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In general, what is evil? From what source does it subsist? In which beings is it? How did the good will to produce it? How was such a will possible? If evil is from another cause than the good, what cause is there for beings beside the good? How is there evil if there is providence? How does evil come to be at all? Why is it not destroyed? Finally, how does any being desire it instead of the good?
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Such questions as these will perhaps be raised in a perplexed discourse. But we demand that one look away from such a discourse into the truth of the matter. Thus we shall at first say this freely and boldly. Evil is not from the good; if something is from the good, it is not evil. As what is cold does not bring forth fire, what is not good does not bring forth what is good. Now it is the nature of the good to produce and to conserve while that of evil is to destroy and to ruin. Thus if all beings are from the good, no being is from evil. Indeed, evil itself will not be, for it would be evil to itself.
If this is not so, evil will not be wholly evil but will have some aspect of the good according to which it is able to be at all. Further, if all beings desire the good and beautiful, if all these produce whatever they produce through producing what appears good, and if the intention of beings has the good as its source and end—for no being focuses on the nature of evil to produce what it produces—how will evil be in beings or be produced from such a good desire? Now if all beings are from the good and the good is beyond all beings, then that which is not is in the good. Thus, evil is neither be-in" (if not, [evil is] not wholly evil) nor not be-in" (for, nothing will be wholly non be-in" unless it is said to be in the good according to what is beyond being). The good lies beyond and is much prior to what simply is and what is not. Evil is neither in what is nor in what is not. Rather, it has a greater absence and estrangement from the good than what is not; it is more greatly without being than what is not.
"But when, then, is evil?" someone will say. "For if there is no evil, both virtue and vice will be the same in whole and, by analogy, in part and what wars against virtue will not be evil. Nonetheless, temperance and intemperance are opposed and justice and injustice are opposed. I speak not only of just or unjust persons or temperate or intemperate persons. For even before the outward manifestation of their difference there is the much earlier opposition in the soul itself, in which the vices have already warred against the virtues, and the passions have already revolted against the logos. From these considerations some evil necessarily shows itself to be opposed to the good. For the good is not opposed to itself, but since it is from one source and has come to be from one cause, it rejoices in communion, unity and friendship. Further, the lesser good is not opposed to the greater good, just as lower heat or less cold are not opposed to greater heat or cold. Thus, evil is in beings and is be-in"; it is placed against and is opposed to the good. If evil is a destruction of beings this does not remove evil from being but it will itself be be-in" and generative of beings. For does not the destruction of one being frequently come to be the genesis of this other being? Thus evil contributes to the completion of all that is and provides through itself non-imperfection to the whole.
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About these charges the true logos responds that evil as evil in no way produces being or genesis but only makes bad and destroys the subsistence of beings as far as it is able. But if someone says that evil is generative of beings and that by the destruction of one being genesis is given to another, one must respond truly that, as destructive, evil does not give genesis or being but that destruction and evil only destroys and makes bad. For genesis and being come to be through the good. Thus evil is destructive through itself but generative through the good. Evil as evil is neither be-in" nor productive of beings; through the good it is good, be-in", and productive of what is good. Or, to put the matter another way, the same thing is not both good and evil in the same respect; the same power—whether itself a power or a destruction—will not be both productive and generative of the same thing in the same respect. Evil itself is neither be-in", good, nor generative or productive of beings or what is good.
Now in those beings in which it comes to be complete, the good produces complete, unmixed, and whole goods. However, those which participate in less of it are non-complete and mixed goods through their lack of the good. Evil is neither good nor productive of good, but those which draw more or less near to the good will be analogically good. Further, the all-complete goodness wanders through all beings; it does not extend merely to the completely good beings about it but it stretches itself down to the last of beings. It is wholly present to some, present in a diminished fashion to others, and in the extreme it is present to others as each is able to partake of it. Thus some beings partake wholly of the good, some are more or less deprived of it, some have a share of the good in a more inferior manner, and to others, which are the last among beings, the good is present as an echo. For if the good were not analogically present to each, then the most divine and eldest beings would have the order of the least among beings. But how would it be possible for all to uniformly partake in the good since not all are enabled to partake in the whole of it in the same way?
Now this is the exceeding greatness of the power of the good: it empowers both those which are deprived of it and the privation of itself toward the whole participation of itself. And if it is necessary to speak the truth freely and clearly, those which war against it do and are able to do battle against it by its power. Hence to speak in a comprehensive fashion: all beings, in whatever way they are, are and are good and are from the good. Insofar as they are deprived of the good they are neither good nor being. For with respect to other conditions such as heat or cold, there are those which are heated and those losing heat; further, many beings are without life and intellect. Even God is apart from being and "is" beyond every manner of being. And simply, with respect to everything else, there are many beings which are able to subsist, yet which have abandoned or have not achieved their own condition. But that which is deprived from the good in every respect was, is, will be, or is able to be in no manner whatsoever.
