March 15, 1996

1. Introduction

The following analysis considers wildland firefighter safety & effectiveness on the fireline as influenced by the general body of firefighting guidelines issued by the land management agencies charged with the task of fire suppression. It has been understood for some time that the number of firefighting rules and regulations imposed upon the line firefighter has become unwieldy. The South Canyon Fire and the 30 Mile Fire both shook the firefighting agencies at their base. The nature and scope of these tragedies created the general feeling that something was wrong, yet no clear solutions were forthcoming.

After the South Canyon Fire Tragedy in 1994 it was resolved by top fire management not to add any more rules. But with the seemingly inevitable fireline deaths since then, more rules and procedure have indeed been added, even if they did not come in the form of a checklist. Directives have been given. Procedures have changed. Training has been modified. Yet, the general body of firefighting guidelines to which the line firefighter is supposed to refer, have not changed.

The following analysis consolidates 59 of the present firefighting guidelines to create the Ten Essential Factors in (Wildland) Firefighting (TEFF). This paper consolidates 59 firefighting guidelines, including the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders, the 18 Watch Out Situations, the 7 Downhill Line Construction Checklist, the 4 Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires, the 7 Look Up, Down & Around Factors, the 4 LCES Components, and the 9 Wildland Urban Watch Outs, into ten essential factors in wildland firefighting. Furthermore, this analysis matches the TEFF with the risk management process, trigger points, a trends analysis, and appropriate fireline tactics, ranging from engagement, to the modification of engagement tactics, to disengagement tactics. Perhaps never before has one analysis brought together these five components: rules, risk management, a trends analysis, trigger points, and tactics. Thus the present analysis and the TEFF combine the “classic” 59 firefighting guidelines with the more recent directives, procedures, and training to create a comprehensive, non-contradictory, consolidated tool for the line wildland firefighter.

During the summer of 2003, the consolidation of the 59 firefighting guidelines into the TEFF was run as a pilot study. As discussed below, favorable comments were given, with suggestions for improvement.

2. Paper Organization

The next section of this paper, 3. Why the Consolidation of the Firefighting Guidelines is Needed, provides a socio-historical analysis of the events that lead to the formulation of various sets of firefighting guidelines, discussing why a system of guidelines that developed over a period of decades should be revisited.

Following that, 4. The Construction of the Ten Essential Factors in (Wildland) Firefighting Through the Consolidation of 59 Firefighting Guidelines, provides an overview of the methodology utilized to create the TEFF by examining, categorizing, and organizing the 59 firefighting guidelines by their function and logical groupings.

The Section entitled 5. The TEFF Card, presents the TEFF Card itself and explains the pilot study which implemented the use of the TEFF Card during the 2003 fire season.

6. What Are the Ten Essential Factors in (Wildland) Firefighting? provides an overview and explanation of the ten essential factors in wildland firefighting.

7. Tracking Trends examines the importance of framing any firefighting guidelines, and especially the TEFF, in terms of trends rather than absolutes of go—no go, which in practice, do not exist in the field. This is a demonstration that rules must have criteria that dictate behavior while allowing for individual judgments by actors in the field.

8. Fire Suppression Tactics presents a brief discusses how, in light of the TEFF and Trends & Trigger Points, Fire Suppression Tactics should change as conditions change. Fire Suppression Tactics should be viewed in terms of trends rather than as absolutes creating a scale of full suppression, modified suppression, and disengagement.

The Conclusion reviews the logic of the TEFF and presents an overview of the testing and research needed for the pursuit of firefighter safety.

3. Why the Consolidation of the Firefighting Guidelines is Needed

It is sometime said in the military that “Rules are written in blood.” This adage reminds us that for the typical staid bureaucracy, change comes only under dramatic, often tragic circumstances. And indeed, many of the firefighting guidelines have there roots in one fire tragedy or another.

