGNED TO PRODUCE A GIVEN PRODUCT,
ASSEMBLY, OR SERVICE WHERE ALL WKRS ARE EXPECTED TO PERFORM ALL TASKS IN
SOME FORM OF ROTATION |
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As a result of globalization, deindustrialization, out sourcing, &
the restructuring of orgs which began in the 80s, team based approaches
became more common |
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Work teams are constructed of wkrs who are responsible for a particular
function or who operate in a given wk area |
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Wk teams have responsibility for the output from the area, including
how the tasks are assigned to wkrs, & control of the wk process itself,
given the equip they have |
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Each member of a wk team can perform any of the tasks for which
the team is responsible |
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MANY WORK TEAMS ARE BASED ON SKILL BASED PAY PLANS THAT INCREASE
WKRS' PAY AS THEY GAIN EXPERIENCE, SKILLS, ETC. |
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The greater the number of skills each wkr, or each team possesses,
the greater the variety of tasks they can perform |
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Many team based programs are based on a skill based pay plan (SBPP) |
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SBPPs tie wkrs' pay to the number of skills they demonstrate |
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Broader skills mean the firm can more easily accommodate change |
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Less equip downtime occurs because one of the skill sets includes
equip
maintenance |
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Multiskilling improves job security |
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Creating wk teams, training them to take responsibility for wk assignments
& output allows for the elimination of supervisors, creating
a leaner org |
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Teams at Saturn Corp are led by a mgt & union rep |
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Saturn teams are involved in dec mking outside of mandatory bargaining
issues such as choosing suppliers, product design, & vehicle types
to be produced |
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Link
Link
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The Figures: Saturn's
Organizing Principles & Saturn's Partnership Structure demonstrate
aspects of the team process at Saturn as a labor mgt system that integrates
cooperation into the culture & structure of the organization throughout
the plant level |
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At Chrysler's Jefferson North Plant, a "modern operating agreement"
was implemented for rebuilding the Detroit plant |
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In the Chrysler team, leaders are elected, but rotation is infrequent
& they encourage equal effort & reduced absenteeism |
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IN WORK TEAMS SUPERVISORS ARE FACILITATORS & WKRS
SUPERVISE THEMSELVES & EACH OTHER |
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Supervisors act as facilitators rather than directing work |
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In orgs w/ team concepts, small numbers of distinct jobs exist |
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Wkr supervisor relations improve
- when there is substantial participation by union leaders
- where wk has not appreciably changed
- where wkrs are experienced
- where mgt does not subcontract |
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Team approaches were controversial at GM in the 70s, but have been
successful in New United Motors Manufacturing, (NUMMI) which is a joint
GM Toyota venture in Freemont CA |
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The NUMMI teams resulted in lower absenteeism & greater
productivity, & a faster pace of production |
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The NUMMI team approach was innovative in that it was accompanied
by a no lay off policy, similar to ones common in Japan |
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At GM Van Nuys Plant only a bare majority of wkrs voted for
the team approach because they saw it as pitting wkrs in various domestic
plants against each other |
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The wkrs at GM Van Nuys also saw teams as eroding local & national
union power, & reducing the power of seniority |
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At Van Nuys there was no job guarantee |
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Teams are the most productive where wkrs have the necessary skill,
esp in the statistical process control area, & where mgt has
designed autonomy into the team structure |
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Teams have trouble when encountering problems that occur outside
the org such as supplier quality, shipping schedules, & inventory
mgt |
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Product line changes can disrupt teams as employment levels
change |
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Because teams were implemented about the same time wage concessions
were granted, they are very controversial in many plants |
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Dissidents claim concessions haven't saved jobs & that teamwork
is harder than the assembly line approach |
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In firms w/ teams, members claim their locals discourage grievances
& create a layer of union bureaucrats who are not in elected office,
& thus not accountable |
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Internal
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Figure: Saturn's Organizing Principles |
External
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Treat people as a fixed asset |
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Provide opportunities for them to maximize their
contributions & value to the organization |
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Provide extensive training & skill development
to all employees |
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Saturn will openly share all info, including financial data |
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Decision making will be based on consensus through a series of formal