Thus the intemperate person who lacks the good by his irrational desires neither is nor desires what is; yet he shares the good according to the obscure echo of his unity and friendship. Even anger partakes of the good, for through its movement and desire it directs and returns what seems to be evil to what seems to be good. Moreover, even those who desire the worst life still desire life and what seems best to them; thus, they partake in the good by their very desire, their desire for life, and their search for [what seems to them to be] the best life.
If the good were wholly annihilated there would be neither being, life, desire, motion, or anything else. Hence the genesis which emerges from destruction is not a power of evil but is the presence of a lesser good. In this respect, disease is a lack of order, but not of every order. For if this were so the disease itself would not subsist; yet the disease is and it abides by having being with the least possible order. Nevertheless, it subsists along with the order.
That which is wholly apart from the good, is neither be-in" nor in beings. But that which is a mixed good is in beings on account of the good; thus it is be-in" and is in beings by partaking of the good. Hence all beings will be more or less insofar as they partake of the good. For even with respect to being itself, that which is in no manner whatever will not be. But that which somehow is, somehow is not. Insofar as it has fallen away from what always is, it is not. Insofar as it partakes in be-in", it is and its whole being and non be-in" are protected and preserved.
Evil, that which has entirely fallen from the good, will not be in those which are more or less good. But that which is somehow good—thus, somehow not good—wars against some beings that are good but not against the whole good. It is protected by its participation in the good, for the good gives being to the privation of itself [with a view] towards the whole participation of itself. Given the complete absence of the good, nothing will be good, mixed or even evil itself. For if evil is non-complete good and the complete absence of the good would involve the absence of both mixed and complete goods, then evil will be and be seen only in respect to those to which it is opposed, and will be removed from others as good. For it is impossible for the same things in the same respect to war against one another in every respect.
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Evil is not be-in" nor in beings. For if all beings are from the good and the good is in all beings and encompasses all, then evil will not be in beings; it will not be in the good; nor will it be destructive through the good. (For, clearly, evil will no more be in the good than cold is in fire.) Yet if this were so, how would evil be in the good? It is impossible and absurd that evil be from the good. For as the writings say, "a good tree does not bring forth evil fruit"; clearly, the opposite is not so. But if evil is not from the good, it is evident that it is from another source and cause. For either evil will be from the good or the good will be from evil. If this is not possible, then evil and the good will be from some other source and cause. However, no dyed is a source; for the source of every dyed is one. Nevertheless, it is absurd that before being "are" two which are completely opposed and that these are from one and the same; for this source would not be simple and one but opposed to itself, so that it would become other than itself.
Also it is clearly not possible for there to be two opposed sources of beings warring against one another and all beings. If this were so, God would be neither at rest nor separated from dispute, for something would be an adversary to him. Further, everything would be without order and always at war. Yet the good gives a share of friendship and peace itself to all beings; these gifts of peace are celebrated by the sacred writings. Wherefore, everything that is good is friendly, and harmonious, a descendant of one life, ordered together toward one life, and are like and gentle and agreeable with one another.
Evil is not in God nor is evil divine. Evil is not from God; for either God is not good or he is good-producing and productive of good things. Now God does not sometimes produce what is good and at other times not produce what is good, nor does God not produce all that is good. For this would bring change and otherness in God in regard to causality which is the most divine of all. But if the good constitution is in God then when he changes from the good he will sometimes be and at other times not be. Further if God participates in the good and derives this participation from another, he will sometimes have it and at other times not have it. Thus evil is not from God nor in God, neither simply nor temporally.
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To speak in a summary fashion: the good is from one whole cause; evil is from many partial defects. God knows evil as good and with God the causes of evils are good-producing powers. But if evil is everlasting, creates, has power, is, and acts, whence does it obtain these? For either they are from the good or the good is from evil or they are both from other causes.
All that is in conformity with nature comes to be
from defined causes. But if nature is without cause and undefined, it is
not by nature. For that contrary to nature [does not come to be] by nature
any more than what is contrary to art [comes to be] by art. But is not
the soul the cause of evils, just as fire is the cause of what is hot,
so that whatever comes in contact with it is full of evils? Is the nature
of the soul good but does it not sometimes act in one manner and sometimes
in another? But if the being and nature of the soul are evil, whence does
it obtain these except from the good creative cause of the totality of
what is? But if the soul is from this how is it evil in being? For all
that is good is descended from the good creative cause. But if it is evil
in its activities, this is not unchangeable. For if not, from whence does
it obtain its virtues unless it itself has come to be good formed? Thus
it remains that evil is a weakness and lack of the good.