The Forest Service began its wildland firefighting mission as a result of the Prestigo Fire in the 1880s and the “Big Blowup” of 1910. The former killed more people than any other known in US history. The later killed many firefighters and civilians. The Mann Gulch Fire on the in the Gates of the Mountains wild area claimed the lives of 13 firefighters on August 5^th, 1949. The Division of Fire Research was ordered to investigate fire behavior for firefighter and fireline safety. On the Inaja Fire on November 25, 1956, eleven firefighter lost their lives. The twin tragedies of Mann Gulch and the Inaja Fire justified the first widely known firefighting guidelines: the 10 Standard Orders and the 13 Watchouts (which today are the 18 Watchouts). In 1957, the Ten Standard Fire Orders were implemented as the primary set of fireline safety guidelines. Note that in the late 1980s the 10 Standard Orders were revised to fit the acronym FIRE ORDERS and the 13 Watchouts became the 18 Watchouts. On March 25, 2003 Joel Holtrop, the Deputy Chief State and Private Forestry issued a memo, File Code: 5100, which required all land management agencies involved in fire suppression to “immediately begin using the 10 Standard Fire Orders in their original 1958 order and composition.” The Loop Fire on the Angeles National Forest, 1966, resulted in the death of 12 El Cariso Hotshots. Following the investigation, the Downhill Line Construction Rules and the use of hand held radios were implemented. In 1971, the Indirect Line Construction Rules were created after the Romero Fire on the Los Padres National Forest claimed four victims. After the Battlement Creek Fire of 1976 claimed four victims, fire shelters became standard PPE (Personal Protective Equipment). The Dude Fire, 1990, claimed six victims after which Paul Gleason began to promote LCES. The South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain, CO, 1994 killed 14 firefighters from nearly all the branches of the firefighting system. The firefighting agencies commissioned Tridata Corporation to survey all levels of the firefighting agencies. While no checklists or guidelines were created, Tridata made nearly 200 recommendations, some of which have become policy. The 30 Mile fire killed four firefighters and injured another four firefighters and two civilians. As they did after South Canyon, the firefighting agencies conducted an investigation, but were reluctant to issue more rules. Instead, various actors have issued directives ordering changes in policy, procedures, training, tactics, etc.

Indeed, it appears as if the rules of firefighting are written in blood. While each new set of rules made needed changes in firefighting operations, their formulation was reactionary and thus scattered, redundant, and in some ways, ambiguous. This analysis and the accompanying pilot study are an attempt to refine firefighting guidelines, reducing the redundancy and the ambiguity.

4. The Construction of the Ten Essential Factors in (Wildland) Firefighting Through the Consolidation of 59 Fire Guidelines

This section of the paper takes the 59 “classic” firefighting guidelines currently in place (the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders, the 18 Watchout Situations, the 7 Downhill Line Construction Checklist, the 4 Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires, the 7 Look Up, Down, & Around Factors, the 4 LCES, and the 9 Wildland Urban Watch Outs) and consolidates them into the Ten Essential Factors in Firefighting (TEFF).

In brief, the rationale for rewriting and consolidating the many firefighting guidelines falls into six categories. First, history may be an excellent teacher, but history is not a concise author. The 59 firefighting guidelines were created over approximately the last 100 years, and they have not logically focused on earlier efforts. Instead, each new set of rules was constructed as a relatively self-sufficient list. It is as if every time a new element were discovered, the discoverer also choose to rewrite the periodic table of the elements.

Second, there are simply too many guidelines to provide clear direction. Some firefighters rely primarily on LCES; some firefighters prefer the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders, others pull out the IRPG (Incident Response Pocket Guide), the Fireline Handbook, or more recently, the Incident Organizer for guidance.

Third, it is apparent from the analysis presented below that the firefighting guidelines are redundant. The analysis below shows that some guidelines are nearly identical, and many of them clearly focus on similar issues, using different wording.

Fourth, a consolidated list of firefighting guidelines would be easier to teach, remember, and use on the fireline. 59 major firefighting guidelines, and over 80 other guidelines mean that it takes young firefighters years to cover all of this information. Firefighters on the fireline cannot clearly implement these guidelines.

Fifth, a consolidated list of firefighting guidelines could be applied more efficiently to the fire situation.

Sixth, a consolidated list could improve the typical utilization of the Risk Management Process.