joint labor mgt committees, or Decision Rings |
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As a stakeholder in the operation of Saturn, the UAW will participate
in business decisions as a full partner, including site selection &
construction, process & product design, choice of technologies, suppliers
selection, make buy decisions, retail dealer selection, pricing, business,
planning, training, business systems development, budgeting, quality systems,
productivity, improvement, job design, new production development, recruitment,
& hiring, maintenance, & engineering |
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Self managed teams or Work Units will be the basic building
blocks of the org |
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There will be a minimum of job classifications |
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Saturn will have a jointly developed & administered recruitment
& selection process, & Work Units will hire their own team members. |
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Seniority will not be the basis for selection, & the primary recruiting
pool will consist of active & laid off GM/UMW employees |
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The technical & social work organization will be integrated |
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There will be fewer full time elected UAW officials & few labor
relations personnel responsible for contract administration |
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Saturn's reward system will be deigned to encourage everyone's efforts
towards the common goals of quality, cost, timing & value to the customer |
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Source: S. Rubinstein, M. Bennett, & T. Kochan,
"The Saturn Partnership: Co Management, & the Reinvention of
the Local Union," in BE Kaufman & MM Kleiner, eds, Employee Representation:
Alternatives & Future Directions (Madison, WI, Industrial Relations
Research Assoc, 1993), p. 343, table, p. 345, figure. |
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Internal
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Figure: Saturn's Partnership
Structure |
External
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Work units are organized into teams of 6 to 15
members, electing their own leaders, who remain working members of the
unit |
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They are self directed & empowered w/ the
authority, responsibility & resources necessary to meet their day to
day assignments & goals, including producing to budget, quality, housekeeping,
safety & health, maintenance, material inventory control, training,
job assignments, repairs, scrap control, vacation approvals, absenteeism,
supplies, record keeping, personnel selection & hiring, work planning,
& work scheduling |
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Saturn has no supervisors in the traditional
sense. |
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Teams interrelated by geography, product, or technology are organized
into modules |
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Modules have common Advisors |
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Modules are integrated into three Business Units: Body Systems
(stamping, body fabrication, injection molding, & paint); Power train
(lost foam casting, machining & assembly of engines & transmissions);
& Vehicle Systems (vehicle interior, chassis, hardware, trim, exterior
panels & assembly) |
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Joint labor mgt Decision Rings meet weekly |
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At the corporate level the Strategic Action Council (SAC) concerns
itself w/ companywide long range planning, & relations w/ dealers,
suppliers, stockholders, & the community |
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Participating in the SAC for the union is the local president &
, on occasion, a UAW national representative |
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The Manufacturing Action Council (MAC) covers the Spring Hill manufacturing
& assembly complex |
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On the MAC representing the local is the union president & the
four vice presidents who also serve as the UAW bargaining committee |
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Each Business Unit has a joint labor mgt Decision Ring at the plant
level |
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The local president appoints an elected exec board member who is joined
by UAW Module Advisors & Crew Coordinators in representing the union |
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Decision Rings are also organized at the module level |
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Module Advisors & the elected Work Unit Counselors (team leaders)
participate in the module Decision Rings |
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Source: S. Rubinstein, M. Bennett, & T. Kochan,
"The Saturn Partnership: Co Management, & the Reinvention of
the Local Union," in BE Kaufman & MM Kleiner, eds, Employee Representation:
Alternatives & Future Directions (Madison, WI, Industrial Relations
Research Assoc, 1993), p. 343, table, p. 345, figure. |
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Internal
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Outline on Employee
Involvement Programs: Opportunities & Threats
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External
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EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT (EI) COMMITTEES ARE KNOWN AS QCs, QWLs,
CIRCLES,
ECs,
OR COMMITTEES |
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Employer / employee committees, often called quality circles,
are formed so that workers can make recommendations to mgt. about
hiring, personnel assignments, hours, terms & conditions of work, &
other similar issues |
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The issues that are dealt w/ in EI are frequently the same issues that
are the subject of collective bargaining in unionized workplaces |
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The Taft Hartley Act forbids the dominance of a Labor or union
orgs by an employer, thus outlawing "business unions" |
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The Electromation court judgment narrows an employer's ability to broadly
