PROSLOGION (in part)
From
M.J. Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).
CHAPTER 2
That God truly exists
Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may
understand, as much as You see fit, that You exist as we believe You to
exist, and that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that
You are something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or can it
be that a thing of such a nature does not exist, since "the Fool has said
in his heart, there is no God" (Ps. xiii. I, lii. 1 )? But surely, when
this same Fool hears what I am speaking about, namely, "something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought,"
he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind, even
if he does not understand that it actually exists. For it is one thing
for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand that
an object actually exists. Thus, when a painter plans beforehand what he
is going to execute, he has [the picture] in his mind, but he does not
yet think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. However,
when he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands
that it exists because he has now made it. Even the Fool, then, is forced
to agree that something-than-which-nothing-greatercan-be-thought exists
in the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is
understood is in the mind. And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought
cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even,
it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-agreater-cannot-be-thought
exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible.
Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
exists both in the mind and in reality.
CHAPTER 3
That God cannot be thought not to exist
And certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot be even thought
not to exist. For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought
not to exist, and this is greater than that which can be thought not to
exist. Hence, if that-than-which-a -greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought
not to exist, then that-than-which-a-greatercannot-be-thought is not the
same as that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, which is absurd. Something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
exists so truly then, that it cannot be even thought not to exist. And
You, Lord our God, are this being. You exist so truly, Lord my God, that
You cannot even be thought not to exist. And this is as it should be, for
if some intelligence could think of something better than You, the creature
would be above its creator and would judge its creator-and that is completely
absurd. In fact, everything else there is, except You alone, can be thought
of as not existing. You alone, then, of all things most truly exist and
therefore of all things possess existence to the highest degree; for anything
else does not exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lesser degree.
Why then did "the Fool say in his heart, there is no God" (Ps. xiii. 1,
lii. 1) when it is so evident to any rational mind that You of all things
exist to the highest degree? Why indeed, unless because he was stupid and
a fool?
CHAPTER 4
How "the Fool said in his heart" what cannot be thought
How indeed has he "said in his heart" what he could not think; or how could
he not think what he "said in his heart," since to "say in one's heart"
and to "think" are the same? But if he really (indeed, since he really)
both thought because he "said in his heart" and did not "say in his heart"
because he could not think, there is not only one sense in which something
is "said in one's heart" or thought. For in one sense a thing is thought
when the word signifying it is thought; in another sense when the very
object which the thing is is understood. In the first sense, then, God
can be thought not to exist, but not at all in the second sense. No one,
indeed, understanding what God is can think that God does not exist, even
though he may say these words in his heart either without any [objective]
signification or with some peculiar signification. For God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.
Whoever really understands this understands clearly that this same being
so exists that not even in thought can it not exist. Thus whoever understands
that God exists in such a way cannot think of Him as not existing.
I give thanks, good Lord, I give thanks to You, since what I believed
before through Your free gift I now so understand through Your illumination,
that if I did not want to believe that You existed, I should nevertheless
be unable not to understand it.
GAUNILO AND ANSELM: DEBATE
Gaunilo
That, however, [this nature] necessarily exists in reality is demonstrated
to me from the fact that, unless it existed, whatever exists in reality
would be greater than it and consequently it would not be that which is
greater than everything that undoubtedly had already been proved to exist
in the mind. To this I reply as follows: if something that cannot even
be thought in the true and real sense must be said to exist in the mind,
then I do not deny that this also exists in my mind in the same way. But
since from this one cannot in any way conclude that it exists also in reality.
I certainly do not yet concede that it actually exists, until this is proved
to me by an indubitable argument. For he who claims that it actually exists
because otherwise it would not be that which is greater than everything
does not consider carefully enough whom he is addressing. For I certainly
do not yet admit this greater [than everything] to be any truly existing
thing; indeed I doubt or even deny it. And I do not concede that it exists
in a different way from that- if one ought to speak of "existence" here-when
the mind tries to imagine a completely unknown thing on the basis of the
spoken words alone. How then can it be proved to me on that basis that
that which is greater than everything truly exists in reality (because
it is evident that it is greater than all others) if I keep on denying
and also doubting that this is evident and do not admit that this greater
[than everything] is either m my mind or thought, not even in the sense
in which many doubtfully real and unreal things are? It must first of all
be proved to me then that this same greater than everything truly exists
in reality somewhere, and then only will the fact that it is greater than
everything make it clear that it also subsists in itself.