While 59 firefighting guidelines are considered here, it should be noted that there are more than 80 other rules in the form of lists, checklists, guidelines, etc. that firefighters learn including the ten Tactical Watch Outs, the five steps of the Risk Management Process, the nine guidelines for Powerline Safety, the six Safety Zone Guidelines, the 16 items on the Structure Protection Checklist, the 7 items on the Structure Assessment Checklist, the 21 Advantages & Disadvantages of Direct & Indirect Attack, Aircraft Watch Out Situations, ERC & BI Fire Indices, items in Incident Organizers, the Fire Triangle, and others. The impact of the new IRPG (Incident Response Pocket Guide) and the Directives coming out of the 30 Mile Fire are significant and add another layer of firefighting guidelines with which the firefighter must comply. (If the reader is aware of other wildland firefighting guidelines not discussed here, please contact the author with this information.) The current study focused on 59 of the “classic” firefighting guidelines because these are the guidelines most commonly used on the fireline and they are the oldest guidelines.

The purpose of this analysis is to consolidate all the firefighting guidelines into Ten Essential Factors in Firefighting. Some of the firefighting guidelines are found in more than one area. While it is recognized that even with the 59 firefighting guidelines, some critical areas have not been addressed, these gaps are not addressed here. Thus, any gaps in firefighter safety and tactics that appear in the 59 firefighting guidelines, also appear in the TEFF.

The method used to construct the TEFF was to examine all of the 59 firefighting guidelines and first combine those that were obviously redundant. Next, the remaining firefighting guidelines were combined according to common words or intent. Finally, the firefighting guidelines were logically separated into fundamental areas of concern.

The Firefighting Guidelines are represented by the following acronyms:

FO 10 Standard Fire Orders

WO 18 Watch-Out Situations

DL 7 Downhill Line Construction Checklist

CD 4 / 7 Common Denominators of fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires

LU 7 Look Up, Down & Around Factors

LC 4 LCES Factors

UW 9 Wildland Urban Watch-Out Situations

The colored font indicates that one of the firefighting guidelines is found in more than one TEFF.

Orange signifies WO 4: “Unfamiliar with local factors influencing fire behavior. This WO appears in the three TEFF designations of Weather, Fire Behavior, and Fuel Type.

Red signifies WO 12: “Cannot see main fire, not in contact w/ someone who can.” This WO appears in the three TEFF designations of Lookouts, Communications, and Fire Status.

Gray signifies WO 17: “Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zone difficult.” This WO appears in the three TEFF designations of Safety Zones, Terrain, and Fuel

Green signifies DL3a: “Crew supervisor is in direct contact w/ lookout who can see fire.” This DL appears in the two TEFF designations of Lookouts and Communication.

Purple signifies DL3b: “Communication is established between all crews.” This DL appears in the two TEFF designations of Communications and Escape Routes.

Turquoise signifies: UW 1: ‘Poor access and narrow one-way roads.” This UW appears in the two TEFF designations of Escape Routes and Terrain.

Brown signifies: UW 2: “Bridge load limits.” This UW appears in the two TEFF designations of Escape Routes and Terrain.

I. Lookouts

There are five Firefighting Guidelines that are related to Lookouts. Those Firefighting Guidelines in color are also placed in other TEFFs.

	LCES WT FFFF		Good		Medium		Bad
I.	L	Lookouts	Good LO in place	Moving farther away from LO	LO becomes less effective because fire &/or crew moves out of sight		No or ineffective LO

II.	C	Communications	Good Commo	Commo becomes so heavy it is difficult to speak to necessary forces	People move into holes where it is difficult to reach them	Weak Commo	Lost commo

III.	E	Escape routes	Good Escape Route in place	Many factors enter into determining whether an Escape Route is "Short" or "Long: Terrain & Fuel dependent	Escape routes become longer, steeper, etc. as crew &/or fire change locations	"Long" Escape Route	Escape Route becomes so long as to make it ineffective

IV.	S	Safety zones	Good Safety Zone	With Improvement, Marginal Safety Zone	Deployment Zone	The only safety zone may be a long Escape Route out of the area; very wind dependent	No Deployment Zone & Long Escape Route out of area

V.	W	Weather	"Good" Wx usually in morning, degrades as day goes on	Fire Wx in mid to late afternoon, & often into early evening	Wx also storm & front dependent		Extreme Wx

VI.	T	Terrain	Fire in consistent terrain	Fire approaching critical terrain	Fire just into critical terrain	Fire well into critical terrain	Fire into new critical terrain

VII.	Fb	Fire Behavior	smoldering	creeping	running / torching	passive crowning	active crowning / major runs

VIII	Fr	Firefighting Resources	Fire feels over-manned	More people split off to do other jobs	Obviously not enough people	Undermanned to the extent that fire is lost	Critical functions failing: LO, Commo, etc.