ask employees to consider employment issues |
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The involvement of workers in non mandatory bargaining issues
is unlikely to lead to charges of employer domination, even though this
is one of the gray areas where some workers may feel pressure, but
are unable to prove it |
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Unions should be aware that QCs & other EI programs can weaken
union influence in the org, & therefore, control of the org |
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Wkrs will identify increasingly w/ the firm if the union doesn't support
opportunities for interest employees to be involved |
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Communication activities in EI programs are often similar to
collecting data w/ a survey & using this data as a representation
of wkr attitudes |
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Some EI programs are vested w/ supervisory tasks |
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General Foods established work groups & the groups made their own
work assignments, created & operated training programs,
& made recommendations on staffing |
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The employee involvement program groups in the Gen Foods org was found,
in a court case, not to be an employer dominated labor org |
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EI IS OFTEN AIMED AT IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY, WORK LIFE,
PAY,
ETC. |
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Productivity studies find that giving workers more control of work
increases
productivity |
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Today, there are greater competitive pressures because of |
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- deindustrialization (conversion of old, heavy industry to
new light industry & information age-- & to services) |
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- globalization, global competition, & the movement of multinational
firms to foreign lands |
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Because of the competitive pressures of deindustrialization & globalization,
many firms are attempting to design more efficient work relationships &
quality circles are one design for increasing efficiency |
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EI IMPROVES WKPLACE CLIMATE, COMMITMENT, BRINGS CHANGE,
& BENEFITS MGT & LABOR |
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EI programs include FOUR components, including: |
|
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1. improving the wkplace climate |
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2. generating commitment in both mgt & wkrs |
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3. implementing change |
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4. creating benefit for both mgt & wkrs through increased
productivity, higher product quality, etc. |
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In planned programs, climate & commitment lead to change |
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In evolved programs, the climate leads to change which leads
in turn to commitment |
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In induced programs, change leads to appropriate climate &
commitment |
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Union willingness to become involved in QWL programs is related to
the progressiveness of the firm & increase foreign competition |
|
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Increased involvement in traditional wkplace decisions is related to
deregulation, changing demographics, & support by a parent national
union |
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Cooperation in strat dec mking is often increases as a result
of foreign competition & decreases as a result of domestic competition
because unions often represent wkrs in competitive domestic industries
& therefore are less willing to pit one firm against another |
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In an EI program w/ GM & the UAW, grievances, discipline, absenteeism,
number of local contract demands, & negotiating time were reduced |
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EI programs result in higher product quality & reduced grievance
rates |
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Product quality & productivity decreased when labor mgt conflict
increased |
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EI programs are associated w/ reduced absenteeism, accidents, grievances,
& quits |
|
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EI programs lead to greater loyalty to the union, rather than undermining
commitment |
|
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The effectiveness of the grievance procedures is a stronger predictor
of attitudes to the union than EI participation |
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EI is associated w/ improved job satisfaction & enhanced commo
skills |
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EI programs increase "orgl citizenship" both through participation
& changing job characteristics that require more task sharing |
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Union antagonism toward EI does not influence employee attitudes, but
it does reduce participation |
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THE LEGALITY OF COOPERATION PLANS IS SOMETIMES PROBLEMATIC
BECAUSE THE LAW STATES WKRS MAY NOT TAKE ON MGT FUNCTIONS UNLESS
THEY ARE CLASSIFIED & PAID AS MGRS |
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Among unionized firms, cooperation plans meet the requirements of the
labor acts because they are jointly agreed to by unions & mgt |
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Firms & nonunion firms estb joint mgt employee committees to deal
w/ production & employment issue |
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Joint mgt employee committees may violate labor law unless the process
& the subject of their work is closely regulated |
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The Taft Hartley Act (THA) forbids firms from creating & operating
employer dominated labor orgs |
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Discussion of employment issue or proposals by committees for taking
action on areas related to wages, hours, terms, & conditions of wk
