OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM ( in part)
from Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 1, translated
by Rev. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933). Copyright
1933 by Harvard University Press.
BOOK I
Chapter 1. Of the Main Difference Between Philosophic Systems
The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either
discover the object of their search or deny that it is discoverable and
confess it to be inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with
regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, this is probably why
some have claimed to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that
it cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring. Those who
believe they have discovered it are the "Dogmatists," specially so called
is Aristotle, for example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain others;
Cleitomachus and Carneades and other Academics treat it as inapprehensible;
the Sceptics keep on searching. Hence it seems reasonable to hold that
the main types of philosophy are three: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and
the Sceptic. Of the other systems it will best become others to speak:
our task at present is to describe in outline the Sceptic doctrine, first
premising that of none of our future statements do we positively affirm
that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact,
like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment¼
Chapter 4. What Scepticism Is
Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances
to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the
equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly
to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness"
or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply
in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects
of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought
or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either
with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said,
in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements";
for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways appearances to appearances,
or judgements to judgements, or allernando appearances to judgements,
in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the
phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever"
to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire
how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may
take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we
do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply
as equivalent to "conflicting judgements." "Equipollence" we use of equality
in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of
the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more
probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither
deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition
of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement
we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End."
Chapter 6. Of the Principles of Scepticism
The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the hope of attaining quietude.
Men of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in
doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on
to inquire what is true in things and what false, hoping by the settlement
of the question to attain quietude. The main basic principle of the Sceptic
system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for
we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.
Chapter 7. Does the Sceptic Dogmatize?
When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogmatizing we do not use the
term "dogma," as some do, in the broader sense of "approval of a thing"
(for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which are the necessary results
of sense-impressions, and he would not, for example, say when feeling hot
or cold "I believe that I am not hot or cold"); but we say that "he does
not dogmatize" using "dogma" in the sense, which some give it, of "assent
to one of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry"; for the Pyrrhonean
philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident. Moreover, even in the
act of enunciating the Sceptic formulae concerning things non-evident such
as the formula "No more (one thing than another)," or the formula "I determine
nothing," or any of the others which we shall presently mention, he does
not dogmatize. For whereas the dogmatizer posits the things about which
he is said to be dogmatizing as really existent, the Sceptic does not posit
these formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the
formula "All things are false" asserts the falsity of itself as well as
of everything else, as does the formula "Nothing is true," so also the
formula "No more" asserts that itself like all the rest, is "No more this
than that," and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And of the other
formulae we say the same. If then, while the dogmatizer posits the matter
of his dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates his formulae
so that they are virtually canceled by themselves, he should not be said
to dogmatize in his enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in
his enunciation of these formulae he states what appears to himself and
announces his own impression in an undogmatic way, without making any positive
assertion regarding the external realities.
Chapter 8. Has the Sceptic a Doctrinal Rule?
We follow the same lines in replying to the question "Has the Sceptic a
doctrinal rule?" For if one defines a "doctrinal rule" as "adherence to
a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances,"
and defines "dogma" as "assent to a non-evident proposition," then we shall
say that he has not a doctrinal rule. But if one defines "doctrinal rule"
as "procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line
of reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible to seem to live
rightly (the word 'rightly' being taken, not as referring to virtue only,
but in a wider sense) and tending to enable one to suspend judgement,"
then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of reasoning
which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable
to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our
own instinctive feelings.
Chapter 9. Does the Sceptic Deal with Physics?
We make a similar reply also to the question "Should the Sceptic deal with
physical problems?" For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making
firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated
in physical theory, we do not deal with physics; yet, on the other hand,
in respect of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition
and of our theory of quietude we do treat of physics. This, too, is the
way in which we approach the logical and ethical branches of so-called
"philosophy."
Chapter 10. Do the Sceptics Abolish Appearances?
Those who say that "the Sceptics abolish appearances," or phenomena, seem
to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our School. For, as we
said above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce
our assent involuntarily; and these impressions are "the appearances."
And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears,
we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance
itself but the account given of the appearance, and that is a different
thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears
to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through
the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter
of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement regarding the
appearance. And even if we do actually argue against the appearances, we
do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances,
but by way of pointing out the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if reason
is such a trickster as to all but snatch away the appearances from under
our very eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the case of things
non-evident so as not to display rashness by following it.
Chapter 11. Of the Criterion of Scepticism
That we adhere to appearances is plain from what we say about the Criterion
of the Sceptic School. The word "Criterion" is used in two senses: in the
one it means "the standard regulating belief in reality or unreality,"
(and this we shall discuss in our refutation); in the other it denotes
the standard of action by conforming to which in the conduct of life we
perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the latter that
we are now speaking. The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we
say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation.
For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open
to question. Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying
object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the
object is in reality such as it appears to be.
Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal
rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.
And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one
part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of
the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in
the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are
naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions
is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition
of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life
as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we
are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements
undogmatically.
Chapter 12. What Is the End of Scepticism?
Our next subject will be the End of the Sceptic system. Now an "End" is
"that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists
for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appetency."
We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters
of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the
Sceptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgement
on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which
false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions
of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgement;
and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state
of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines that
anything is by nature good or bad is forever being disquieted: when he
is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented
by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he
thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more
perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in
his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing
the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines
nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything
eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have
befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse
and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful
that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which
he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced
the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining
quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects
of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended
judgement; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon
their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however,
suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled
by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is old at times and thirsty,
and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas
ordinary people are afflicted by two circumstances, namely, by the affections
themselves and in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions
are evil by nature, the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in
the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less
discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the
Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate
affection." But some notable Sceptics have added the further definition
"suspension of judgement in investigations."
Chapter 13. Of the General Modes Leading to Suspension
of Judgment
Now that we have been saying that tranquillity follows on suspension of
judgement, it will be our next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension.
Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things
in opposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of
thought to objects of thought or alternando. For instance, we oppose
appearances when we say "The same tower appears round from a distance,
but square from close at hand"; and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer
to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly
bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare
well, and draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist.
And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras countered the
notion that snow is white with the argument, "Snow is frozen water, and
water is black; therefore snow also is black." With a different idea we
oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing
examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when
someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say
to him in reply, "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School
to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound
theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible
that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already really
existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to
yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."
But in order that we may have a more exact understanding of these antitheses
I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgement is brought about,
but without making any positive assertion regarding either their number
or their validity; for it is possible that they may be unsound or there
may be more of them than I shall enumerate.
Chapter 14. Concerning the Ten Modes
The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is that the "modes" by which
"suspension" is supposed to be brought about are ten in number; and they
also give them the synonymous names of "arguments" and "positions." They
are these: the first, based on the variety in animals; the second, on the
differences in human beings; the third, on the different structures of
the organs of sense; the fourth, on the circumstantial conditions; the
fifth, on positions and intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures;
the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects;
the eighth, on the fact of relativity; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity
of occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the
legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions. This order, however, we
adopt without prejudice.