IX	Fs	Fire Status	Fire tactics going well: good anchor, progressing on line; more line progress than fire growth	Weak anchor: roll out, spotting, bad position on fire, etc.	Tactics not working well: must chase spots, roll out, or fire is growing faster than you can line it	Fire making major advances & you are loosing a lot of line	Fire is forcing w/drawl from the line/area

X	Ft	Fuel Type	Consistent Fuel	Fire approaches more volatile fuel (moisture, type, consistency)	Fire into significant pocket of more volatile fuel	Transition to volatile fuel is causing increased fie behavior	Critical Fuel: flashy, ladder fuel, preheated, pre-burned, etc., capable of initiating blow-up

The tactic of Engagement is the primary tactic that is taught to firefighters. Fire suppression tactics have an almost exclusive focus on aggressively attacking a fire with little training given to understanding when engagement should be ended or modified. The tactic called Modification is so named to indicate that the firefighter is modifying “normal” engagement tactics because of safety and/or effectiveness concerns. In general, if a fire suppression tactic is not effective, it is also not safe. The tactic called Disengagement is so named because firefighters should recognize that they may not be able to engage, or directly or indirectly attack all fires. In fact, some form of “retreat” tactics needs to be clearly taught to firefighters. The Trends to Trigger Points Matrix on Side One of the TEFF Card is designed to give a visual indicator or when a firefighter might want to shift from Engagement to Modification or to Disengagement. No absolute criteria that encompasses all fireline situations can be designed. However, if the firefighter is seeing many TEFF indicators degrading beyond the medium level, this should indicate it is time to modify or even disengage.

9. Conclusion

The TEFF is designed to consolidate the 59 firefighting guidelines. This tool along with the innovations of a Trends Leading to Trigger Points Matrix analysis, which replaces the absolute go—no go criteria often associated with the Ten Standard Fire Orders, LCES, and other firefighting guidelines, and the trisection of firefighting tactics into Engagement, Modification, or Disengagement provides one comprehensive, concise, and effective tool to promote safety on the fireline. Firefighters are constantly commenting that fires are becoming more complex, they have more training to complete than ever before, they are being asked to achieve more divergent goals than ever before. The TEFF Card is an effort to reverse that trend and bring firefighting back to a concern with the basics of firefighting and fireline safety.

APPENDIX : A

A Summary of the TEFF

TEFF 1: Sufficient Lookouts are in place given the Hazard Assessment.

TEFF 2: Communications: Sufficient Communications are in place: generally communications are needed w/ lookout(s), crews, supervisors, & adjoining forces, but there may be other critical links.

TEFF 3: Escape Routes: A suitable Escape Route is known to all.

TEFF 4: Safety Zones: A suitable Safety Zone is known to all. The Safety Zone may be to exit the fire area.

TEFF 5: Weather: The Weather is doing what is expected; no RH or wind trigger points have been crossed.

TEFF 6: Terrain: The Terrain is not causing unexpected fire behavior, creating a hazard for Firefighting Resources, or compromising the Escape Route.

TEFF 7: Fire Behavior is understood in light of Weather, Terrain, & Fuel Type. Fire behavior is not doing anything unexpected, thus Firefighting Resources' tactics are succeeding as expected.

TEFF 8: While more Resources may be on order, Firefighting Resources are sufficient for Firefighters to remain safe & to successfully implement current tactics.

TEFF 9: Firefighters are aware of the scope of the fire, & current tactics are successful in light of amount of Firefighting Resources & to keep current Firefighters safe.

TEFF 10: Fuel Type is understood, and is exhibiting expected Fire Behavior

APPENDIX : B

INSTRUCTIONS: The Ten Essential Factors in (Wildland) Firefighting (TEFF)

“Are You TEFF Enough?”

The TEFF Card consolidates 59 standard firefighting guidelines, including the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders, the 18 Situations That Shout Watch-Out, the Downhill Line Construction List, the Common Denominators on Tragedy Fires, etc. TEFF assumes the firefighter has a strong background in the 59 firefighting guidelines.