which intrude into the mandatory bargaining issues specified in the act |
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The NLRB was faced w/ ruling on the legality of an employer sponsored
committee in the Electromation case |
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In the Electromation case the NLRB asked when does a mgt wkr committee
lose its protection as a communication device & become a labor org,
i.e. a business union? |
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In the Electromation case the NLRB asked what employer conduct is interference
or domination of mgt wkr committees? |
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In the Electromation case the firm had set up five volunteer committees
to look at absenteeism, pay bonuses, etc. |
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In the Electromation case the firm initiated the committees, drafted
their goals, & had mgt reps to facilitate |
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The NLRB rules that the Electromation wkr mgt committee was a employer
dominated labor organization |
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While it is difficult to determine what is a legal wkr mgt committee
in a nonunion setting, such committees are still going ahead in many firms |
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EI IS AT THE CENTER OF THE SUCCESS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK ORGS
(HPWOs) |
|
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High performance wk orgs are firms that have adopted many EI &
other wk practice innovations that increase wkr participation in or control
of the the wkplace |
|
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Research indicates that firms need to implement a coherent set of practices
in order to enhance orgl performance |
|
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A study of mini mills found that plants that implemented a combination
of problem solving teams, flexible job assignments, training for multiple
jobs, guaranteed employment security, & flexible pay plans were more
productive & profitable than firms that implemented smaller combinations
of these |
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Operating up time & added value were proportionally greater as
more EI programs were added |
|
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Wkrs are proportionally more satisfied w/ work as more EI programs
are added |
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WORKPLACE RESTRUCTURING IS SOMETIMES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
EI & OFTEN A GUISE FOR LAYOFFS & PAY CUTS |
|
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Because of globalization in the form of increased foreign competition,
a great deal of wkplace restructuring has taken place over the past 20
yrs |
|
| |
This has been the orgl env in which EI programs have been born in US
Labor mgt relations |
|
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Restructuring increases the intensity of wk, reduces the number of
wkrs in mfr jobs, reduces mid mgt, & has outsourced many jobs |
|
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Wkplace restructuring & firm performance improve when the local
union has horz & vert commo network ties & internal political vitality |
|
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Firms that implemented substantial EI programs during the early 90s
had higher layoffs & no net increase in pay |
|
| |
Restructuring, overall, has been negative for wkrs, & had mixed
results for the firms themselves as seen in smaller sales gains & smaller
export gains |
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EI programs have neither increased job security nor pay except where
the org's revenues were growing |
|
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Unions have also not made gains where EI programs were implemented |
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THE DIFFUSION & INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CHANGE IS SLOW
IN THE US COMPARED TO EUROPE & JAPAN |
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An imp issue for labor & mgt is how successful changes get diffused
both w/in an org, as well as among orgs & become commonplace, the norm,
i.e. institutionalized |
|
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EI needs a stable env to grow, & yet it is apparent that EI in
the US has grown in the era of globalization, deindustrialization, downsizing,
sourcing, restructuring, etc. |
|
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In any EI program, the union needs to avoid or isolate collective bargaining
shocks & mgt needs to avoid strategic shocks |
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Layoffs create problems for teams because wkrs use competitive seniority
rights to bump in & out |
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Changes are aided by implementing them in new facilities w/ new wkrs
& then diffusion of successful changes can them move to estbed setting |
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Unions can assist change best when they have a role in strat dec mking
such as plant locations |
|
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They may provided needed concessions & wk rule changes to make
existing facilities economically viable |
|
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Training in new tech, increased job security, ensuring the viability
of the firm, & satisfying wk processes are imp issues to wkrs &
unions which EI programs can address |
|
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Labor should recognize that gainsharing & innovative participation
are a logical pieces of successful labor mgt relations in today's wkplace |
|
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The ability to institutionalize change depends on high levels of trust
& commitment by union leaders, union members, wkrs, supervisors, plant
mgrs, & corp execs |
|
| |
Each of these orgl actors has different interests, a different status
quo to protect, a different perception of EI programs, & a different
role to play in advancing EI & a stronger wkplace |
|
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Estbing trust is not easy in the era of globalization, but it can be
done, & it will improve the wkplace for all actors |
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