Anselm
I said further that if a thing exists even in the mind alone, it can be
thought to exist also in reality, which is greater. If, then, it (namely,
"that-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought") exists in the mind alone,
it is something than which a greater can be thought. What, I ask you, could
be more logical'? For if it exists even in the mind alone, cannot it be
thought to exist also in reality? And if it can [be so thought], is it
not the case that he who thinks this thinks of something greater than it,
if it exists in the mind alone? What, then, could follow more logically
than that, if "that-than-which-a-greatercannot-be-thought" exists in the
mind alone, it is the same as that-than-which-a-greatercan-be-thought?
But surely "that-than-which-a-greater-cun-be-thought" is not for any mind
[the same as] "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought." Does it not
follow, then, that "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought," if it
exists in anyone's mind, does not exist in the mind alone? For if it exists
in the mind alone, it is that-than-whicha-greater-can-be-thought, which
is absurd.
It is evident, moreover, that in the same way one can think of and
understand that which cannot not exist. And one who thinks of this thinks
of something greater than one who thinks of what can not exist. When, therefore,
one thinks of that-than-which-agreater-cannot-be-thought, if one thinks
of what can not exist, one does not think of that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.
Now the same thing cannot at the same time be thought of and not thought
of. For this reason he who thinks of that-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
does not think of something that can not exist but something that cannot
not exist. Therefore what he thinks of exists necessarily, since whatever
can not exist is not what he thinks of.
Gaunilo
They say that there is in the ocean somewhere an island which' because
of the difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of finding that which does
not exist, some have called the "Lost Island." And the story goes that
it is blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance,
much more even than the Happy Isles, and, having no owner or inhabitant,
it is superior everywhere in abundance of riches to all those other lands
that men inhabit. Now, if anyone tells me that it is like this, I shall
easily understand what is said, since nothing is difficult about it. But
if he should then go on to say, as though it were a logical consequence
of this: You cannot any more doubt that this island that is more excellent
than all other lands truly exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt
that it is in your mind; and since it is more excellent to exist not only
in the mind alone but also in reality therefore it must needs be that it
exists. For if it did not exist, any other land existing in reality would
be more excellent than it, and so this island, already conceived by you
to be more excellent than others, will not be more excellent. If, I say,
someone wishes thus to persuade me that this island really exists beyond
all doubt, I should either think that he was joking, or I should find it
hard to decide which of us I ought to judge the bigger fool-I, if I agreed
with him, or he, if he thought that he had proved the existence of this
island with any certainty, unless he had first convinced me that its very
excellence exists in my mind precisely as a thing existing truly and indubitably
and not just as something unreal or doubtfully real.
Anselm
You claim, however, that this is as though someone asserted that it cannot
be doubted that a certain island in the ocean (which is more fertile than
all other lands and which, because of the difficulty or even the impossibility
of discovering what does not exist, is called the "Lost Island") truly
exists in reality since anyone easily understands it when it is described
in words. Now, I truly promise that if anyone should discover for me something
existing either in reality or in the mind alone-except "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought"-to
which the logic of my argument would apply, then I shall find that Lost
Island and give it, never more to be lost. to that person.
Gaunilo
If then someone should assert [to the Fool in Proslogium III] that this
greater [than everything] is such that it cannot be thought not to exist
(again without any other proof than that otherwise it would not be greater
than everything), then he could make this same reply and say: When have
I said that there truly existed some being that is "greater than everything,"
such that from this it could be proved to me that this same being really
existed to such a degree that it could not be thought not to exist? That
is why it must first be conclusively proved by argument that there is some
higher nature, namely that which is greater and better than all the things
that are, so that from this we can also infer everything else which necessarily
cannot be wanting to what is greater and better than everything.