NOTE: The TEFF Card is on a trial run. If successful it may be used to reduce paperwork, cards, etc.

On side one of the TEFF Card are the Ten Essential Factors in Firefighting (TEFF) and a trends scale. On the other side of the TEFF Card are the three levels of Fire Suppression Tactics including Engagement, Modify, and Disengagement,.

To use the TEFF Card, at the beginning of shift, mark or mentally note two boxes for each of the Ten Essential Factors. First, mark current conditions at the beginning of the shift. Second, mark the conditions you expect at the peak of burning period.

Then, throughout the day, as you use the Risk Management Process and as conditions change, update your TEFF Card to represent current conditions. You may specify specific trigger points (i.e. lost the Lookout, fire roles out on underslung line, etc.) which cause you to Modify your Fire Suppression Tactics. Second, you may watch for trends, or degradation of several of the TEFFs that might cause you to Modify your Fire Suppression Tactics.

Feedback: We need your input! Mark your most appropriate response, and make comments!!

1. I found the TEFF Card to be useful.

A B C D E

Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly

Agree Disagree

2. How many shifts did you use the TEFF? ___________________

3. I think we are better off using the 10 & 18, and not the TEFF Card

A B C D E

Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly

Agree Disagree

4. Rank your top three preferences for fire guidelines by indicating 1, 2 & 3

_________ 10 Standard Firefighting Orders _________ 7 Look Up, Down & Around

_________ 18 Situations that Shout Watch-Out _________ 4 LCES

_________ 7 Downhill Line Construction Checklist _________ 9 Wildland Urban Watch Outs

_________ 10 TEFF

_________ 4 Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires

_________ Some combination of the above, such as ___________________________________

5. What is your highest Redcard Qual? ________________________________________________

The TEFF Card could be improved by: _________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

MAKE COMMENTS ON OTHER SIDE !!

Patrick Withen

McCall Smokejumpers

PO Box 1065

McCall, ID 83636

----------------------------------------------------------------Fold-------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------Staple or Tape along this Fold Line----------------------------------------

WRITE COMMENTS HERE, and fold to the inside. You may include your name & email address if you would like to be kept informed on the development of TEFF

Contact:

Patrick Withen

McCall Smokejumpers

PO Box 1065

McCall, ID 83638

208-634-0385 Fax

208-634-0378 Ops

276-393-5268 Cell

APPENDIX C: The TEFF Card

Side One of the TEFF Card:

Side Two of the TEFF Card

APPENDIX D: A SUMMARY OF THE TEFF & THE 59 FIREFIGHTING GUIDELINES

10 FO The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders

18 WO The 18 Watch Out Situations

7 DL The Downhill Line Construction Checklist

4 CD Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires

7 LU Look Up, Down & Around Factors

4 LC LCES

9 UW The Wildland Urban Watch Outs

59 Total

I. Lookouts

FO 8 Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations

WO 12 Cannot see main fire; not in contact w/ someone who can

DL 3 LCES will be coordinated for all personnel involved

DL 3a Crew supervisors is in direct contact w/ lookout who can see the fire

LC 1 Lookouts must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

II. Communications

FO 4 Ensure Instructions are given & understood

FO 6 Remain in Communication w/ crew members, your supervisor, & adjoining forces

WO 5 Uninformed on strategy, tactics, & hazards

WO 6 Instructions & assignments not clear

WO 7 No communication link w/ crew members or supervisor

WO 12 Cannot see main fire; not in contact w/ someone who can

DL 3A Crew supervisors is in direct contact w/ lookout who can see the fire

Dl 3B Communication is established between all crews

LC 2 Communications must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

III. Escape Routes

DL 3b Rapid access to safety zones in case fire crosses below crew

LC 3 Escape Routes must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

UW 1 Poor access & narrow one-way roads

UW 2 Bridge load limits

IV. Safety Zones

FO 7 Determine safety zones & escape routes

WO 3 Safety zones & escape routes not identified

WO 17 Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zones difficult

LC 4 Safety zones must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

V. Weather: Wind, Temperature, & Humidity

FO 3 Recognize current weather conditions & obtain forecasts

WO 4 Unfamiliar w/ weather

WO 14 Weather becoming hotter & drier

WO 15 Wind increases and/or changes direction

CD 3 When there is an unexpected shift in wind direction or in wind speed

LU 5 Observe wind

LU 6 Observe stability

UW 8 Strong winds

VI. Terrain

WO 2 In country not seen in daylight

WO 9 Building fireline downhill w/ fire below

WO 13 On hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below

WO 17 Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zones difficult

DL 5 Fireline will not lie in or adjacent to a chute or chimney

CE 4 When fire responds to topographic conditions & runs uphill

LU 3 Scout terrain

UW 1 Poor access & narrow one-way roads

UW 2 Bridge load limits

UW 6 Structures in chimneys, box canyons, narrow canyons, or on steep slopes

VII. Fire Behavior

FO 2 Initiate all action based on current & expected fire behavior

WO 4 Unfamiliar w/ local factors influencing fire behavior

WO 16 Getting frequent spot fires across line

DL 7 Bottom of the fire will be monitored; if the potential exists for the fire to spread, action will be taken to secure the fire edge

LU 7 Watch fire behavior

UW 7 Extreme fire behavior

VIII. Firefighting Resources

FO 1 Fight fire aggressively, but provide for safety first

FO 9 Retain control at all times

FO 10 Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively

WO 18 Taking a nap near the fireline

DL 1 Crew supervisors & overhead will discuss assignment prior to committing crews

UW 4 Inadequate water supply

UW 9 Evacuation of public (panic)

IX. Fire Status

FO 5 Obtain current information on the fire status

WO 1 Fire not scouted & sized up

WO 8 Constructing line w/o safe anchor point

WO 19 Attempting frontal assault on fire

WO 11 Unburned fuel between you & fire

WO 12 Cannot see main fire; not in contact w/ someone who can

DL 2 Decision will be made after proposed fireline has been scouted

DL 4 Direct attack will be used whenever possible; if not possible, the fireline should be completed between anchor points before being fired out

DL 6 Starting point will be anchored for crew building fire down from the top

CD 1 On relatively small fires or deceptively quiet areas of large fires

X. Fuel Type

WO 4 Unfamiliar w/ local factors influencing fire behavior

WO 17 Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zones difficult

CD 2 In relatively light fuels, such as grass, herbs, & light brush

LU 1 Assess fuel characteristics

LU 2 Feel & measure fuel moisture

UW 3 Wooden construction & wood shake roofs

UW 5 Natural fuels 30 ft. for closer to structures

APPENDIX F : Biographical Info on the Author

The author, Patrick Withen is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Organizational Studies and Chair of the Dept. of Social Sciences at the University of Virginia at Wise, and is a Smokejumper for the U.S. Forest Service, out of McCall, ID.

SCHOOL SEASON Mid-August to Mid-May

Patrick Withen

Associate Professor of Sociology

& Chair of the Dept. of Social Sciences

University of Virginia at Wise

1 College Ave.

Wise, VA 24293

276-376-4526 office

pwithen@virginia.edu email

FIRE SEASON Mid-May to Mid-August

Patrick Withen

McCall Smokejumpers

PO Box 1065

McCall, ID 83638

276-393-5268 cell

276-393-5269 pwithen@virginia.edu email

276-393-5270

March 24, 2004

TEFF030919

* Corresponding author address: Patrick Withen, University of Virginia at Wise, 1 College Ave., Wise, VA 24293; phone: 276-376-4526; email: pwithen@virginia.edu webpages: http://www.fireworld.info &

** The TEFF Card and the TEFF Card Instructions are included in Appendix A

TEFF	Number of Guidelines
1. Lookouts	5 Guidelines
2. Communications	9 Guidelines
3, Escape Routes	4 Guidelines
4. Safety Zones	4 Guidelines
5. Weather	8 Guidelines
6. Terrain	10 Guidelines
7. Fire Behavior	6 Guidelines
8. Fire Resources	7 Guidelines
9. Fire Status	10 Guidelines
10. Fuel Type	7 Guidelines
Total	70 (some Guidelines appear in more than one TEFF)
Average	7 per TEFF

Engage	Modify	Disengage
Anchor & Flank	Change Engagement Tactics	Pull back closer to safety zone, take a break, rethink strategy
Direct Attack	Consolidate Forces	Retreat
Frontal Assault on Head	Hold, Improve, Reinforce	Evacuate
Indirect Attack	Patrol, Hold what you have	Last Resort
Backfire/Burnout	Pull Back to better line location (indirect)