Anselm
It has already been clearly seen, however, that "that-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought"
cannot be thought not to exist, because it exists as a matter of such certain
truth. Otherwise it would not exist at all. In short, if anyone says that
he thinks that this being does not exist, I reply that, when he thinks
of this, either he thinks of something than which a greater cannot be thought,
or he does not think of it. If he does not think of it, then he does not
think that what he does not think of does not exist. If, however, he does
think of it, then indeed he thinks of something which cannot be even thought
not to exist. For if it could be thought not to exist, it could be thought
to have a beginning and an end-but this cannot be. Thus, he who thinks
of it thinks of something that cannot be thought not to exist; indeed,
he who thinks of this does not think of it as not existing, otherwise he
would think what cannot be thought. Therefore "that-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought"
cannot be thought not to exist.
Gaunilo
When, however, it is said that this supreme being cannot be thought not
to exist, it would perhaps be better to say that it cannot be understood
not to exist nor even to be able not to exist. For, strictly speaking,
unreal things cannot be understood, though certainly they can be thought
of in the same way as the Fool thought that God does not exist. I know
with complete certainty that I exist, but I also know at the same time
nevertheless that I can not-exist. And I understand without any doubt that
that which exists to the highest degree, namely God, both exists and cannot
not exist. I do not know, however, whether I can think of myself as not
existing while I know with absolute certainty that I do exist; but if I
can, why cannot [I do the same] with regard to anything else I know with
the same certainty? If however I cannot, this will not be the distinguishing
characteristic of God [namely, to be such that He cannot be thought not
to exist].
Anselm
You say, moreover, that when it is said that this supreme reality cannot
be thought not to exist, it would perhaps be better to say that it cannot
be understood not to exist or even to be able not to exist. However, it
must rather be said that it cannot be thought.
For if I had said that the thing in question could not be understood
not to exist, perhaps you yourself (who claim that we cannot understand-if
this word is to be taken strictly-things that are unreal) would object
that nothing that exists can be understood not to exist. For it is false
[to say that] what exists does not exist, so that it is not the distinguishing
characteristic of God not to be able to be understood not to exist. But,
if any of those things which exist with absolute certainty can be understood
not to exist, in the same way other things that certainly exist can be
understood not to exist. But, if the matter is carefully considered, this
objection cannot be made apropos [the term] "thought." For even if none
of those things that exist can be understood not to exist, all however
can be thought as not existing, save that which exists to a supreme degree.
For in fact all those things (and they alone) that have a beginning or
end or are made up of parts and, as I have already said, all those things
that do not exist as a whole in a particular place or at a particular time
can be thought as not existing. Only that being in which there is neither
beginning nor end nor conjunction of parts, and that thought does not discern
save as a whole in every place and at every time, cannot be thought as
not existing.
Know then that you can think of yourself as not existing while yet you
are absolutely sure that you exist. I am astonished that you have said
that you do not know this. For we think of many things that we know to
exist, as not existing; and [we think of] many things that we know not
to exist, as existing-not judging that it is really as we think but imagining
it to be so. We can, in fact, think of something as not existing while
knowing that it does exist, since we can [think of] the one and know the
other at the same time. And we cannot think of something as not existing
if yet we know that it does exist, since we cannot think of it as existing
and not existing at the same time. He, therefore, who distinguishes these
two senses of this assertion will understand that [in one sense] nothing
can be thought as not existing while yet it is known to exist, and that
[in another sense] whatever exists, save that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought,
can be thought of as not existing even when we know that it does exist.
Thus it is that, on the one hand, it is the distinguishing characteristic
of God that He cannot be thought of as not existing [in the one sense],
and that, on the other hand, many things, the while they do exist, cannot
be thought of as not existing [in the other sense]. In what sense, however,
one can say that God can be thought of as not existing I think I have adequately
explained in my tract.