I.	L	Lookouts
			FO 8	Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations
			WO 12	Cannot see main fire; not in contact w/ someone who can
			DL 3	LCES will be coordinated for all personnel involved
			DL 3a	Crew supervisors is in direct contact w/ lookout who can see the fire
			LC 1	Lookouts must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

II.	C	Communications
			FO 4	Ensure Instructions are given & understood
			FO 6	Remain in Communication w/ crew members, your supervisor, & adjoining forces
			WO 5	Uninformed on strategy, tactics, & hazards
			WO 6	Instructions & assignments no clear
			WO 7	No communication link w/ crew members or supervisor
			WO 12	Cannot see main fire; not in contact w/ someone who can
			DL 3a	Crew supervisors is in direct contact w/ lookout who can see the fire
			DL 3b	Communication is established between all crews
			LC 2	Communications must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

IV.	S	Safety zones
			FO 7	Determine safety zones & escape routes
			WO 3	Safety zones & escape routes not identified
			WO 17	Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zones difficult
			LC 4	Safety zones must be established & known to all firefighters before needed

V.	W	Weather: wind, temperature & humidity
			FO 3	Recognize current weather conditions & obtain forecasts
			WO 4	Unfamiliar w/ weather….
			WO 14	Weather becoming hotter & drier
			WO 15	Wind increases and/or changes direction
			CD 3	When there is an unexpected shift in wind direction or in wind speed
			LU 5	Observe wind
			LU 6	Observe stability
			UW 8	Strong winds

VI.	T	Terrain
			WO 2	In country not seen in daylight
			WO 9	Building fireline downhill w/ fire below
			WO 13	On hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below
			WO 17	Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zones difficult
			DL 5	Fireline will not lie in or adjacent to a chute or chimney
			CE 4	When fire responds to topographic conditions & runs uphill
			LU 3	Scout terrain
			UW 1	Poor access & narrow one-way roads
			UW 2	Bridge load limits
			UW 6	Structures in chimneys, box canyons, narrow canyons, or on steep slopes

VII.	Fb	Fire Behavior
			FO 2	Initiate all action based on current & expected fire behavior
			WO 4	….Unfamiliar w/ local factors influencing fire behavior
			WO 16	Getting frequent spot fires across line
			DL 7	Bottom of the fire will be monitored; if the potential exists for the fire to spread, action will be taken to secure the fire edge
			LU 7	Watch fire behavior
			UW 7	Extreme Fire Behavior

VIII	Fr	Firefighting Resources
			FO 1	Fight Fire Aggressively, but provide for safety first
			FO 9	Retain control at all times
			FO 10	Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively
			WO 18	Taking a nap near the fireline
			DL 1	Crew supervisors & overhead will discuss assignment prior to committing crews
			UW 4	Inadequate water supply
			UW 9	Evacuation of public (panic)

IX	Fs	Fire Status
			FO 5	Obtain current information on the fire status
			WO 1	Fire not scouted & sized up
			WO 8	Constructing line w/o safe anchor point
			WO 10	Attempting frontal assault on fire
			WO 11	Unburned fuel between you & fire
			WO 12	Cannot see main fire; not in contact w/ someone who can
			DL 2	Decision will be made after proposed fireline has been scouted
			DL 4	Direct attack will be used whenever possible; if not possible, the fireline should be completed between anchor points before being fired out
			DL 6	Starting point will be anchored for crew building fire down from the top
			CD 1	On relatively small fires or deceptively quiet areas of large fires

X	Ft	Fuel Type
			WO 4:	….Unfamiliar w/ local factors influencing fire behavior
			WO 17	Terrain & fuels make escape to safety zones difficult
			CD 2	In relatively light fuels, such as grass, herbs, & light brush
			LU 1	Assess Fuel Characteristics
			LU 2	Feel & measure fuel moisture
			UW 3	Wooden Construction & wood shake roofs
			UW 5	Natural fuels 30 ft. or closer to structures

Poor access & narrow one-way roads

TEFF

Number of Guidelines

Side Two of the TEFF Card (Actual Size)

APPENDIX C: The TEFF Card

Side Two of the TEFF Card